Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and her husband filed a negligence action seeking damages related to plaintiff's injuries, which were caused by falling plastic bins that struck her on the head in defendant's store. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. The court held that defendant's failure to plead contributory negligence did not make all evidence regarding plaintiff's conduct excludable and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion in limine. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court further held that, because res ipsa loquitur did not apply, the court need not decide whether plaintiff was correct in her assertion that giving Instruction 16 was error because it was inconsistent with the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The court finally held that because Instruction 14, based on Arkansas Model Jury Instructions 305B and 602, did not affect plaintiff's substantial rights and any error was harmless, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

The Minch Family sued the Estate of the Norbys in diversity, seeking injunctive relief and damages for flooding of the Minch Family's property, allegedly caused by a field dike built on the Norbys' land. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that the Minch Family's claims were time-barred and whether the magistrate judge abused its discretion by denying the Minch Family's motion to amend its complaint to allege a claim for punitive damages and the Minch Family's motion to amend the scheduling order. The court held that the Minch Family had failed to meet its burden of showing that the applicable two year-statute of limitations should be tolled and its claims were untimely. The court held that because it had affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Minch Family's claims as time-barred, the issue of punitive damages was moot. The court further held that because the Minch Family's motion only related to its claim for punitive damages, the court need not address the issue of whether the magistrate judge abused its discretion in denying its motion to amend the court's scheduling order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Appellant appealed the district court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Lake Lotawana, and its mayor, and the subsequent dismissal of her wrongful termination and retaliation claims. On appeal, appellant contended that the city breached her employment contract and that she established triable issues of fact as to her retaliation claims. The court held that the city was entitled to summary judgment on appellant's wrongful termination claim where she did not have an enforceable contract or viable tort claim. The court also held that appellant was terminated because of her inappropriate activities and therefore, the dismissal of appellant's retaliation claims was affirmed because nothing in the record indicated that her opposition to unlawful discrimination was a contributing factor to her termination. The court further held, for the same reasons, that appellant could not succeed under the more stringent standard applied in the Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgement of the district court.

Plaintiff sued his former music teacher, the Logan-Rogersville R-VII School District, and the school principal, asserting nine different claims stemming from the teacher's alleged sexual abuse of plaintiff. At issue was whether the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claims and denying his motion to amend his complaint. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that Counts 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 were time-barred where plaintiff's complaint established that his cause of action accrued in 1992 when he was 15 years old, the statute of limitations was tolled until his 21st birthday, and he had five years, until November 22, 2003, to file his complaint. The court also held that plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title IX were also time-barred where both claims relied on the state's statute of limitations governing personal-injury claims and Missouri imposed a five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.120.4. For the same reasons, plaintiff's state-law claims were time barred by section 516.120.4. The court further held that the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's childhood sexual abuse claim was affirmed where Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.046 required him to commence his action within five years of his 18th birthday. The court finally held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's sexual abuse claim against the school district and principal and the district court did not err in denying as futile plaintiff's motion to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Liberty Mutual sued Pella in the district court for declaratory judgment where the suit was sought to determine the scope of Liberty Mutual's obligation, under general commercial liability (GCL) policies issued to Pella, to reimburse Pella's defense costs in two underlying lawsuits. Both parties appealed the judgment of the district court. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that Liberty Mutual's duty to reimburse Pella's defense costs should be determined by looking at the allegations in the complaint to determine if they stated a covered claim where Liberty Mutual would still have no duty to defend even if it had to reimburse defense costs in a suit where an "occurrence" was alleged but not yet an established fact. The court also held that because the underlying suits did not allege an "occurrence," Liberty Mutual did not owe Pella a duty to reimburse its costs in defending either action. Therefore, the court need not address Liberty Mutual's alternative argument. The court further held that the district court did not commit reversible error in granting summary judgment to Liberty Mutual. The court finally held that, in light of its conclusion that Liberty Mutual had no duty to reimburse Pella's defense costs in the underlying suits, the court need not address the issue of defense costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Liberty Mutual on Pella's bad-faith counterclaim. The court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment to Pella on Liberty Mutual's claim for declaratory judgment and remanded with instructions to enter declaratory judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual.

