Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Welch called 911. A Wishard ambulance arrived. Welch was 34 weeks pregnant. Paramedics ascertained that her water broke and she had a prolapsed umbilical cord. After consulting with her obstetrician’s office, paramedics contacted the Beech Grove emergency room and transported her there. Beech Grove did not have an obstetrics facility. Rather than delivering the baby, the physician sent Welch in the Wishard ambulance to another hospital, where the baby was delivered by Caesarean section. He had suffered hypoxia resulting in severe brain damage. Plaintiffs alleged that Wishard violated the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395dd. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the situation did not fit the definition of “come to the emergency room:” that an individual in an ambulance owned and operated by the hospital is deemed to have come to the emergency room unless the ambulance is operated under communitywide emergency medical service protocols that direct it to transport the individual to a hospital other than the owner. The Wishard ambulance was operating under EMS protocols when it transported the plaintiffs. Although the definition was adopted after the incident, it was merely a clarification. View "Beller v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. IN" on Justia Law

Ruppel sued CBS in Illinois alleging CBS’s predecessor, Westinghouse, caused the mesothelioma from which he suffers. Westinghouse had included asbestos in the turbines it supplied to the U.S. Navy, and Ruppel was allegedly exposed to it during his Naval service and later when he worked on an aircraft carrier as a civilian. CBS removed the case under the federal officer removal statute, which permits removal of certain suits where a defendant that acted under a federal officer has a colorable federal defense, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Ruppel moved to remand and, without allowing response, the district court granted the motion. The district court concluded Ruppel only sued CBS for failing to warn about the dangers of asbestos for which there is no federal defense. The Seventh Circuit reversed. CBS’s relationship with Ruppel arises solely out of CBS’s duties to the Navy. It also has a colorable argument for the government contractor defense, which immunizes government contractors when they supply products with specifications approved by the government. View "Ruppel v. CBS Corp." on Justia Law

The insurers provided law enforcement liability coverage to the city of Waukegan and its employees acting within the scope of employment. In 2009, Starks filed a civil rights suit against the city and some current and former police officers, among others, alleging that each played a role in his wrongful conviction for a 1986 crime. The insurers obtained a declaratory judgment that they have no duty to defend or indemnify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the policies were not in effect at the time of the crime, that Starks was not exonerated during the period when the policies were in place, and that any outrageous conduct that might be grounds for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress also fell outside the policy dates. View "Northfield Ins.Co. v. City of Waukegan" on Justia Law

American citizen-civilians, employees of a private Iraqi security services company, alleged that they were detained and tortured by U.S. military personnel while in Iraq in 2006, then released without being charged with a crime. Plaintiffs sought damages and to recover seized personal property. The district court denied motions to dismiss. In 2011, the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, holding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Secretary Rumsfeld's personal responsibility and that he is not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that a common-law claim for damages should not be created. The Supreme Court has never created or even favorably mentioned a nonstatutory right of action for damages on account of conduct that occurred outside of the U.S. The Military Claims Act and the Foreign Claims Act indicate that Congress has decided that compensation should come from the Treasury rather than from federal employees and that plaintiffs do not need a common-law damages remedy in order to achieve some recompense. Even such a remedy existed, Rumsfeld could not be held liable. He did not arrest plaintiffs, hold them incommunicado, refuse to speak with the FBI, subject them to loud noises, or threaten them while they wore hoods. View "Vance v. Rumsfeld" on Justia Law

Lynch was injured while working at a jobsite as a mechanic for Metropolitan Rail (Metra), when the top rail of a chain-link fence he was installing fell and struck him on the back of his neck and shoulders. In his suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Metra. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that Lynch adequately raised material issues of fact concerning whether Metra was negligent. View "Lynch v. NE Reg'l Commuter R.R.Corp." on Justia Law

