Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Lowell Burris and his wife commenced a product liability action against Menard, Versa, and Versa's affiliate in Minnesota state court. After Menard removed the action to federal court, which had diversity jurisdiction, Gulf commenced this action seeking a judgment declaring "that the policy issued by Gulf to [the named insureds] does not afford coverage to them or Menard, Inc. for any claim made by [Burris] under the terms of the Gulf Policy." The district court granted Gulf's motion for a summary declaratory judgment on the ground that Versa' dissolution after expiration of the policy meant that the insured "cannot meet its obligations under the SIR" (Self-Insured Retention endorsement), a material breach that terminated Gulf's obligations under the policy. Burris appealed. The court concluded that summary judgment for Gulf was factually unwarranted and the declaratory judgment action was dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff sued her employer and its workers' compensation insurer for intentional obstruction of workers' compensation in violation of Minnesota statute 176.82. The employer and insurer moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The court held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the employer intentionally obstructed her receipt of workers' compensation benefits through her manager's fabrications and its 17-month delay in payment. The court also held that genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the insurer intentionally obstructed her receipt of workers' compensation benefits by concealing the manager's first statement about the purpose of the meeting at issue, filing a factually-inaccurate claim denial, and continuing to deny the claim through trial. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff filed a products liability action against CNH based on injuries he sustained while operating a CNH-manufactured bulldozer. A jury returned a verdict in favor of CNH and defendant appealed. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the manufacturing defect claims where plaintiff had not pointed to sufficient evidence in the record that would support his claim that the product manufactured by CNH "departed from its intended design" and did not meet its "design specifications." The court also held that there was no error in the jury instructions regarding the "sophisticated user," "premature wear" instruction, "safety code" instruction, and "manufacturer expert in its field" instruction. Finally, because plaintiff was unable to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's dismissal of a prospective juror, the jury verdict must be upheld. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Continental sold its food and beverage metal can and can-end technology to Crown via a stock purchase agreement (SPA) in March 1990. The parties disputed the extent of each other's resultant liabilities, as defined by the indemnity provision in the SPA in concurrent binding arbitration and judicial proceedings. Continental subsequently appealed the grant of summary judgment and the district court's denial of its motion to reconsider or alter or amend its judgment. The court found that Continental failed to meet its burden of proving it was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the meaning of the indemnity provision. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that Continental was precluded from further litigating the provision's meaning, properly granted summary judgment in favor of Crown, and did not abuse its discretion in denying Continental's motion to reconsider.

Defendant sent the Bettendorf, Iowa Police Department an envelope containing white powder and a threatening letter. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to a threatening communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. 876(c) and was sentenced to 21 months in prison. Defendant appealed the district court's order that he pay restitution to the State Lab. The court agreed with the district court that section 876(c) was a crime of violence within the meaning of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A, and that the State Lab could be a victim under the MVRA. However, as the the government failed to prove the amount of actual loss, the court reversed the restitution order.

Plaintiff brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants alleging, among other claims, that officers used excessive force against her in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer Justin Hooper. Officer Hooper performed a "leg sweep" on plaintiff while trying to stop her from striking her boyfriend. The court concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Officer Hooper used excessive force against plaintiff based on the physical distance between plaintiff and her boyfriend at the time of the incident, the nature of the crime at issue (disorderly conduct), and the degree of the injury suffered. The court also reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds where the right Officer Hooper allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the misconduct. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

This case involved a dispute between an excess and primary insurer, both of whom insured a trucking company whose tractor trailer was involved in a fatal accident. Parties injured in the accident sued the trucking company and obtained a jury verdict which exposed the excess carrier to a $17 million dollar liability. The excess carrier sued the primary carrier, alleging bad faith in failing to settle the underlying claim within the policy limits. The court held that the district court did not err in applying Missouri law because the excess insurer failed to identify Washington as a state "with a relationship to, or an interest in the issues that approaches Missouri's[.]" The court also held that the excess insurer's bad faith claim failed because its insured never made a demand of the primary insurer to settle the underlying litigation within the policy limits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the primary insurer.

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of their son, sued, inter alia, the Isanti County Deputy Sheriff in his individual and official capacity under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and relevant state law, seeking damages for alleged injuries suffered when the deputy entered their home without a warrant. The deputy was dispatched to plaintiffs' home to conduct a "welfare check on a five-year-old son and an intoxicated mother." The jury returned a verdict in favor of the deputy and the district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. On appeal, plaintiffs sought a new trial, arguing that the district court gave erroneous jury instructions and made erroneous evidentiary rulings. The court held that the district court did not err in instructing the jury on who bore the burden of proof; in instructing the jury on the emergency aid exception; in admitting the preliminary breath test result for the limited purpose of determining the reasonableness of the deputy's actions after he administered the test; and in excluding the proffered testimony of a subsequent home-entry incident involving the deputy. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff sued Wal-Mart after she tripped on a rug in the store, asserting tort claims for her injuries. A jury ruled in favor of Wal-Mart and the district court subsequently denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The court found no abuse of discretion regarding the admission of Wal-Mart's independent physician; there was no clear abuse of discretion where the district court refused to allow into evidence any exhibits or testimony regarding a previous incident that occurred on the same rug, in the same location prior to plaintiff's fall; and there was no abuse of discretion by denying the motion for new trial because of improper closing arguments.

Plaintiffs sued defendant for negligence and loss of consortium when defendant performed an unsuccessful spinal fusion surgery on one plaintiff. The jury found in favor of defendant and plaintiffs subsequently appealed the court's denial of their motion for a new trial. The court held that the district court did not clearly and prejudicially abuse its considerable discretion in prohibiting the admission of the evidence concerning defendant's other patients under Rule 404(b). The court also held that the district court's exclusion of the evidence was also proper under Rule 403 because any relevance was substantially outweighed by the evidence's greater potential to prejudice defendant unfairly, confuse the jury, and cause undue delay. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion where it properly deferred to the jury's weighing of conflicting expert testimony about whether defendant properly placed the pedicle screws. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.