Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Watson’s father, Hickle, worked for the Department of Energy, 1954 to 1962. Hickle died of Hodgkin’s disease in 1964. Congress enacted the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act in 2000 to compensate for illnesses caused by exposure to radiation and other toxic substances while working for the Department of Energy. Covered employees or eligible survivors may receive compensation in a lump sum payment; under specific circumstances, a covered employee’s child is also eligible, 42 U.S.C. 7385s-3(d)(2). When her father died, Watson was 19 years old, not a full-time student; she lived with her parents, worked as a waitress, relied on her parents for support, and was listed as a dependent on their income tax returns. She sought survivor benefits in 2002 and received a lump-sum payment of $150,000. She later claimed further compensation as a “covered child,” under a different section of the Act, arguing that she was “incapable of self-support” at the time of Hickle’s death. The Department of Labor denied her claim. Before the district court, Watson challenged the interpretation of “incapable of self-support,” claiming that the Department impermissibly required a showing of physical or mental incapability. The district court denied her motion for summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Watson v. Solis" on Justia Law

Banks worked as a coal miner for 17 years and smoked about one pack of cigarettes per day for 38 years. His employment ended in 1991. After two unsuccessful attempts, in 2003, Banks filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, which provides benefits to coal miners who become disabled due to pneumoconiosis, 30 U.S.C. 901. An ALJ found that Banks had shown a change in his condition and that he suffered from legal pneumoconiosis which substantially contributed to his total disability. Banks was awarded benefits and the Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, adopting the regulatory interpretation urged by the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. The ALJ relied on reasoned medical opinions.

Ronske’s widow sued Heil after a dump truck body it manufactured caused Ronske’s death. Heil held a commercial general liability policy. Evanston insured the first $1 million loss in excess of $500,000 self-insured retention. Heil was required to defend, investigate, and accept any reasonable settlement offer within the SIR; Evanston could choose to assume charge of defense and settlement. Heil retained attorney Pelini. After more than two years, Evanston wanted to assume defense and appointed Sutter, with Pelini to remain involved. Pelini’s fees would count toward exhaustion of the SIR, and Evanston would pay Pelini’s fees in excess of the SIR. The parties settled for $5,711,000. Evanston paid $1 million, leaving Heil responsible for $4,711,000 and $63,533.79 in fees and costs in excess of its SIR. Evanston declined to pay fees and costs. A jury found that Evanston breached the contract and refused in bad faith to pay amounts owed under the policy, but did not fail to settle the wrongful death action in bad faith, awarded Heil compensatory damages plus prejudgment interest for breach of contract, $15,883.44 in statutory damages for bad faith refusal to pay, and $2 million punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit vacated the $2 million punitive damages award, but affirmed the finding of liability under state law.

Deputy Dugle's police cruiser was struck by a Norfolk train as he left firearms training at the county range. Dugle spent 11 days in a coma, suffered broken bones, and incurred traumatic brain injury. The range is accessible by a gravel drive that crosses a farm and the tracks. There is no evidence that the county maintains the drive; it is not shown on the official map. Despite signs instructing crews to sound the horn on both approaches the crew failed to do so. Dugle had slowed as he approached the crossbuck sign with the words "railroad" and "crossing," but the parties dispute by how much and when. A camera on the train demonstrates that the cruiser was visible to the crew for about 4.25 seconds before impact. Norfolk claimed that it maintains its 30-foot right-of-way in compliance with Kentucky law and that any obstructions were on private property. The district court granted summary judgment for Norfolk, holding that the crossing was not ultrahazardous because Dugle could have avoided the collision by stopping at the sign. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that no Kentucky case has concluded that sight lines of over 400 feet indicated that a crossing is safe as a matter of law.

In 2005, plaintiff’s car collided with a train owned by defendant. The train was stopped on the tracks in Louisville, Kentucky, blocking a crossing. Plaintiff never hit her brakes and slammed into the side of the red boxcar at 40 to 45 miles per hour. She survived the crash, claimed that warning lights were not flashing and that she never saw the train until the instant before the impact, and sued in state court for negligence and failure to comply with the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. 421, and other federal laws, including 49 U.S.C. 20134, by failing to properly maintain, employ, use and install proper warning devices and procedures at railway crossings. Defendant removed the case to federal court, where it was granted summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit vacated for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Although plaintiff never moved for remand, courts are required to consider jurisdiction. The cited federal regulations do not create or imply a cause of action.

