Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A 1993 Ford Explorer, struck by another car near the left rear wheel, rolled over. Plaintiffs, driver and passenger, were injured. At the close of discovery in their case against the manufacturer, plaintiffs had not designated an expert on the subject of the vehicle's design. The magistrate judge concluded that the suit could not proceed without expert testimony and granted summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Consumer expectations are just one factor in the inquiry whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. A jury unassisted by expert testimony would have to rely on speculation. The record did not show whether the vehicles are unduly (or unexpectedly) dangerous, based on: under what circumstances they roll over; under what circumstances consumers expect them to do so; whether it would be possible to reduce the rollover rate; and whether a different and safer design would have averted this particular accident.

In 2007 employee retired when the steel plant, at which he had worked for 42 years, shut down. Under a plan negotiated by the union, his pension payment, without any offset, was $688.13 a month. Employee was told that payment of his pension would be deferred for more than 10 years because the plan required that employee pay back workers' compensation settlements that he had received after sustaining on-the-job injuries in 2005 and 2006. The plan refers to offset for payments for "disability in the nature of a permanent disability for which the Company is liable." The district court entered judgment for the employee. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The committee's decision was within its discretion; the plan's specific mention of workers' compensation supports its characterization.

A newborn suffered severe brain damage because doctors failed to promptly diagnose and treat an infection contracted at his 2003 birth. He was born prematurely and certain tests, normally done during pregnancy, were not performed by the federally-subsidized clinic where the mother received care. The clinic and its doctors are deemed federal employees under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(g)-(n), and shielded from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In 2005 the parents filed suit in state court and, in 2006, HHS denied an administrative claim for damages. Within six months of the denial the case was removed to federal court. In 2010, the district court held that the claim was filed within the two year statute of limitations under the FTCA (28 U.S.C. 2401(b)) and awarded more than $29 million in damages against the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A claim only accrues when a plaintiff obtains sufficient knowledge of the government-related cause of his injury; the plaintiffs were reasonably diligent.

In 2001 plaintiff received prenatal care from a clinic that receives federal funds. Its physicians and the clinic are deemed federal employees for purposes of malpractice liability, so that the United States could be substituted as a party to a suit. 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(1); claims would be governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act, and neither would face liability. For complex situations, the clinic contracted with UIC for specialists. Plaintiff's baby died following a difficult delivery. She sued the clinic, its doctor, the delivery hospital, and two UIC physicians who assisted. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services denied claims for damages. The district court entered summary judgment for the UIC doctors under the Illinois Good Samaritan Act, which shields physicians who provide "emergency care without fee to a person," 745 ILCS 49/25, but declined to dismiss the case against the government, which had been substituted for the clinic. The Seventh Circuit reversed, first holding that the district court had derivative jurisdiction. Although the salaried UIC doctors did not receive a direct financial benefit from the delivery, their employer billed the clinic for services. There was evidence that one doctor submitted a billing form with respect to the delivery; the other made a "bad faith" decision not to bill.

A class action suit against tobacco-related entities, first filed in 1998, alleged that for years the tobacco companies conspired to conceal the facts about the addictive and dangerous nature of cigarettes by intentionally using incomplete, misleading, or untruthful marketing and advertising. The putative class consists of Illinois residents who bought or smoked cigarettes, seeking disgorgement of profits on an unjust enrichment theory. After extensive proceedings, the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mere violation of a consumer's legal right to know about a product's risks, without anything more, cannot support a claim that the manufacturer unjustly retained the revenue from the product's sale to the consumerâs detriment. Plaintiffs did not allege that they suffered any harm, that they relied on the marketing, or that they would have acted differently had the defendants been truthful.

Decedent, on active duty, committed suicide in his barracks. Navy and Department of Defense personnel had been called and arrived at his residence, but did not find the gun they were told he had. They permitted decedent to go to the bathroom accompanied by his friend. Upon entering, he pulled a gun from his waistband and committed suicide by shooting himself. After attempting unsuccessfully to recover from the Navy through administrative procedures, decedent's family brought a wrongful death claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court found the case barred by the Feres doctrine, which provides that "the Government is not liable ... for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Decedent stood "in the type of relationship to the military at the time of his . . . injury that the occurrences causing the injury arose out of activity incident to military service."

The company made and sold a toy that, when swallowed, made children seriously ill. The product was recalled and removed from store shelves. Plaintiffs, purchasers whose children were not harmed and who did not ask for a refund, challenged the adequacy of the recall and alleged violations of the Consumer Products Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 2051â89, express and implied warranties, and state consumer-protection statutes. The district court denied class certification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that plaintiffs' had standing, based on financial harm. There would be serious problems of class action management, apart from differences in state law. Individual notice would be impossible, making it hard for class members to opt out. No one knows who bought the kits or who used them without problems. It would be difficult to determine who would be entitled to a remedy. The per-buyer costs of identifying class members and giving notice would exceed the price of the toys. The principal effect of class certification would be to induce defendants to pay class lawyers enough to make them go away; effectual relief for consumers is unlikely.

Plaintiff, who is white, worked with an African-American who was confrontational, rude, and disruptive in the workplace. Plaintiff claims that a 940-pound steel coil that fell on him, from a machine operated by the "workplace bully," was dropped purposefully because of his race. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer on a racially hostile work environment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1981, without considering plaintiff's response brief or exhibits, which were non-compliant with local rules. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in enforcing its rules and deadlines. The record contained insufficient evidence for a jury to find that the co-worker's offensive conduct before the accident was severe or pervasive. While the injury was severe, no reasonable inference could be drawn that the coil was purposefully dropped because of race or that the employer was negligent in discovering the alleged racial harassment. The company had a reasonable procedure in place for detecting and correcting harassment, but plaintiff did not avail himself of that procedure.

Seeing that plaintiff was not wearing a seatbelt, the officer followed him to a store where plaintiff worked, arriving at 5:57 p.m.. Plaintiff, due at work at 6:00 p.m., sped into the parking lot. The officer pulled in behind him and activated his emergency lights. Plaintiff did not respond, so the officer drove the squad car between him and the store, then followed him toward the store and grabbed him. Plaintiff did not stop, but ran to the store. The officer used his taser. Apparently plaintiff continued to struggle and the officer used handcuffs and pepper spray. Plaintiff was fired. He filed suit for excessive force and false arrest under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988. The officer counter-sued for battery. The jury returned a mixed verdict, finding against the officer on his battery claim, against plaintiff on his false arrest claim, and for plaintiff on his excessive force claim, but granting only nominal damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The jury could reasonably have believed that the tasering was justifiable and the judge acted within his discretion in denying attorney fees in a suit seeking to redress a private injury and based on an isolated incident.

A semi-truck jackknifed while making a delivery for a federally licensed carrier and struck a vehicle, killing its driver. The estate brought a wrongful death action in Illinois state court against the driver, his wife (titular owner of the truck), and the company. The suit settled with entry of a $2 million consent judgment against the company, the driver, and his wife. The estate agreed that payment by the company's carrier of the $1 million policy limit would satisfy part of the judgment; the remainder would come from the driver's policy for "Non-trucking/bobtail liability" that covers driving cabs without trailers outside the service of the federally licensed carriers under whose authority drivers operate. That carrier declined coverage, citing a policy exclusion for vehicles "while in the business of anyone to whom ... rented," and obtained summary judgment in federal district court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing 49 C.F.R. 376.2(d)(2), which defines "owner" as including someone like the driver, "who, without title, has the right to exclusive use of equipment" and reasoned that the driver, as agent for his wife, leased the truck to the company, even though the company was unaware that the wife held title.