Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Body Aesthetic and three of its surgeons, claiming that they invaded her privacy and breached the fiduciary duty of confidentiality they owed to her when they gave nude photographic images of her body to a newspaper, which published the images. A jury found in favor of plaintiff on her breach of fiduciary duty claim and awarded her compensatory damages. Plaintiff appealed and requested a new trial, claiming the magistrate judge abused the court's discretion by excluding certain critical evidence that would have likely increased the verdict amount. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding testimony from the newspaper's writer and this abuse of discretion was substantially prejudicial to plaintiff's ability to show defendants' breach of fiduciary duty disregarded her privacy rights and adversely affected her claims for punitive damages. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment on punitive damages and remanded for a new trial as to that issue.

Plaintiff sued Brooklyn Park Motors and several Toyota affiliates in Minnesota state court after her son was killed and her daughter seriously injured in a crash with a 1996 Toyota Camry. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the denial of her motion to remand and the dismissal of Brooklyn Park Motors. The court affirmed and held that Brooklyn Park Motors, the sole Minnesota defendant, had been fraudulently joined because plaintiff had not asserted any reasonable basis for recovery against it. Accordingly, the claims against Brooklyn Park Motors was dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants for breach of duty, improper taking in violation of international law, conversion, conspiracy to commit a tort, aiding and abetting an improper taking and fraudulent scheme, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The court held that, because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602 et seq., applied to all defendants and no exception to sovereign immunity existed in this case, the judgment was affirmed.

A police sergeant arrested plaintiff without a warrant for running a contest which allegedly violated Minnesota gambling laws. The sergeant later obtained a search warrant and seized several items from the house where plaintiff was running the contest. A reporter broadcasted a news story about the contest and plaintiff's arrest on a local CBS television station. Plaintiff subsequently sued the sergeant and the city of Minneapolis under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for civil rights violations for the arrest and search, and the reporter and CBS for defamation. Both sides moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion for defendants. The court held that because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that any of the sergeant's actions violated a constitutional right, he could not deprive the sergeant of qualified immunity, and thus summary judgment was appropriate. Summary judgment was also proper as to the city because municipalities could not be held liable under Section 1983 where plaintiff had not argued on appeal that any municipal policy or custom led to a deprivation of his constitutional rights. The court also held that plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure and it was not reckless disregard for the truth to conclude that plaintiff could face future incarceration related to the contests. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its substantial discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for spoliation sanctions. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Appellant filed suit against four Minneapolis police officers and the City of Minneapolis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the officers used excessive, unreasonable force against her, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the excessive force claim and held that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the officers used excessive force against appellant. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the section 1983 claims against Officer Carroll because appellant admitted that he did not use excessive force against her. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that because appellant did not allege any damages, she failed to state a claim under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act. Minn. Stat. 13.01, subdiv. 1. The court held, however, that the district court failed to consider whether appellant could recover her costs and disbursements in her December 19, 2008 action to compel compliance under Minn. Stat. 13.01, subdiv. 4. Therefore, the court remanded for a ruling on whether appellant was entitled to costs or disbursements under that section of the statute. The court finally held that the district court properly dismissed appellant's common law battery claims against officers as untimely because the two-year statute of limitations period had expired. The court held, however, that appellant presented sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on the basis of official immunity on the alleged state tort claims.

Plaintiff purchased a security alarm for her home from HSM Electronic Protection Services, Inc. (HSM), which was later purchased by Stanley Convergent Security Solutions (Stanley). Plaintiff sued Stanley, claiming that Stanley did not respond properly to a low-temperature alarm from Gage's home and therefore was liable for over $250,000 in damages for willful and wanton negligence, intentional misconduct, fraud, and misrepresentation. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's denial of her motion and grant of summary judgment in favor of Stanley, contending that the district court applied an incorrect theory of law. The court held that the district court misapplied Minnesota law where the Minnesota Supreme Court's case law recognizing and developing willful and wanton negligence was still valid, provided a precise definition of the claim, and was therefore binding upon the court. Consequently, the court disagreed with the district court's reliance on New York case law applying gross negligence as "instructive" despite there being a "principled distinction between wanton negligence and gross negligence." The court also held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the operator, who knew of the peril present in plaintiff's home, exercised reasonable and ordinary care in response. Accordingly, summary judgment was not appropriate and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

In this appeal concerning the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), 2674, the court determined whether a purported personal representative could invoke the adjudicatory capacity, that is, the subject-matter jurisdiction of a United States District Court on behalf of statutory beneficiaries if, under section 2675(a), the representative failed or refused to first present to the appropriate federal agency evidence of her authority to act on behalf of such beneficiaries. As a preliminary matter, the court held that when faced with conflicting panel opinions, the earliest opinion must be followed "as it should have controlled the subsequent panels that created the conflict." The court held that a properly "presented" claim under section 2675(a) must include evidence of a representative's authority to act on behalf of the claim's beneficiaries under state law. The court also held that conformity with section 2675(a) was a jurisdictional term of the FTCA's limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Since there was no such compliance in this case, the district court properly dismissed the suit for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court further held that the personal representative did not have standing to assert the wrongful death claim at issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff and his wife (the Kaplans) filed suit against Mayo Clinic Rochester, Inc., other Mayo entities (collectively, Mayo), and Mayo doctors David Nagorney and Lawrence Burgart, making a number of claims arising out of plaintiff's erroneous diagnosis of pancreatic cancer and plaintiff's surgery based on that diagnosis. The Kaplans subsequently appealed the judgments in favor of Mayo and Dr. Burgart on their negligent-failure-to-diagnose and contract claims. The court held that the error, if any, in admitting a certain medical file, which included insurance documents, into evidence did not affect the Kaplans' substantial rights and the Kaplans were not prejudiced by the district court's decision not to give a limiting instruction. The court agreed with the district court that the Kaplans' assertion that the biopsy slides might have been tampered with was based on rank speculation where they failed to present evidence that the slides had been changed in any way. The court also held that the Kaplans have shown no basis for granting them a new trial on their claim for negligent failure to diagnose. The court held, however, that the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law where the Kaplans have offered sufficient evidence in their case-in-chief to support a breach-of-contract claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

This case stemmed from a dispute regarding the conversion of a railroad line on plaintiffs' property to a public trail, pursuant to the National Trail System Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. 1241 et seq. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, brought suit against defendant, alleging claims of inverse condemnation and trespass under Missouri law. After defendant removed the case to federal district court, that court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the applicable statutes of limitations had expired on both of plaintiffs' claims. The court held that because plaintiffs did not file their suit until December 23, 2002, both claims were time-barred, absent a tolling a provision or some exception to the statute of limitations. The court also held that plaintiffs failed to allege a continuous trespass and their trespass claim was barred by the applicable five-year statute of limitations.

Plaintiff, a jailer in Miller County, filed a civil rights action against Miller County, its sheriff, three of its county commissioners, and several other defendants to recover for her serious injuries which were caused by two inmates who took her hostage and attacked her after she honored their request to visit the jail's law library. The Miller County individual defendants filed this interlocutory appeal, alleging that the district court erred in concluding that a reasonable jury could find that they violated plaintiff's substantive due process rights. The court held that the Miller County individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where their conduct was not conscience shocking and therefore did not violate plaintiff's substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings against Miller County, the remaining defendant.