Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901, originally included a “15-year presumption” that total pulmonary or respiratory impairment of a coal worker with 15 years of experience in the mines was due to pneumoconiosis (black lung). Congress removed this presumption in 1981, but in 2010 revived the presumption for claims filed after January 1, 2005, still pending on or after March 23, 2010. Bailey, employed by Consolidation Coal for 26 years, also smoked cigarettes for many years. He was diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and sought benefits. Three claims were considered during the interval when the 15-year presumption was withdrawn. Two were denied, and he withdrew a third. For his current claim, filed in 2007, three doctors agreed that Bailey is totally disabled by COPD. Because of the rejected claims, Bailey was required to show a change in condition. An ALJ, using the 15-year presumption, held that Bailey can now establish pneumoconiosis caused in part by coal dust exposure, two elements deficient in earlier claims, and awarded benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The ALJ correctly applied the 15-year presumption, addressed evidence relating to Bailey’s health and smoking history, and delivered a rational decision, supported by substantial evidence. View "Consolidation Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers Comp. Programs" on Justia Law

FBI agents Freeman and Howell investigated the Hinds, who worked for Indiana criminal defense attorney Alexander, for bribery of witnesses, including Kirtz. They equipped Kirtz and Chrisp with recording devices for a meeting, during which Alexander stated that he did not know about Hinds’s bribery and would attempt to find out what was going on. Although Kirtz and Chrisp later confirmed that this meeting occurred and that they delivered the recordings, the agents never produced the recordings and claimed that the meeting never occurred. Months later, McKinney, who had a grudge against Alexander, became the new prosecutor. Alexander claims that McKinney conspired with Kirtz and Chrisp (then under investigation for participation in an arson ring) to destroy the recording and manufacture evidence against Alexander. Alexander was acquitted of bribery charges and filed a Notice of Tort Claim with the FBI, stating his intention to sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680. The FBI declined to act. Alexander filed suit, alleging malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed, based on failure to state a claim for malicious prosecution and untimely filing of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Alexander alleged specific events that fell within the limitations period. View "Alexander v. United States" on Justia Law

From 1981 to 1989, Schultz worked painting equipment, floors, walls, ceilings, and pipes at AMC company plants. In 2005 he was diagnosed with acute myeloid leukemia (AML). He died 2006. His wife sued paint companies, alleging that the companies produced or distributed the paint Schultz used at work and that benzene from the paints caused his disease. She offered reports from two experts: Stewart, an industrial hygienist, who reconstructed Schultz’s work with the paints to quantify his benzene exposure, and Gore, an oncologist, who testified that benzene is generally known to cause AML and specifically was a substantial factor in the development of Schultz’s disease. The district court granted the companies summary judgment on the ground that Gore’s testimony was scientifically unreliable; without that evidence, Schultz had no way of linking his disease to the paints. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in excluding Gore’s testimony. View "Schultz v. Glidden Co." on Justia Law

Pro-Pac, a packaging business, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2006, then filed an adversary proceeding against WOW, a logistics service provider, for aiding and abetting a Pro-Pac employee’s breach of fiduciary duty. The bankruptcy court found that WOW had aided and abetted the Pro-Pac employee, but based its award on an independent unjust enrichment claim. The district court ordered the bankruptcy court to dismiss, reasoning that the unjust-enrichment argument had been introduced too late in the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the district court erred in dismissing the case, but that the bankruptcy court erred in assessing Pro-Pac’s damages. On remand, the bankruptcy court must reexamine issues relating to WOW’s tort liability. If the bankruptcy court wants to award punitive damages, it must first award compensatory damages based on the harm Pro-Pac suffered. View "Pro-Pac Inc. v. WOW Logistics Inc." on Justia Law

Prince was the general contractor for construction of an apartment building. Rybaltowski was an employee of a waterproofing company. His boss took Rybaltowski to the project site to perform an unpaid demonstration of the proposed caulking of windows. While Rybaltowski was at the site, a beam supporting masonry equipment fell on him. Less than an hour after the accident, Prince signed a subcontract with the waterproofing company. The insurance policy at issue was a Commercial General Liability Insurance policy with an exclusion from coverage for bodily injury to any contractor arising out of or in the course of the rendering or performing services of any kind or nature whatsoever by such contractor. “Contractor” was defined to include employees of subcontractors. The district court entered judgment in favor of the insurer, finding it had no duty to defend. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, reasoning that the policy can be interpreted so that services are not provided until the contractor begins compensated work on the project. View "Atl. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Prince Contractors, Inc." on Justia Law

