Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought suit against Deerbrook for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff was injured in an accident caused by Deerbrook's insured and after plaintiff received a judgment against the insured, the insured assigned his bad faith claim to plaintiff. Plaintiff argued that Deerbrook breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to its insured when Deerbrook did not attempt to reach a settlement of plaintiff's claims after the insured's liability in excess of the policy limit became reasonably clear. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's rejection of his request to instruct the jury that it could consider Deerbrook's failure to effectuate a settlement in determining whether Deerbrook breached the implied covenant. The court concluded that plaintiff's proposed jury instruction was consistent with the law but that there was no evidentiary basis for the instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs brought several state causes of action in Arizona state court against Medtronic for injuries sustained by Richard Stengel from his use of a pain pump manufactured by Medtronic. Medtronic timely removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and the district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims as preempted by federal law. The court held that even if some of plaintiffs' claims could be interpreted to escape express preemption, they could not be interpreted to escape implied preemption. Therefore, the district court correctly held that plaintiffs' proposed amendment was futile and thus did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.

Plaintiff was injured when the automobile in which he was traveling collided with an automobile owned and driven by an off-duty sailor whose negligence was conceded. Plaintiff and his wife brought suit against the United States on a theory of respondeat superior. The court concluded that a servicemember en route to participation in a recreational activity, where participation was encouraged by the Navy but not required, was not acting in the line of duty. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government.

Plaintiff, a minor, brought federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state negligence claims against the County and its employee social workers (collectively, defendants). Plaintiff, sexually assaulted by his 17-year-old foster brother while living in a foster family home, contended that defendants failed to intervene prior to his sexual assault, despite their knowledge of the escalating threats and violence against him. The district court dismissed with prejudice all claims against the County. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion because the district court denied leave to amend where plaintiff was denied the opportunity to allege additional facts supporting the claim that defendant's constitutional violations were carried out pursuant to County policy or custom and where the County's derivative liability was tied directly to the negligence of, or successful assertion of immunity by, its employees. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision and vacated the judgment.

The district court affirmed a bankruptcy court's confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization under 11 U.S.C. 524(g), a special provision for the reorganization of companies facing substantial asbestos-related liability. Appellants were several insurance companies that did not reach settlements with Thorpe and Pacific, together with Debtors in bankruptcy court, and who were denied standing to challenge the reorganization plan. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the plan preempted appellants' state law contract rights; disagreed with the position of Debtors that the appeal was equitably moot; and in reaching the merits, reversed the district court's conclusion that appellants lacked standing. The court remanded to the district court with instructions that it return the case to the bankruptcy court to give appellants the opportunity to present their proof and argument.

This case involved an Oregon statute which adopted a special statute of limitations for abuse victims. Under the statute, an action must be commenced before the person reached age 40 or within five years of discovery of the causal connection between the abuse and the injury. At issue was the effect of this statute on plaintiff's federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that he was beaten by teachers at his elementary school from 1986-1988. The court concluded that Oregon's general statute of limitations, rather than the specialized abuse statute, governed plaintiff's claims and that federal, not state law, governed accrual of his claims.

Plaintiff commenced this action against Burger King, raising claims under Oregon law for product liability, negligence, and vicarious liability after plaintiff discovered that a Burger King employee had spit into his Whopper. Plaintiff subsequently appealed from a final judgment on the pleadings dismissing his diversity action against defendants. This order certified to the Supreme Court of Washington the dispositive and unsettled question of Washington state law at issue in this appeal, namely, whether the Washington Products Liability Act (WPLA), Wash. Rev. Code 7.72.010, permitted relief for emotional distress damages, in the absence of physical injury to the plaintiff purchaser, caused by being served and touching, but not consuming a contaminated food product.

Plaintiffs, representing a putative class of purchasers of contact lens solutions, appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that defendant violated California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq., and False Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500 et seq., by marketing Complete MoisturePlus as a product that cleaned and disinfected lenses. The district court ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing. Defendant argued that the ruling was not in error and that even if it was, the suit was properly dismissed because the class' claims were preempted by 21 U.S.C. 360k(a) of the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976 (MDA), 21 U.S.C. 360(c) et seq. The court held that the district court was incorrect to conclude that this class of plaintiffs lacked standing where they had demonstrated economic harm, but the court held that it could affirm the district court's summary judgment on any ground supported by the record. Therefore, the court held that the record demonstrated that the class' claims were preempted, so the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.

Plaintiffs, individual homeowners, sued defendants, some of the nation's largest housing developers, seeking damages, attorneys fees and costs, and the option to rescind their home purchases due to defendants' fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of California law. At issue was whether plaintiffs, who purchased homes in new developments, had standing to sue defendants for injuries allegedly caused by defendants' practice of marketing neighboring homes to individuals who presented a high risk of foreclosure and abandonment of their homes, financing those high-risk buyers, concealing that information, and misrepresenting the character of the neighborhoods. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' overpayment and rescission claims for lack of Article III standing. The court also held that plaintiffs' decreased economic value and desirability were cognizable injuries. While the court agreed with the district court that, on the current record, plaintiffs have not established a sufficient causal connection between any decreased value and desirability and defendants' actions, plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their complaint and attach expert testimony on causation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

This case was related to certain documents produced in discovery and filed in the bankruptcy court, containing allegations that Father M and D, two priests who were not parties to the Portland Archdiocese's bankruptcy case, had sexually abused children. The bankruptcy court held that the discovery documents at issue could be disclosed to the public, because the public's interest in disclosure of these discovery documents outweighed the priests' privacy interest under Rule 26(c) and that the documents filed in court could be disclosed because they did not contain "scandalous" allegations for purposes of 11 U.S.C. 107(b). The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling as to the release of discovery documents disclosing Father M's name under Rule 26(c), because the public's serious safety concerns could not be addressed if Father M's name was redacted. But because the record did not reflect the existence of any similar significant public interest that required the disclosure of Father D's name, the court held that Father D's name must be redacted from any discovery documents that were released. Finally, because of the mandatory duty to keep scandalous material confidential at the request of a party under section 107(b), the court reversed the decision to release the punitive damages memorandum and attached documents.