Stryker, a manufacturer of medical devices, sued its umbrella insurer XL, seeking coverage for claims stemming from the implantation of expired artificial knees. The dispute concerned the precise "defect" that triggers batch coverage under the Medical Products Endorsement. The district court held that XL was liable under the policy for the entirety of Stryker’s losses on both direct claims brought against Stryker, as well as claims brought against Pfizer that Stryker was obligated to reimburse under an asset purchase agreement. The court found that the items were defective if they were available in Stryker’s inventory for implantation by physicians beyond their shelf-life of five years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed XL’s liability for the full amount of Stryker’s losses and pre-judgment interest. XL’s payment to Pfizer applies to exhaust the policy with respect to the direct claims. The court reversed the holding that the aggregate limit of liability of the XL policy does not apply to the judgments on the direct claims and remanded for determination of what portion, if any, of the total liability for those judgments beyond $15 million represents consequential damages as defined under Michigan contract law.

TIG issued a $25 million excess policy to Stryker, a manufacturer of medical devices. Coverage attached above the underlying (XL) umbrella policy, with a limit of $15 million. Stryker sued XL, seeking defense and indemnification for claims related to replacement knees (first suit). Pfizer then sued Stryker, seeking indemnification with respect to claims based on Uni-Knees; the companies had an asset purchase agreement. The court ruled in favor of Pfizer. When XL denied coverage, Stryker sued both insurers. In 2008, the district court held that XL was liable for all of Stryker's liabilities with respect to both suits and also granted declaratory judgment against TIG. XL settled directly with Pfizer, and obtained a ruling that this satisfied its obligations. TIG moved to remove the declaratory judgment ruling, arguing that the ruling that XL was responsible with respect to both suits made it impossible to subject TIG to liability. The district court denied this motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the case is not moot, noting that the claims may exhaust the XL policy; reversed a ruling that TIG is precluded from raising coverage defenses on remand, noting that TIG was not a party to the first suit; and remanded.

Plaintiff began experiencing severe headaches and swelling in his left eye in 2007 while incarcerated. Shortly after his release, plaintiff was diagnosed with Ewing’s Sarcoma, a serious form of bone cancer. According to plaintiff, surgery would have been sufficient to treat the disease had prison staff detected it earlier. However, due to the late diagnosis, chemotherapy and radiation are now necessary. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court held that plaintiff pled sufficient facts upon which one could draw the inference that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment and committed medical malpractice. The doctor and nurse filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that their involvement with plaintiff was minimal and cannot form the basis for a finding of deliberate indifference or gross negligence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the defendants entitled to qualified immunity. Neither negligent medical care, nor delay in providing medical care, can rise to the level of a constitutional violation absent specific allegations of sufficiently harmful acts or omissions reflecting deliberate indifference.

About four years after a driver, insured by State Farm, collided with Phelps’s car and caused a spine injury that required surgery, Phelps filed suit, alleging that State Farm violated Kentucky’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm on the ground that Phelps had failed to show that the three years taken to settle her claim raised a genuine dispute as to whether State Farm had acted in bad faith. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting State Farm’s low initial offer, extensive delays, four transfers to new adjusters, and prolonged refusal to disclose policy limits.

In 2004, plaintiff had arthroscopic surgery to treat pain and instability in his shoulder joint. The doctor implanted a pain-pump catheter and, over the next two days, a Stryker pain pump delivered a regular dose of a local anesthetic, bupivicaine, to the joint. Plaintiff’s condition improved after surgery but worsened over time, and in 2008 he learned he no longer had any cartilage remaining in his shoulder, a condition called chondrolysis. He sued, alleging strict liability, negligence and breach of warranty. The district court concluded that Stryker could not reasonably have known about the risk of chondrolysis in 2004 and thus had no duty to warn of the risk and held that Plaintiff failed as a matter of law to prove causation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not present any evidence that Stryker knew or should have known that the use was dangerous or that a warning on Stryker's pain pump would have caused the doctor not to use the device in his joint space.