Fleishman began working for Continental in 1984 as a trial attorney defending workers’ compensation claims. Izzo oversaw the attorneys. Beginning in 2003, Fleishman suffered a series of medical problems related to a brain aneurism. He took intermittent medical leaves between July 2003 and June 2005. Izzo mentioned to Fleishman that his numbers “were off” because he was out on leave and inquired whether Fleishman thought about retirement. Fleishman declined and did not request another leave or accommodation after his return, although he had a noticeable dent on the side of his head. He was assigned to a new group that handled high-value cases. And his supervisor began receiving a series of performance-related complaints that ultimately led to his termination in 2007 at the age of 54. Fleishman filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623 (a)(1) and the Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). The district court granted Continental summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Fleishman offered no evidence of age discrimination and does not meet the definition of disabled under the ADA. View "Fleishman v. Cont'l Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Blue, a bus driver insured under Hartford group disability plans, stopped working because of chronic headaches in 1998; Hartford approved short-term disability (STD) benefits. Blue was diagnosed with sphenopalatine ganglion neuralgia. Hartford approved long-term (LTD) benefits in 2001. To qualify for STD benefits, Blue needed to show inability to perform his own occupation; for LTD benefits, he needed to show that he could not do “any occupation or work for which he was or could become qualified by training, education or experience.” In 2002, Hartford amended its LTD policy, retroactive to 1993, adopting the more lenient “own occupation” standard. Hartford received annual physician’s reports, and by 2008, his provider indicated that Blue was capable of full-time light or sedentary work. Hartford notified Blue that he was no longer eligible for LTD benefits, quoting the “any occupation” language; it apparently did not send the 2002 retroactive amendment. In 2011, Hartford acknowledged its mistake to the district court, reinstated benefits, and issued a check for retroactive benefits. After granting one, but denying a second, extension of time, the district court ruled without Blue’s response, finding the contract claim was moot and granting Hartford summary judgment on the bad faith claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Blue v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2010-2011 several hundred plaintiffs filed 10 lawsuits in Illinois state courts against Abbott, for personal injuries they allege were caused by Depakote, a prescription. Plaintiffs moved the Supreme Court of Illinois to consolidate and transfer their cases to St. Clair County, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 384; the Supreme Court has not ruled. Abbott removed each of the cases to federal court, asserting that the motion to consolidate brought the cases under the “mass action” provision of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(i), which allows the removal of any case where 100 or more people propose to try their claims jointly. Cases filed in St. Clair and Madison counties were removed to the Southern District of Illinois and cases filed in Cook County were removed to the Northern District; plaintiffs moved to remand in both courts. The Northern District denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand. The Seventh Circuit held that removal was proper, rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that they did not propose a joint trial because their motion to consolidate did not address how the trials of the various claims in the cases would be conducted, other than proposing that they all take place in St. Clair County.View "Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Carroll and Kelliher worked at Merrill Lynch. Carroll lodged a complaint that led to the firing of two employees. Restructuring followed and a supervisory position opened. Although Carroll did not apply, she felt “overlooked” when Merrill Lynch hired another. Carroll felt that Kelliher, apparently not involved with the earlier human resources complaint, was performing some of her duties. Around 9:00 PM on Thanksgiving, Carroll called Kelliher at home. As Carroll later admitted, she “fucking snapped;” she acknowledged that, if she received a similar call, she would feel “threatened.” Mrs. Kelliher overheard loud accusations and began listening from another receiver. Increasingly frightened, she pushed the “record” button on her answering machine. The Kellihers did not call the police, but called a Merrill Lynch supervisor. At his supervisors’ request, Kelliher played the recording and reported Carroll’s call to the police. Two months later, Carroll filed a police report, accusing the Kellihers of violating the Illinois eavesdropping statute. Merrill Lynch fired Carroll for her conduct on the call. Carroll sued Kelliher and Merrill Lynch. The district court entered summary judgment on her claim under the Illinois statute, concluding that the recording fell within the statute’s fear of crime exemption. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Carroll v. Merrill Lynch, Jim Kelliher, and Pat Kelliher" on Justia Law

Turbo blowers are used in waste water treatment plants to maintain the oxygen dissolved in the water at a level needed by the aerobic bacteria that break down organic waste into carbon dioxide, nitrogen, and water. In 2006 Neuros began offering such blowers to facilities in North America. Two years later, KTurbo began marketing its blowers. In 2008 Neuros won a bid to supply blowers to a Utah plant. Lee, the chief executive officer of KTurbo, was dissatisfied, and slides and related tables that accused Neuros of fraud in its representations to the Utah purchaser. Lee made his presentation to engineering firms that advise treatment plants on which blowers to buy, but apparently failed to win any business away from Neuros. Lee also published his accusations on a website and sent them to the sales representatives. Neuros sued, charging violations of the Lanham Act, the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and defamation. A bench trial resulted in a judgment in favor of Neuros on its defamation claim and an award of $60,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the award, but held that the other claims should not have been dismissed. View "Neuros Co., Ltd. v. KTurbo, Inc." on Justia Law