Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In his 40s, Kastner had worked as a truck driver and as a delivery manager. Having suffered injuries following a fall and subsequent heavy lifting at work, he suffered from a degenerative disc disorder and pain in various parts of his body, and sought disability insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. 423(d). An administrative law judge determined that, though Kastner’s impairments are severe, they do not meet listed requirements for a presumptively disabling condition and that Kastner has residual capability to perform certain jobs in the economy. The Appeals Council denied review and the district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the ALJ did not adequately explain why Kastner had not met the requirements for a presumptive disability. View "Kastner v. Astrue" on Justia Law

While working at an animal shelter, Povey injured her wrist moving a dog. She had surgery and underwent physical therapy. Jeffersonville’s Human Resources Director explained that the shelter did not have light duty positions. Povey’s supervisor nonetheless limited her duties and exempted Povey from working weekends because it would entail heavy lifting. Co-workers complained. Although an investigation concluded that there was no illegal harassment, Povey reported that she felt harassment “behind her back” and filed a complaint. Jeffersonville then received medical notice of Povey’s permanent physical restrictions which prohibited repetitive hand movement or lifting, pushing or pulling more than five pounds with her right arm. Povey’s employment was terminated. Povey sued under 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted Jeffersonville summary judgment, finding that Povey did not demonstrate that her wrist injury impaired her from completing daily tasks; her perceived impairment foreclosed her from accepting a broad range or class of jobs; she was perceived unable to perform manual tasks; she was a qualified individual as defined under the ADA; or that she was terminated in retaliation for exercising her rights under the ADA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Povey v. City of Jeffersonville" on Justia Law

The Illinois inmate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that his cell was infested with mice and cockroaches, that a window pane was missing and rain came in through the window, and that a warden had seen the conditions, yet nothing had been done. The district judge dismissed on alternative grounds: that the defendants were immune from suit by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and that the complaint failed to allege harm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, after noting that the complaint alleged that allowing rain to enter the cell created a health hazard, adequately alleging harm. Depending on how extensive infestation is, what odors or bites or risk of disease the pests create, the prisoner’s known particular psychological sensitivities, and how long infestation continues, a trier of fact might reasonably conclude that the prisoner had been subjected to harm sufficient to support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment even if he had not contracted a disease or suffered any pain. The suit is against a state and a state agency and Congress did not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity under section 1983, as it could have done. A state and its agencies are not suable “persons” under section 1983. View "Thomas v. State of IL" on Justia Law

In 2007, CSI entered into a contract with Sunrise to install carpets, countertops, flooring, and wall tiles at a new condominium within the geographical jurisdiction of the union’s Local 13. Though CSI was not a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement with Local 13, most other workers at the job site were union members. The union became aware that Sunrise was using non-unionized workers and began picketing and a strike. A union organizer stated that Sunrise should get rid of CSI and that if it used CSI on other job sites in the future, Local 13 would set up pickets at those jobs as well. Due to the threat, Sunrise canceled another contract and moved CSI workers to night hours at the condominium project. CSI’s president claims that the union organizer attacked him at the job site and brought claims for lost profits, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unfair labor practices (secondary pressure) under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 187. The district court ruled in favor of defendants Regional Council, Local 13, and the union organizer on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Carpet Serv. Int'l, Inc. v. Chicago Reg'l Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Leibovitch family was traveling along the Trans-Israel highway near Kalkilya through an area bordering the West Bank. Agents of the Palestine Islamic Jihad crossed from the West Bank into Israel and fired upon the Leibovitchs’ minivan using pistols and a Kalishnikov rifle. The Leibovitchs’ seven-year-old child, an Israeli national, was killed by the gunshots. Her three-year-old sister, an American citizen, survived but was severely injured by bullets that shattered bones in her right wrist and pierced her torso. Two grandparents and two siblings were also in the van during the attack, but survived. In 2008, the Leibovitchs brought suit against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Ministry of Information and Security under the terrorism exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605A, for providing material support and resources to the organization that carried out the attacks. The district court entered default judgment against Iran on the claim for injuries sustained by the U.S. citizen child, but found no jurisdiction over intentional infliction of emotional distress claims by other family members, who are not citizens. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the Act confers subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims. View "Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law

In 2007, an explosion occurred at a metal processing plant in Manchester, Georgia owned by GSMC, which had obtained insurance through Continental, covering damage to the plant. Continental made some payments to GSMC, but GSMC subsequently sued, alleging that the payments were inadequate. GSMC is now in bankruptcy. Plaintiffs, claiming that the failure of Continental to timely pay adequate damages to GSMC caused them damages, brought suit against Continental and Hylant, their former insurance broker. Three of the plaintiffs are businesses affiliated with GSMC, and are additional named insureds under the policy that covered the Manchester plant. The other plaintiffs are owners and operators of GSMC, and allege that they are third-party beneficiaries of the policy. The district court dismissed the claims of: breach of contract; promissory estoppel; bad faith; negligence; tortious interference with contract; negligent infliction of emotional distress; and breach of fiduciary duties. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying Indiana law. View "G & S Holdings LLC v. Cont'l Cas. Co." on Justia Law

A suit on behalf of a 14-year-old, eighth grade boy alleged that the failure of the public school district to prevent sexual abuse by a female teacher violated the student’s rights under Title IX of the federal Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681, and constituted negligent infliction of emotional distress under Wisconsin law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district; claims against the teacher remain pending. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In a private suit under Title IX, a school district cannot be held liable on the ground of respondeat superior for an employee’s violation absent proof of actual notice and deliberate indifference. That other teachers suspected improper conduct and administrators investigated and accepted the teacher’s denials does not establish knowledge or deliberate indifference. . View "N. R. Doe v. St. Francis Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2003, the airline established guidelines that address accommodating employees who, because of disability, can no longer do essential functions of their current jobs, even with reasonable accommodation. The guidelines specify that the transfer process is competitive, so that an employee in need of accommodation will not be automatically placed into a vacant position, but will be given preference over similarly qualified applicants. The EEOC challenged the policy under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court ruled in favor of the airline. On rehearing, en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that the ADA does mandate that an employer appoint employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are qualified, provided that such accommodations would be ordinarily reasonable and would not present an undue hardship to that employer. The court concluded that contrary precedent did not survive in light of U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Filus, a 50-year-old former truck driver, has twice applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, claiming that back problems have left him incapable of gainful employment. An administrative law judge concluded that Filus could perform some light work and denied his most recent application. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supports the denial. The ALJ adequately considered Filus’s testimony about the limiting effects of his pain along with his testimony that he regularly completed his daily household activities without any pain medication, not even over-the-counter products.View "Filus v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Beatty injured his back on the job at Olin’s manufacturing plant. At the direction of Olin’s medical department, he was evaluated by his physician, who instructed him to remain off of work for a week. He gave that doctor’s note to the medical department. With the exception of two days of light duty, he did not report for work for the next six weeks. He eventually got a retroactive medical excuse from his doctor, but Olin’s medical department sought an independent examination, anticipating a workers’ compensation claim. In the meantime, a clerk told Olin’s labor-relations manager that Beatty had not been at work for several weeks and had not called in. Olin’s policy requires employees to call in daily if they cannot come to work; failure to call in for three workdays in a row is grounds for termination. Based on Beatty’s noncompliance with the policy, the labor-relations manager terminated his employment. Beatty later filed a workers’ compensation claim, which eventually settled. He then sued for retaliatory discharge. The district court granted summary judgment for Olin. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the manager who made the termination decision was entirely unaware of Beatty’s status vis-á-vis Olin’s medical department. View "Beatty v. Olin Corp." on Justia Law