LCI Equipments, Inc. (LLC) was a Texas corporation that imported and sold the tractor that killed Rudy Slater in a roll-over accident. Wanda Slater, an Arkansas resident and Rudy's wife, commenced a wrongful death action in state court, asserting negligence and strict product liability claims against LCI, and others, focusing primarily on the tractor's lack of a roll-over protection system (ROPS). LCI's insurer, also a Texas corporation, denied coverage and refused to defend LCI under its Commercial General Liability policy. With the wrongful death suit pending, LCI assigned its rights in the policy to Slater who then commenced this action against the insurer in Arkansas state court. On appeal, Slater asserted for the first time the absence of diversity jurisdiction and further argued that the district court erred in construing the policy exclusion. The court held that, as here, where Slater structured the case, naming LCI as a nominal plaintiff, the district court had, and properly exercised, diversity jurisdiction. The court also noted that the partial assignment of the $100 interest retained by LCI did not defeat jurisdiction. The court held that Slater's argument that the insurer had a duty to defend because of LCI's failure to install ROPS safety equipment was not properly preserved in the district court and therefore, the court declined to consider it further. The court also agreed with the district court's conclusion that LaBatt Co. v. Hartford Lloyd's Ins. Co., reflected Texas law. Moreover, the definition of "Your product" in the insurer's policy expressly excluded the "providing of or failure to provide warnings or instructions," unlike the exclusion at issue in LaBatt. Therefore, the insurer's contention was more consistent with the plain language of the policy and Slater had failed to show plain error. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiffs filed this diversity action to foreclose a contractor's lien and an architect's and engineer's lien against Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC (Phoenix Land) and Phoenix Health, LLC (Phoenix Health), as owners of the property in dispute, and three financial institutions with recorded security interests in the property. Phoenix Land filed a counterclaim, asserting breach of contract, negligence, breach of implied warranty, breach of fiduciary relationship, and deceptive trade practices by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's order denying their motion to compel arbitration of Phoenix Land's counterclaim. The court held that the district court did not err in finding plaintiffs' motion to compel arbitration on the ground that they had waived their right to arbitrate the dispute; they knew of the right and acted inconsistently with that right; and Phoenix Land suffered prejudice by plaintiffs' inconsistent actions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the court.

Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., asserting four state law claims of action when she received an undelivered letter that she had written to her son, a solider serving in the Army, where the envelope was stamped in red ink: "DECEASED." After some investigation, plaintiff's son was, in fact, alive. As a result of receiving the erroneously stamped letter, plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress requiring medical treatment. At issue was whether the lawsuits should be dismissed on the ground that the United States' sovereign immunity deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the postal-matter exception barred the lawsuit and consequently, the court need not address the misrepresentation exception. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Appellants challenged the denial of their claim for benefits arising from an underinsured motorists (UIM) policy issued by appellee. Appellants appealed the adverse grant of summary judgment and the denial of their request for certification of a question of law to the North Dakota Supreme Court. The court held that the negligent driver's excess-liability policy was relevant to determining the underinsured status of his vehicle. Thus, as a matter of law, the negligent driver's vehicle was not underinsured and appellants were not entitled to coverage under the UIM endorsement. The court also declined to certify the question where the case had been decided by summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This case arose when appellant alleged claims of tortuous interference with contract or business expectancy and violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ark. Code Ann. 4-88-101, et seq. Appellant subsequently sought a temporary retraining order and preliminary injunction after appellee terminated appellant's patient privileges at a residential nursing home. The court held that appellant did not meet the factors in the Dataphase Syst. Inc. v. C.L. Syst., which evaluated whether to issue an injunction. Consequently, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a preliminary injunction and the judgment was affirmed.