Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Fulgenzi was prescribed the generic drug metoclopramide (FDA approved in 1980), sold originally under the brand name Reglan, a drug approved for short-term treatment of patients suffering from gastroesophageal reflux disease. In her suit, claiming failure to adequately warn of risks, she alleged that taking the drug caused her to develop tardive dyskinesia, an often-irreversible neurological disorder that causes involuntary movements, especially of the lower face. In 2009, the Supreme Court held that with respect to branded drug manufacturers, state failure-to-warn suits were not preempted by the federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act , 21 U.S.C. 301. In 2011 the Court held that such suits could not go forward against generic drug manufacturers, as it is impossible to comply simultaneously with their state duty to adequately warn and their federal duty of sameness (federal law requires generic drug labels to be the same as their branded counterpart). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that after the branded-drug manufacturer of metoclopramide strengthened warnings on its label, the generic manufacturer failed to update its label as required by federal law, rendering compliance with both federal and state duties no longer impossible. View "Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc." on Justia Law

While working at a Ford Motor plant, Rudisill was hit in the face by a piece of equipment, was knocked against a wall, fell to the floor, and rolled forward through the floor opening into the hot pit below. He lay there unconscious, being burned, until coworkers pulled him out of the pit. Rudisill had gained consciousness by this time and was screaming in pain. Rudisill sustained a head injury that required several staples to close. He was also burned on his arms and legs, abdomen, and left hand. Rudisill continues to experience pain, dizzy spells, ringing in the ears, and memory problems. He has had numerous surgeries and has undergone physical and occupational therapy. After a safety review immediately following the incident, Ford decided to modify the process so that employees slide metal grates over the pit before removing the guard rails. After receiving workers’ compensation benefits, Rudisill sued Ford, alleging intentional tort; his wife asserted a derivative claim of loss of consortium. The district court granted summary judgment for Ford. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding insufficient evidence that Ford acted with deliberate intent to injure Rudisill, as required by Ohio statute. View "Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Quigley was 23 years old, with no known life-threatening physical conditions when he was transferred from one Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) facility to an MDOC guidance center, where he was under the care of CMS, a service provider with which MDOC contracted. CMS employees Dr. Thai and physician’s assistant Garver treated Quigley for moderate depression and prescribed medications. After about a month, Quigley was found dead in his cell. The medication chart confirmed that Quigley had been administered both Amitriptyline and Trazodone the previous three days. The autopsy report concluded that Quigley died of an epileptic seizure disorder. Quigley’s estate obtained affidavits from a forensic pathologist, who concluded that Quigley likely died from a fatal drug interaction between the tricyclic Amitriptyline and tetracyclic Trazodone and from a psychiatrist, who similarly concluded that the fatal drug interaction likely killed Quigley. Thai provided three medical-expert affidavits, all concluding that the best explanation for Quigley’s death is epileptic seizure. Quigley’s estate sued Thai, Garver, and CMS under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied a motion asserting qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that there were unresolved material questions of fact concerning the cause of death. View "Quigley v. Thai" on Justia Law

The Fund, a multi-employer pension plan under ERISA, has a Plan, providing for administration by a Board with authority to make benefit determinations and amend the Plan, including retroactively. No amendment may result in reduced benefits for any participant whose rights have vested, except in specified circumstances. Price began receiving Plan disability benefits under the “Total and Permanent Disability Benefit” category in 1990, after work-related injuries left him unable to work. In 2001, the Fund notified Price that he no longer qualified for benefits under this category, but that he could continue receiving benefits under provisions for “Occupational Disability Benefit.” His benefits were discontinued after 2006, according to an Amendment. Price became eligible for early retirement in 2012. The Board rejected an appeal. The district court granted Price judgment in his suit under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). On remand from the Sixth Circuit, for review determination of vesting under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the judge again ruled in favor of Price. The Sixth Circuit again reversed; the court failed to look to the terms of the plan but instead found that because the Board’s decision letter did not discuss whether the benefits vested, the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. View "Price v. Bd. of Trs. of IN Laborers' Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Stoudemire, then age 23, entered the Michigan Department of Corrections system in 2002, suffering from systemic lupus erythematosus, a chronic, painful autoimmune disease; hypercoagulapathy, a related disorder involving tendency to develop blood clots; and depression. Stoudemire bore a significant risk of experiencing kidney and liver damage, heart attacks, amputations, and chronic pain. Stoudemire’s health quickly deteriorated. She experienced a heart attack, liver failure, and life-threatening embolisms. She underwent three amputations, losing both legs below the knee. At her 2007 parole, she suffered from chronic depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and conditions related to medications. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132; and Michigan law, Stoudemire, alleged that she was placed in a segregation unit following her amputation that lacked accommodations for disabled persons, and was subjected to a strip search that served no legitimate purpose. The district court denied motions by the warden and an officer, seeking summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit vacated with respect to the warden, stating that the court did not adequately analyze deliberate indifference, but affirmed with respect to the officer, stating that the excessively invasive nature of the search outweighed any need to conduct it. View "Stoudemire v. MI Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Dorothy resided at the Landing assisted living facility from 2001 until 2007. She was 80 years old in 2007. She had Parkinson’s disease, dementia, and had suffered a stroke in 2001. She had no history of diabetes or hypoglycemia. She was able to groom herself, use the restroom, walk with a walker, and feed herself. An employee discovered Dorothy in an unresponsive state in her room. She spent 15 months in a semicomatose state before dying. Her son sued for negligence, violation of Ohio’s Patients’ Bill of Rights (OH Rev Code 3721.17), and wrongful death. He alleged that employees mistakenly gave Dorothy antidiabetic medication, which caused hypoglycemia and resulted in permanent brain dysfunction. Because he could not prove exactly how Dorothy received the medication, he requested a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur, which the district court gave. The jury awarded $680,000 in compensatory damages and $1,250,000 in punitive damages, plus attorney fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to jury instructions on res ipsa and punitive damages and rejected a claim of judicial bias, but remanded with instructions to reduce the punitive damages award to $800,000. View "Freudeman v. Landing of Canton" on Justia Law

