Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Pittman, a pretrial detainee, stated, during intake, that he had no major medical problems, no thoughts about killing or injuring himself, no previous suicide attempts, and no psychiatric history. Weeks later he stated that he was suicidal and was placed on a 15-minute suicide watch. During subsequent evaluations, he denied suicidal thoughts. Staff members were unaware that evaluations for suicidal tendencies had been conducted in connection with an arrest two years earlier. Pittman continued to complain about health issues and to act out in an effort to be housed outside lockdown. The night he attempted to hang himself, Pittman was seen crying in his cell. His guardian claims, but staff denies, that he requested to talk to CRISIS staff. The attempt rendered him severely brain-damaged and disabled. His guardian alleged deliberate indifference to his risk of suicide and willful and wanton failure to provide adequate medical care and to protect him. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that there was a genuine issue of triable of fact with respect to the claims against two defendants and that the county may have vicarious liability on the state law claim for the actions of those defendants. View "Pittman v. Cnty. of Madison" on Justia Law

In 2006 Buechel was incarcerated at FCI-Greenville federal correctional institution, where he contracted Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, (MRSA), a staph infection resistant to certain antibiotics. Buechel was hospitalized for more than 40 days and was left with serious and permanent damage to his heart and lungs. He sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), alleging that his injuries were caused by the prison’s negligence. The district court issued a pretrial order that limited Buechel’s negligence claim to a theory that he contracted MRSA from contact with one fellow inmate, in the prison laundry in July 2006, or more generally as a result of sloppy procedures in handling infected prison laundry. After a bench trial, the court held that Buechel had not proved that he contracted MRSA from either the inmate or the laundry procedures and entered judgment in favor of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding that Buechel failed to prove that he contracted MRSA from the inmate or as a result of inadequate laundry procedures, but vacated and remanded for consideration of a broader theory. Buechel’s administrative claim and complaint presented a broader theory that the prison was negligent more generally in its failure to adhere to its MRSA-containment policies.View "Buechel v. United States" on Justia Law

The claimant alleges that Father Hanser, a former pastor at a Catholic Parish in Brookfield,Wisconsin, sexually abused him in the late 1970s when he was seven years old. In 2007 the claimant participated in a voluntary mediation program conducted by the Archdiocese to address claims of sexual abuse by priests. The mediation produced a settlement. The Archdiocese paid the claimant $100,000, and he released the Archdiocese from all claims relating to abuse by Father Hanser. When the Archdiocese filed its Chapter 11 petition four years later, the claimant submitted a claim based on the same allegations of abuse by Father Hanser, claiming that an Archdiocesan representative had fraudulently induced him to settle by giving him inaccurate information about when the Archdiocese first received reports of abuse by Father Hanser. The bankruptcy judge refused to set the agreement aside because the claimant had not shown that but for the alleged misrepresentations, he would not have accepted the settlement. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The claimant failed to show that the alleged misrepresentations were a substantial factor in his decision to accept the settlement and never made an offer of proof explaining what an expanded record would show. View " Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Wourms, age 16, was killed in a crash; he was driving erratically when an officer, warned by a 911 call from Wourms’ mother that her son was drunk and “going crazy,” turned on his emergency lights to signal him to pull over. Wourms increased his speed to about 80 mph in an area posted for 25 mph. His father sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that the crash was caused by the police car intentionally ramming Wourms’s car, resulting in an unconstitutional seizure of his person and property. The officer denied that his car touched Wourms’s car. The district court entered summary judgment, finding the evidence insufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the cars had collided. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that without a collision, Wourms was entirely responsible; the police officer had every legal right to signal Wourms to pull over. Even ramming a recklessly driven car to induce the driver to stop or cause the car to crash, need not be unreasonable. In this case, however, there were no marks on the police car that matched marks on Wourms’s car, no debris on the road where Wourms started to swerve, and no skid marks from the police car. Witness testimony indicated that the police could not have caught Wourms in time to hit his car before the crash.View "Wourms v. Fields" on Justia Law

Pierce claimed that she injured her lower back in 2004 while moving cases of glassware at her waitressing job. She quit her job and sought medical treatment. An MRI showed signs of disc degeneration. She received chiropractic and electric-shock treatments to her back. She also took prescription pain medication. After her back improved, she started a new job at a café. In March 2006 (her alleged onset date for disability), Pierce re-injured her back to the point that she could no longer sit or stand comfortably, and she had to quit her new job. The injury disrupted her sleep, caused numbness in her legs, and prevented her from being able to sit, stand, lift, or bend for long periods. She could not work for more than five hours without pain. An ALJ found that Pierce, then more than 55 years old, was not disabled. The Seventh Circuit remanded for further proceedings, finding the ALJ’s assessment of Pierce’s credibility was flawed in several respects. View "Pierce v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Horsfall worked as a real estate agent for First Weber, 2001-2002, and was the listing agent on First Weber’s contract with Call, who was trying to sell property. The contract gave First Weber exclusive rights collect commissions for sale of the property during the listing period and an exclusive right to collect commissions from sales to defined “protected buyers” for one year after the listing expired. The Acostas made an offer on the property and became “protected buyers.” Call’s contract with First Weber ended in August and at the same time, Horsfall left First Weber to establish his own brokerage, Picket Fence. In October, the Acostas contacted Horsfall. Without involving First Weber, Horsfall resuscitated the transaction with Call. The Acostas and Call executed a sales contract for the Call property. Picket Fence received a $6,000 commission, inconsistent with Horsfall’s status as First Weber’s agent under the earlier contract and in violation of Wisconsin real estate practice rules. Six years later, First Weber sued Horsfall in state court, asserting r breach of contract, tortious interference, and unjust enrichment. The state court entered a judgment against Horsfall for $10,978.91. Horsfall filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing First Weber as a creditor. First Weber responded that its judgment was non‐dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), as involving “willful and malicious injury.” The bankruptcy court, district court, and Seventh Circuit found the debt dischargeable. View "First Weber Grp., Inc. v. Horsfall" on Justia Law

