Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Wife, suing on behalf of her deceased husband, (plaintiff) filed tort claims and a breach of warranty claim against pharmaceutical companies, alleging that the prescription Mirapex that husband used to treat his Parkinson's disease lead him to compulsively gamble. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants because plaintiff's claims were time-barred. The court held that the district court correctly determined that plaintiff's claim accrued more than two years before he brought his suit and thus was time-barred. The court also held that because husband became aware of the effect of the Mirapex more than two years before he filed suit, the continuing tort doctrine did not save his claim; that the open courts provision did not operate to save plaintiff's claim; that the district court did not err in determining that the facts were sufficiently developed to establish a concrete injury in 2006 for the purpose of determining ripeness; that the affidavits at issue did not raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether husband's behavioral problems and side effects were so severe as to render him legally incompetent and therefore, the tolling provisions of section 16.0001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code were unavailable; and that plaintiff had not satisfied the requirement that purchasers gave notice of a breach of warranty claim prior to filing suit and therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant on that claim. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

After defendant denied plaintiff's claim for long-term disability benefits (LTD benefits), where plaintiff suffered from fibromyalgia, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant pursuant to ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1000 et seq. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in plaintiff's favor finding that defendant had abused its discretion in denying benefits to plaintiff. The court held that the district court improperly determined that defendant abused its discretion when it ultimately denied the LTD benefits claim. Based on the record, there was more than a scintilla of evidence supporting defendant's conclusion that plaintiff's condition did not render him "disabled" under the policy's any occupation definition and defendant's decision was supported by substantial evidence, where a reasonable person could have reached a similar decision. The court also held that the fact that defendant operated under a structural conflict of interest, as both plan administrator and insurer, did not warrant a finding that defendant abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's claim. Accordingly, the court reversed summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant, the named beneficiary of an accident benefits plan that her husband obtained through his employer, brought suit under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., alleging that the plan administrator, Metropolitan Life Insurance (Metlife), abused its discretion in determining that her husband was intoxicated at the time of the accident and denying coverage. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to Metlife because Metlife's interpretation of the relevant policies was arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial evidence. The court held that Metlife did not abuse its discretion as plan administrator when it denied benefits based on the general exclusion for intoxication that appeared in the certificate of insurance. The court also held that the toxicology report, which concluded that the husband's blood alcohol level was above the state limit, constituted evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and therefore, satisfied the substantial evidence standard. The court also held that because it agreed with the district court's conclusion that the denial of benefits was justified in light of the intoxication conclusion, it need not address Metlife's assertion that the husband's death was not accidental because it was reasonably foreseeable or, alternatively, the result of intentional self-inflicted injury. Accordingly, summary judgment was affirmed.

Viasystems, Inc., a Missouri-based corporation, filed suit against EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG (St. Georgen), a German corporation, alleging several claims in contract and tort. At issue was whether the district court properly concluded that it had neither specific nor general personal jurisdiction over St. Georgen and granted its motion to dismiss. The court held that Viasystems failed to establish a prima facie case that specific and general jurisdiction could be asserted over St. Georgen. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Viasystems' motion for jurisdictional discovery. Therefore, because St. Georgen did not have sufficient "minimum contacts" with Missouri, the maintenance of the suit would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the case.

Plaintiff sued the City of Jonesboro, its mayor, and the members of its city council, alleging that methane gas from a city landfill invaded a tract of land owned by plaintiff and so reduced its value which amounted to a taking of the property by the city. Plaintiff sought just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, other compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. At issue was whether the district court properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, holding that plaintiff's claims were barred by issue preclusion and, in the alternative, that the court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court held that plaintiff's claims did not complain of injuries caused by the state court judgment, but of injuries caused by the invasion of plaintiff's land by methane emanating from the city's landfill. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply to those claims. The court found that the parties and the district court focused on issue preclusion, but the court held that the case was more readily resolved based on claim preclusion. Thus, the court held that plaintiff's claims were barred by claim preclusion and that plaintiff did not avoid claim preclusion through the reservation of federal rights that he included in the third amended complaint in the state court action. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiffs sued defendant over the sale of an automated hunting and fishing licensing system, alleging that defendant misrepresented the capabilities and costs of its software system, as well as information about key programming personnel. Both parties appealed the judgment of the district court, which awarded plaintiffs $965,000 and designated its post-trial order as a final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The court held that, due to the close factual and legal relationship between the fraud, warranty, and good faith and fair dealing claims, Rule 54(b) certification was inappropriate where plaintiffs' unadjudicated claims shared the same facts as the certified claims and where, under Missouri law, fraud and breach of warranty claims shared similar elements and the same conduct could support both theories. The court also held that the district court correctly dismissed defendant's cross-claim against Active Network, Inc. (Active Network) and its assessment of the equities was not clearly unreasonable. Accordingly, the court held that the district court properly certified its order dismissing the cross-claim against Active Network. As there was no final judgment on all claims or a proper 54(b) certification as to the claims between plaintiffs and defendant, the remainder of the appeals were dismissed without prejudice, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, the personal representative of the estate of Velda Smith, sued defendants for medical malpractice, claiming that defendants negligently failed to transfer Smith to a medical facility where she could have received tissue plasminogen activator("tPA") to treat her stroke. At issue was whether the district court properly excluded evidence of plaintiff's medical expert's testimony and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court affirmed summary judgment and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert's testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 where the testimony was predicated on a methodologically flawed and unreliable published medical study ("Zivin Paper").

Appellees sued the Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis ("Archdiocese"), alleging that one of its priests sexually abused them when they were children and asserted Missouri common law claims against the Archdiocese for negligent hiring and for negligent retention and supervision. The Archdiocese moved for an interlocutory review of the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where the Archdiocese principally relied on Gibson v. Brewer, in which the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the dismissal of some materially indistinguishable claims. The court held that assuming the district court correctly held Gibson advanced a faulty First Amendment analysis, the district court erred in failing to predict the impact of the Missouri Constitution upon the negligence claims. Because the Supreme Court of Missouri in Gibson indicated the First Amendment was a complete defense to the negligence claims and reiterated the religious freedom provisions of the Missouri Constitution were broader than those of the First Amendment, it seemed highly likely that the Supreme Court of Missouri would bar the negligence claims under the Missouri Constitution, if its First Amendment analysis were later abrogated by the Supreme Court of the United States. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for dismissal of the negligence claims, as well as for further proceedings.

Appellant sued defendants, the City of Minneapolis ("city") and an off-duty city police officer, alleging excessive force claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and assault and batter claims under Minnesota Law. At issue was whether the district court properly granted the city's motion for summary judgment with respect to the vicarious liability claims against the city. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment where appellant failed to show that the officer's assault occurred within work-related limits of time and place.

Plaintiff filed a petition for equitable garnishment against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") after she was injured at a crosswalk from a truck driver, the insured under State Farm's policies, who negligently struck and injured her. At issue was whether plaintiff could recover additional amounts from State Farm where State Farm's policy contained an "anti-stacking" clause and an "excess coverage" clause. The court reversed the district court's ruling that plaintiff could stack State Farm's liability limits in each of its four policies where Paragraph 3 of the policy did not create an ambiguity that permitted a court to ignore the unambiguous anti-stacking clause in Paragraph I. The court also remanded to the district court to decide whether a single insurer, having issued four policies to the owner of four vehicles who then negligently caused an accident while driving a non-owned vehicle, may enforce its anti-stacking clause after it satisfied the minimum Missouri's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law's, State. 303.010 et seq., coverage requirement.