Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Joseph Tracy appealed the Benefits Review Board's determination that injuries he incurred in part during his employment by Global International Offshore Ltd. from 1998-2002 were not covered under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901-950. Because the court held that no portion of Tracy's employment during this period satisfied the Act's status and situs test, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Keller Foundation/Case FNDN, et al v. Tracy, et al; Tracy, Jr. v. Director, Workers' Compensation Programs" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against the manufacturer of an electronic control device - commonly known as a "taser" - and sued police officers for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law wrongful death. At issue was whether a police officer had used constitutionally excessive force by repeatedly deploying a taser against a combative suspect and whether the manufacturer of that device had provided sufficient warning that its repeated use could lead to death. The deceased suspect had gouged out the eye of a family member, attempting to exorcize her demons, when police officers arrived at the scene. The court held that the taser provided sufficient warning as a matter of law. The court also held that, although the officers used significant force in this case, it was justified by the considerable government interests at stake. Because the court concluded that the officers acted reasonably in using force, plaintiffs' state law claims against the officers for wrongful death could not succeed unless the use of the taser constituted deadly force and the use of the deadly force was not justified. The court concluded that it was not convinced that the use of the taser involved deadly force, but even if the taser qualified as deadly force, no reasonable jury could find that the circumstances here failed to justify the use of deadly force. View "Marquez, et al v. City of Phoenix, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a recognized figure in aviation history and defendants are retired commercial airline captains who became friends with plaintiff in the 1980s. Defendants sell aviation-related memorabilia, including items related to or signed by plaintiff. In 2008, plaintiff brought claims against defendants, including violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., California's common law right to privacy, and California's statutory right to publicity, Cal. Civ. Code 3344. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants. Plaintiff contended that the district court should not have struck his declaration, which contained comprehensive details he did not remember at his deposition. He also contended that, under California's single-publication rule, defendants "republished" statements about him on their website - when they modified unrelated information on their website. The court rejected both arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Yeager, et al v. Bowlin, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration denied Hill's application. An ALJ also denied Plaintiff's application, and the appeals council denied Plaintiff's request for review. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security and affirmed the ALJ's decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the ALJ failed to consider evidence favorable to Plaintiff and posed an improper hypothetical question to the vocational expert; and (2) therefore, substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act.

Plaintiff played professional football for nineteen years. When he retired in 2002, he was employed by the Tennessee Titans. In 2008, he filed a workers' compensation claim in California, alleging that he suffered pain and disability from injuries incurred during his career. Plaintiff asked the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to vacate an arbitration award that prohibited him from pursuing workers' compensation benefits under California law, arguing (1) the award violated California public policy and federal labor policy, and (2) the award was in disregard of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The district court confirmed the arbitration award. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff did not allege sufficient contacts with California to show his workers' compensation claim came within the scope of California's workers' compensation regime, and therefore, he did not establish that the arbitration award violated California public policy; (2) because Plaintiff did not show that the award deprived him of something to which he was entitled under state law, he did not show it violated federal labor policy; and (3) Plaintiff did not establish that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

This case involved a dispute over the proceeds of a life insurance policy. At issue was whether the federal interpleader remedy shields a negligent stakeholder from tort liability for its creation of a conflict over entitlement to the interpleaded funds. After analyzing the Supreme Court's reasoning in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it did not, and that a claimant may seek to recover all damages directly and proximately caused by the negligent stakeholder's conduct. In so holding, the Court reversed the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

Deborah Benge, a former employee of Pacific Ship Repair and Fabrication, filed a disability claim under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act seeking compensation for her work-related injury. The ALJ found that Benge's disability at the time was permanent. The Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) made partial permanent disability payments to Benge until Benge underwent surgery. An ALJ subsequently determined that Benge's nine-month total disability immediately following the surgery was temporary in nature. This determination absolved the OWCP from making disability payments during this time period. Instead, Pacific was liable for the payments. The Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ, concluding that even if a disability is declared permanent, it may be later re-characterized as temporary when the underlying condition worsens and re-stabilizes following a surgical procedure. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the Longshore Act, a prior finding of partial permanent disability does not preclude a later finding of temporary disability for the same underlying injury during a period of recovery following surgery; and (2) because Benge's partial disability could be re-characterized as a temporary total disability in accord with changed circumstances, Pacific was responsible for the temporary total disability payments.

In 2004, Michael Rosa was apprehended by police officers after one of the officers deployed his advanced Taser M26 ECD (M26). After officers had Michael in restraints, Michael stopped breathing and later died of ventricular arrhythmia. The doctor who performed the autopsy listed "Taser application and arrest by police" as contributing conditions. Michael's death was subsequently linked to metabolic acidosis, a condition under which lactic acid accumulates more quickly than the body can dispose of it, causing the pH in the body to decrease, making sudden cardiac arrest more likely. Plaintiffs, Michael's parents and his daughter sued TASER International, Inc. (Defendant) as manufacturer of the M26, asserting that Michael died because it had provided an inadequate warning of the dangers of the product to the officers who used it. Plaintiffs pursued both strict liability and negligence theories under California law based upon this failure to warn. The district court awarded summary judgment to Defendant. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the district court properly awarded summary judgment in favor of TASER because the risk of lactic acidosis was not knowable in 2003 when the M26 at issue was distributed.

Defendant CB&I Constructors, Inc. negligently caused a June 2002 wildfire that burned roughly 18,000 acres of the Angeles National Forest in Southern California. The United States brought a civil action against CB&I to recover damages for harm caused by the fire. The jury found CB&I liable and awarded roughly $7.6 million in fire suppression, emergency mitigation, and resource protection costs, and $28.8 million in intangible environmental damages. CB&I challenged the award for environmental damages. The district court held that the government provided sufficient evidence for the jury to determine the amount of environmental damages, and that the resulting award was not grossly excessive. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under California law, the government was entitled to full compensation for all the harms caused by the fire, including intangible environment harm; and (2) substantial evidence supported the jury's determination of the amount of environmental damages, and the award was not grossly excessive.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal district court against the United States government, alleging causes of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that agents from the DEA committed the torts of assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress when they executed a search warrant at plaintiffs' mobile home. The court agreed with the district court that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether DEA Agents' use of force against the adult members of plaintiffs' family was reasonable. The court, however, disagreed with the district court's conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether DEA Agents used reasonable force against the 11-year-old and 14-year-old plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.