Dalton worked in coal mine jobs from 1957 until 1991 and was exposed to substantial coal and rock dust. He developed trouble breathing; he quit his job and was never employed again. In 1999 Dalton sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901‐45. In 2003, an ALJ awarded benefits, finding that Dalton was a “miner,” that Frontier was the “responsible operator,” and that Dalton had established clinical pneumoconiosis, based on the opinions of pulmonary experts, but could not determine the date of onset of total disability, so Dalton’s benefits began in 1999. The Board vacated, finding that the ALJ had not properly evaluated CT scans. The ALJ again awarded benefits beginning in 1999. In 2007, the case was again remanded. A new ALJ reweighed the evidence and ordered benefits to begin in 1999. Dalton died in 2007. The ALJ denied a motion by Dalton’s children to substitute as claimant. The Board dismissed an appeal and a cross‐appeal. The District Director returned the case to its third ALJ, who allowed the children’s motion, modified the date for commencement of benefits to 1991, and awarded attorneys’ fees and expenses. The Board vacated with respect to the onset date. The Seventh Circuit remanded for entry of the 1991 onset date, rejecting a claim that the children lacked standing. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that 1991 marked the time of onset for Dalton’s total disability on account of pneumoconiosis. View "Dalton v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs" on Justia Law

Garcia, previously a construction worker and then age 40, applied for social security disability benefits in 2010, claiming abdominal pain caused by cirrhosis of the liver, severe low platelet count, hepatitis C, and an umbilical hernia, all of which had been diagnosed by several physicians that year. All were caused or exacerbated by alcoholism, but he stopped drinking and alcoholism is no longer a “contributing factor” barring him from obtaining disability benefits, 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(C). An ALJ ruled that Garcia is capable of doing limited sedentary work. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that Garcia would be a candidate for a liver transplant, but was not on the list because he was too sick for surgery. His platelet count was too low to for even a liver biopsy. Garcia has been repeatedly hospitalized and treated for pain with morphine and other opium derivatives, with limited success. He has lupus, anemia, colitis, anxiety and other psychological problems, and chronic fatigue. One physician described Garcia’s condition as “chronic and terminal.” The court stated that Garcia is “one of the most seriously disabled applicants for social security disability benefits whom we’ve encountered in many years … We are surprised that the Justice Department would defend such a denial.” View "Garcia v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Phusion manufactures and distributes an alcoholic beverage called “Four Loko.” Its original formula contained energy stimulants, such as caffeine, guarana, taurine, and wormwood. Phusion purchased a commercial general liability insurance policy and a umbrella policy from members of the Liberty Mutual Group. The policies include identical provisions, excluding coverage for bodily injury or property damage when the insured may be held liable by reason of causing or contributing to intoxication. Plaintiffs sued Phusion in separate state court actions, alleging injuries caused by consumption of Four Loko. Two cases involved traffic accidents, one involved a shooting, another involved paranoid behavior resulting in accidental death, and a fifth claim involved a death from heart trouble. Phusion notified Liberty, which sought a declaratory judgment regarding the scope of coverage. The district court examined the underlying cases in the context of comparable automobile exclusions and ruled that four of the five cases fell within the Liquor Liability Exclusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Liquor Liability Exclusions in the policies are unambiguous and apply to Phusion. The allegations of simple negligence raised by the plaintiffs in the underlying complaints are not sufficiently independent from the allegations that Phusion caused or contributed to the intoxication of any person. View "Netherlands Ins.. Co. v. Phusion Projects, Inc." on Justia Law

A Caterpillar worker developed epicondylitis, an inflammation of tendons near the elbow. A Department of Labor regulation requires employers to report injuries if “the work environment either caused or contributed to the resulting condition.” The employee worked in a packing department, placing items in boxes for shipping. Caterpillar convened a panel, with three board‐certified specialists in musculoskeletal disorders. Relying on guides issued by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the American Medical Association that repetitive motion plus force (weight or impact) can cause epicondylitis, and that pronation plus force also can cause the condition, but that repetitive motion alone does not, the panel found that work could not have caused the employee’s epicondylitis. Although Caterpillar presented several witnesses, the ALJ accepted the view of the DOL’s single witness, which ignored epidemiological studies and Caterpillar’s experience. The Seventh Circuit remanded. On remand, the ALJ again held that Caterpillar must pay a penalty for failing to report an injury as work‐related and OSHA declined to review the decision. Caterpillar has filed another petition for judicial review. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Prevailing views, and the data behind them, must be considered; they cannot be ignored on the opinion of any witness. View "Caterpillar Logistics, Inc. v. Soli" on Justia Law