Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

After Juston Pohl was injured in an automobile accident in Furnas County, Pohl brought this negligence action against the County, alleging that the accident was caused by the County's failure to have a properly placed and maintained road sign at the scene. The County responded that the accident was caused by Pohl's own negligent driving. The district court found both parties negligent, apportioning sixty percent of the negligence to the County and forty percent to Pohl, and awarding Pohl $407,163 in damages. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) finding the County was negligent in its maintenance and placement of the sign; (2) finding that the County's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident; (3) finding that Pohl's negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries; and (4) apportioning negligence between the parties.

Plaintiff sued her former employer after the company made public statements about her involvement in an incident in which a pernicious racial slur appeared on a return receipt that she handed to a customer. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of her claim for false light invasion of privacy and grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on her defamation claim. The court concluded that plaintiff was a private figure and a reasonable jury could conclude that the employer's statements were false, that they harmed her reputation, and that this harm was distinguishable from any harm flowing from the generic news stories. Therefore, the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the employer on plaintiff's defamation claim. The court agreed, however, with the district court that Missouri would not recognize plaintiff's false light claim.

Plaintiff filed suit against BIP alleging tort claims based upon BIP's marketing and sales of pramiprexole, a drug commonly prescribed as Mirapex. Plaintiff took Mirapex from 2002 to 2007 to treat symptoms of Restless Leg Syndrome. Plaintiff alleged that his use of Mirapex caused compulsive behaviors, such as gambling and hypersexuality. BIP moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted and plaintiff subsequently appealed. The court held that the district court correctly determined that plaintiff's claims accrued as of October 2007, and thus the statute of limitations period began to run at that time; with the exception of the strict liability claim, the court did not need to address plaintiff's argument that longer statute of limitations periods applied because he waived this argument on two occasions; and Nevada's two-year personal injury statute of limitations period applied to the strict liability claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

S&A sued Farms.com alleging that Farms.com violated the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq., breached its fiduciary duty, committed negligence, and made misrepresentations. The district court granted Farms.com's motion for summary judgment and S&A appealed. The court found that S&A did not sufficiently plead a fraudulent-inducement claim under 7 U.S.C. 6, but only alleged that Farms.com engaged in a fraudulent scheme under 7 U.S.C. 6o(1)(B). The court concluded that the district court did not err by granting Farms.com's motion for summary judgment on S&A's fraud claim where S&A's complaint alleged only a fraudulent scheme, not that Farms.com's failure to register caused it damages. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in granting Farms.com's motion for summary judgment on S&A's breach of fiduciary duty claim where S&A presented no evidence describing a commodity-trading advisor's standard of care or how Farms.com breached that standard of care.

Appellants appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of American Standard. The district court concluded that appellants were not entitled to recover underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage benefits under four American Standard policies because the tortfeasor's vehicle was not an "underinsured motor vehicle" under the policies' plain language. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that appellants were not entitled to recover under the UIM policies because stacking them did not result in an amount exceeding the tortfeasor's liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

LINA appealed the district court's ruling that LINA abused its discretion in denying death benefits to Dawn McClelland based upon her husband's life insurance policy. LINA also appealed the district court's award of attorney's fees. The court found that LINA committed an abuse of discretion in denying benefits because its interpretation was contrary to the language of the plan that it would cover "loss of life" based upon an "accident" and because substantial evidence did not support its decision. The court also found that the total fee awarded should be $85,000 and remanded to the district court to enter an award in that amount. The prejudgment interest award was affirmed.

Plaintiff sued Hartford seeking coverage under his life insurance policy for accidental dismemberment benefits after he suffered serious injuries to his eyes when a can of oven cleaner exploded in his face. The district court dismissed plaintiff's suit, concluding it was untimely because it was brought three years after the loss, outside the policy's time limitations for bringing legal actions against Hartford. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that he brought suit within Arkansas's five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions, Ark. Code Ann. 23-79-202(b). The court agreed with plaintiff and held that prior case law was inconsistent with Hartford's contention that the "period prescribed by law" referred to in section 23-79-202 meant something other than the full five-year period set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 16-56-111. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff sued Jessica J. Wright and her insurers for equitable garnishment to collect a state court judgment. Wright had hacked into plaintiff's voicemail and Facebook services, sending disparaging letters and emails about him, and making anonymous phone calls and texts to harass or defame him, among other things. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurers and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that the Umbrella Policy covered personal injury arising from defamation or privacy violations and excluded coverage for personal injury arising from mental abuse. Therefore, the acts in this case - whether they were the results of Wright's negligence - were mental abuse and not covered by the insurance policy.

Plaintiff brought suit against BNSF, alleging common law negligence and seeking compensation for injuries he suffered when the automobile he was driving hit a BNSF railcar that was stopped at a railroad crossing. The district court granted summary judgment to BNSF, dismissing all of plaintiff's claims. Because the court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that the warning regulations did not create a federal standard of care under which the railroad was expected to act, the 2007 Amendments to the Federal Railway Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. 20106, had no effect on the prior case law relating to those regulations. As such, Norfolk Southern Railway v. Shanklin was not overruled by the 2007 Amendment and was controlling. Therefore, plaintiff's warning claims were preempted because the B Street Crossing warning system was paid for in party by federal funds. Further, the local-condition savings clause under the FRSA was not applicable. The court also held that the district court was correct in determining that plaintiff's claim of negligence based on failure to equip the railcar with reflective devices was preempted; the district court appropriately granted summary judgment based on lack of causation and the court need not reach the issue of whether plaintiff's claim was preempted; and the district court properly granted summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim that BNSF was negligent in failing to keep its rolling stock under reasonable and proper control and supervision.

Defendant was found guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and assault resulting in a serious bodily injury. The district court ordered defendant to pay restitution to South Dakota's Medicaid program and South Dakota's State Crime Victim Compensation program under the Mandatory Victim's Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. Defendant appealed. The court concluded that the district court did not err in ordering mandatory restitution because defendant's victim was a victim of a crime covered by the MVRA; the victim suffered a loss in the form of expensive medical treatment; and the victim received compensation for her loss from third parties. Under the MVRA and section 3664(j)(1), the court was required to award restitution directly to those third parties in an amount equal to the amount of compensation and not exceeding the total amount of the victim's loss. The fact that the third parties were agencies of South Dakota did not change the analysis. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.