Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

OneBeacon and AMICO were insurers of the B.F. Goodrich and, among others, were liable for environmental cleanup at the Goodrich plant in Calvert City, Kentucky. AMICO settled with Goodrich, but OneBeacon’s predecessor went to trial. A state court jury found for Goodrich, and OneBeacon was ordered to pay $42 million in compensatory damages and $12 million in attorney fees. The state court also denied OneBeacon's request for settlement credits to reflect amounts paid by other insurers, such as AMICO, through settlements with Goodrich. OneBeacon sought equitable contribution; AMICO removed to federal court. The district court granted AMICO summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ohio policy favoring settlements provides that a settled policy is exhausted for purposes of equitable contribution; the court declined to address whether Ohio law permits interclass contribution actions or whether the jury finding of bad faith bars equitable relief.

Decedent died when a 28-ton beam struck an overpass, fell off of the trailer transporting it, and crushed the cab of his truck, which was on the highway behind the trailer. The district court granted motions for summary judgment in favor of companies responsible for loading the beam on the trailer, hiring the trucking company, and obtaining permits. The court construed Michigan Compiled Laws 257.719(1) as forbidding recovery from anyone other than the owner of a vehicle that collides with a lawfully established bridge. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The estate did not bring suit directly under the statute. In a common-law negligence case, all principles concerning common-law liability and defenses apply. The statute may imply that others who pay may be able to shift their liability to an owner, not that they can have no liability in the first instance. The fact that liability for all damages and injury is fixed on the owner of the vehicle even where concurrent or intervening acts of negligence precipitate the accident, does not imply that tortfeasors responsible for those concurrent or intervening acts cannot also be liable.

V&M filed suit against Centimark alleging breach of contract and negligence after metal roof sheeting panels being installed at its steelwork facility fell into an electrical substation, causing loss of power for more than 30 hours. Damages for repairs and lost profits were around $3 million The district court granted Centimark summary judgment, ruling that V&M failed to produce sufficient evidence of causation to sustain either legal claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that genuine issues of material fact exist.

Plaintiffs were catastrophically injured in automobile accidents. All sustained traumatic brain injuries and are now mentally impaired. State Farm initially paid no-fault insurance benefits for the cost of attendant care services rendered at home, but reduced the rates on the basis of market surveys of the cost of the services. State Farm refused to raise the rates because it could not verify whether plaintiffs had received the type of care that would justify paying higher rates. Plaintiffs refused to submit documentation regarding the nature and extent of the care they were receiving. Plaintiffs sued. The district court awarded plaintiffs monetary sanctions, instead of default judgment, in response to State Farm’s violation of discovery orders. A jury rendered a verdict in State Farm’s Favor. The Sixth Circuit dismissed appeal regarding the discovery sanctions, for lack of jurisdiction, but otherwise affirmed.

Plaintiffs, allegedly injured while working for Cassens, sought worker's compensation benefits under Michigan’ law. Cassens’s third-party administrator, denied each plaintiff benefits. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the denials were fraudulent and violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B), 1962(c), and 1964(c). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Supremacy Clause prevents the Michigan legislature from preempting a RICO remedy by declaring its worker"s compensation scheme to be exclusive of federal remedies. An expected entitlement to benefits under the state statute qualifies as property, as does the claim for such benefits, and the injury to such property creates, under certain circumstances, a RICO violation.

While working for plaintiff, Hashman was standing in the open compartment, driving a forklift manufactured by Raymond when she either fell or stepped from the open side of the compartment. Her foot was trapped. She suffered severe injuries resulting in partial amputation. After settling Hashman's workers' compensation claim, plaintiff sought subrogation from Raymond, claiming that a design defect, failure to include a rear guard door on the forklift, caused the injuries. The district court granted summary judgment for Raymond, finding that plaintiff could not sustain a design defect claim without expert testimony and that the methods of its proposed expert were not sufficiently reliable to support the proffered opinions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There were at least four problems with the expert's methodology: anecdotal evidence, improper extrapolation, failure to consider other possible causes, and lack of testing. Although plaintiff could argue a "consumer expectations" theory without expert testimony, there was insufficient evidence to support the claim.

In 2006, U.S. Marshals worked with officers in 24 states on a fugitive round-up that led to arrests of 10,733 people, including plaintiff, who was wrongfully arrested because of clerical mistakes. All charges were eventually dropped, but news reporters had filmed her arrest and aired the story, including plaintiff's name and a statement that she was wanted for identity theft, after the dismissal. One station also placed the video on its website, along with a written story. Plaintiff's attorney faxed a cease and desist letter to the station, which removed the story, although it remained accessible by keyword search for several days. Most of plaintiffs' claims against the federal and city governments, the U.S. Marshals Service, the broadcast company and employees, and various named and unnamed Marshals, were resolved. The district court rejected defamation and false light claim against the broadcast company, based on the fair report privilege requirement of proof of actual malice, and a Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), claim against the U.S. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the discretionary function exception. Investigating and apprehending plaintiff was discretionary and not within the safe harbor for intentional torts.

Plaintiff fell and broke bones while walking in defendant’s campground. She sought damages for medical expenses and lost earning capacity. Before her injury, she worked part-time in childcare, earning $9,000 to $10,000 annually; she claims that her injuries forced her to switch jobs and work as a full-time manicurist. She presented testimony of an accountant, that, but for her injury, plaintiff could have earned approximately $17,600 a year as a full-time childcare worker; her annual earning capacity as a full-time manicurist was approximately the same. Factoring in her disability and increased likelihood of missed work, he concluded that lost earning capacity totaled $232,346. The jury awarded $200,000. The Sixth Circuit reversed. On remand, the district court excluded the accountant’s expert testimony as unduly speculative. Although plaintiff testified that her injuries prevented her from performing procedures that would have earned additional money, the court instructed the jury that it could not award damages for lost earning capacity. The jury awarded $10,000. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to liability, but vacated on damages. The expert testimony was not unreasonably speculative; the court “appears to have misunderstood the concept of lost earning capacity.”

Plaintiffs sought insurance coverage for settlement and defense costs related to thousands of asbestos-exposure products-liability lawsuits that began in 1981. Many of the underlying asbestos claims arose from exposure to products manufactured by Reardon, a corporation that sold its assets and liabilities to plaintiff and became a division of plaintiff's business in 1966. The policies did not expressly identify Reardon or its later incarnation as "Named Insureds," but provided coverage for asbestos claims related to the Reardon products, and each has paid pursuant to the policies' aggregate limits for "Products Hazard" claims. The insurance companies, collectively, have paid more than $100 millions plaintiffs sought more than $125 million in additional coverage, arguing that the Products Hazard caps did not apply to the Reardon claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurance companies. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the policy language supported application of the cap,

Plaintiff, a pipefitter, worked with asbestos-containing gaskets made by defendant from 1962 until 1970. From 1962 until 1975, he also sustained significant exposure to asbestos insulation. He died in 2008, of mesothelioma, a cancer of the lining of the lung. Before his death, plaintiff sued under theories including strict liability and negligence. Defendant does not dispute that asbestos-containing products likely caused the mesothelioma, but argues that the mesothelioma was caused by exposure to asbestos insulation, and that its own gaskets were not a substantial factor. A jury awarded plaintiff $516,094. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Given that plaintiff failed to quantify the exposure to asbestos from defendant's gaskets and concedes that plaintiff sustained massive exposure to asbestos from non-defendant sources, there was insufficient evidence to infer that defendant's gaskets probably, as opposed to possibly, were a substantial cause of plaintiff's mesothelioma.