SAMS contracted with Environs to provide architectural services for construction of a Homewood Suites hotel in Fort Wayne. Environs was to be paid a flat fee of $70,000. The contract stated: The Owner [SAMS] agrees that to the fullest extent permitted by law, Environs Architects/Planners, Inc. total liability to the Owner shall not exceed the amount of the total lump sum fee due to negligence, errors, omissions, strict liability, breach of contract or breach of warranty. The hotel was nearly complete when serious structural defects were discovered. The building department condemned the structure. Attempts to remedy failed; the hotel was demolished without opening. SAMS estimated its loss at more than $4.2 million. While SAMS’s suit against Environs was pending, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the “economic loss rule” applies to construction contracts under Indiana law: a party to a contract cannot be liable under a tort theory for any purely economic loss caused by negligent performance of the contract, absent any personal injury or damage to other property. The district court applied the rule to grant summary judgment rejecting SAMS’s negligence claim and held that SAMS’s recovery on its breach of contract claim would be limited to $70,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Sams Hotel Grp., LLC v. Environs, Inc." on Justia Law

Morris died after a 2004 collision in Indiana; he was a passenger in Sampson’s vehicle. Sampson was insured by Mid-Century. The Estate made a claim for $50,000, the highest allowable amount. Nuzzo, a citizen of Ohio, was the assigned claims adjustor. The Estate ultimately filed a wrongful death suit. An Indiana state court awarded $1.2 million. Sampson assigned his rights against Mid-Century for an agreement that the Estate would not pursue collection against Sampson personally. In 2011, the Estate sued Mid-Century in California state court, alleging that its bad faith failure to pay the claim resulted in the excess jury verdict against Sampson. The court dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. The Estate then sued Mid-Century and Nuzzo in Ohio state court, alleging tortious bad faith failure to pay the claim and breach of contract. The case was removed to an Ohio federal district court, then transferred to the district court in Indianapolis, which found that claims against Nuzzo were potentially viable under Ohio law, but that Indiana law governed both claims, so that Nuzzo was fraudulently joined. The court dismissed claims against Nuzzo and denied the Estate’s motion to remand. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to remand, finding that Nuzzo was not fraudulently joined. View "Morris v. Nuzzo" on Justia Law

In 2006, W&S hired Martino, a naturalized citizen born in Italy, as a sales representative. He signed an agreement that prohibited him from engaging in any other business or work for remuneration or profit without consent. W&S only approved outside positions requiring five or fewer hours a week on average, not including Sundays, and average weekly pay of $100 or less. Martino also served as a pastor of a small church and he submitted an outside position request, indicating that his pastoral position involved eight to 10 hours per week, not including Sundays, with average weekly pay of $300. After rejecting Martino’s argument that his position was a public service, human resources responded that W&S was not discharging Martino but asking that he resign his pastoral position. Martino subsequently was unable to timely produce I-9 eligibility to work documentation. Within two months of hiring him, W&S terminated Martino. The district court entered summary judgment for W&S in Martino’s suit, alleging termination based on religious beliefs and defamation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Martino’s evidence neither called into doubt W&S’s explanation for his discharge nor established a prima facie case of defamation. View "Martino v. W & S Fin. Grp." on Justia Law

Majors worked at GE’s Bloomington plant for 32 years. In 2000, she suffered a work-related injury to her right shoulder that left her limited to lifting no more than 20 pounds and precluded her from work above shoulder level with her right arm. The restrictions were considered temporary at first, but according to her medical file maintained by GE, the restrictions later were determined to be permanent. After GE denied her temporary and permanent positions to which she was otherwise entitled under the seniority-based bidding procedure, Majors sued under Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, claiming retaliation for filing EEOC charges after being denied hours, and that GE constructively discharged her when she elected to retire. The district court granted GE summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Majors couldn’t perform an essential function of the position she sought without an accommodation that was not reasonable and presented insufficient evidence of retaliation. View "Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co." on Justia Law

Lees was sexually assaulted in her Carthage dorm room by men she believed to be Carthage students. She brought a negligence action against the college, seeking to introduce the opinion testimony of Dr. Kennedy, a premises-security expert, as evidence of the standard of care for campus safety. Kennedy was to testify that there were numerous security deficiencies at Carthage and at Lees’s residence hall, that there was history of sexual assault at the school, and that Carthage fell short of recommended practices in campus security. The district court excluded Kennedy’s testimony, finding that the industry standards were only aspirational and failed to account for variation between different academic environments and that recent sexual assaults at Carthage involved acquaintance rape, while the Lees attack was stranger rape; the court entered summary judgment for Carthage. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding proposed testimony about standards published by the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators admissible under Rule 702 and not unreliable merely because the standards are aspirational; the standards represent an authoritative statement by premises-security professionals regarding recommended practices. Testimony about the absence of a “prop alarm” on the dorm’s basement door also reflects application of reliable principles and methods to the specific facts of the case. View "Lees v. Carthage Coll." on Justia Law