Watts began working for UPS in 1990; in 2000 she injured her back while unloading her truck. She was diagnosed with acute back strain and placed on medical leave. Watts was awarded Temporary Total Disability (TTD) payments, including medical treatment, and did not return to work for two years. In 2002 a doctor reported that Watts had reached “maximum medical improvement,” as defined by the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and was ready for gradual return to normal work in a restricted time frame. UPS terminated Watts’s TTD payments. UPS had a light-duty work program, Temporary Alternative Work. Typical tasks included answering phones, pumping gas, and washing cars. Watts was rejected from the program. UPS claims that Watts was not qualified for the program under the collective bargaining agreement. Watts’s claims have gone to trial three times and been appealed once before. Most recently the district court granted UPS judgment as a matter of law on grounds that Watts’s claim was preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, and was untimely under the six-month limitations period. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that section 301 does not preempt an Americans with Disabilities Act claim in federal court. View "Teresa Watts v. United Parcel Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are five pension funds operated by the State of Ohio for public employees that invested hundreds of millions of dollars in 308 mortgage-backed securities (MBS) between 2005 and 2008, all of which received a “AAA” or equivalent credit rating from one of the three major credit-rating agencies. The value of MBS collapsed during this period, leaving the Funds with estimated losses of $457 million. The Funds sued under Ohio’s “blue sky” laws and a common-law theory of negligent misrepresentation, alleging that the Agencies’ ratings were false and misleading and that the Funds’ reasonable reliance on those ratings caused their losses. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Even if a credit rating can serve as an actionable misrepresentation, the Agencies owed no duty to the Funds and the Funds’ allegations of bad business practices did not establish a reasonable inference of wrongdoing View "OH Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Hensley worked in various capacities as a coal miner at various times between 1972 and 1988. He also smoked half a pack of cigarettes every day for at least 10 years. From 1990 to 2010, Hensley sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901. In 2010, after two rejections, an ALJ concluded that Hensley suffered from a disabling form of pneumoconiosis caused by his jobs in the coal mines and awarded him benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the ALJ failed to account for relevant record material, relying solely on x-ray evidence, while other evidence cut the other way, permitting a finding that Hensley does not suffer from pneumoconiosis. The biopsy of Hensley’s lungs came back negative, CT scans may have been inconclusive, and several physicians testified against an award of benefits. View "Dixie Fuel Co., LLC v. Dir. Office of Workers' Comp. Programs" on Justia Law

Kohl, a certified bomb technician, participated in an experiment funded by the U.S. Department of Defense at the Tennessee State Fire Academy, which involved constructing and detonating explosives in vehicles and collecting post-blast debris for analysis. Officers of the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives participated. Following detonation, after an “all-clear” was given, participants, including Kohl, entered the range to inspect the vehicles. Kohl searched the passenger’s side, while another technician attempted to search the driver’s side of the vehicle. The driver’s side door would not open. While other team members were preparing to winch the door a second time, Kohl returned to the passenger’s side door. Kohl’s negligence complaint alleged that due to the winching, the door came loose and the frame crashed into Kohl’s head. Kohl was diagnosed with “post-concussive syndrome with persistent headaches and cognitive changes” and has not been employed since the incident. Relying on the discretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671, the district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the government’s decisions about how to extract evidence and what types of equipment to use are shielded from liability by the exception. View "Kohl v. United States" on Justia Law