Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a class of indigent children who suffered from severe emotional and mental disabilities, sued Idaho state officials more than three decades ago, alleging that the officials were providing them with inadequate care in violation of their constitutional and statutory rights. The parties reached agreements intended to remedy deficiencies in care and those agreements were embodied in three consent decrees entered and monitored by the district court. Plaintiffs appealed the 2007 order of the district court finding that defendants had substantially complied with the remaining Action Items, which were specified in an Implementation Plan that resulted from the third consent decree, asserting that it was error for the district court to apply the standard for civil contempt in determining whether to vacate the decrees. Plaintiffs further contended that the district court committed errors in fact and law in issuing protective orders barring them from taking supplemental depositions of appellee and two non-parties. The court held that the district court's application of the contempt standard with the imposition of the burden of proof on plaintiffs was error where the district court accepted the Action Items as the entire measure of compliance with the consent decree. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the district court. The court also held that the district court committed no errors in upholding the assertion of the deliberative process privilege to one non-party and appellee, as well as the legislative privilege to the second non-party. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the protective orders.

Plaintiff sued defendant seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that defendant's liens were not valid, in whole or in part, where plaintiff received a substantial settlement from her insurer when she suffered serious injuries in a car accident and received extensive health care services from defendant. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant because it had a right to recover the money spent on plaintiff's medical care under 25 U.S.C. 1621e. The court reversed and held that section 1621e, which allowed healthcare providers to recover expenses from third-party tortfeasors, relevant insureres, or other third parties, did not apply to the action where defendant sought to enforce a right of recovery against plaintiff to whom it provided services.

Plaintiffs, twenty-two Argentinian residents, brought suit against DaimlerChrylser Aktiengesellschaft ("DCAG") alleging that one of DCAG's subsidiaries, Mercedes-Benz Argentina ("MBA"), collaborated with state security forces to kidnap, torture, and kill plaintiffs and/or their relatives during Argentina's "Dirty War." At issue was whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over DCAG. The court held that DCAG was subject to personal jurisdiction in California through the contacts of its subsidiary Mercedes-Benz USA ("MBUSA") where MBUSA was DCAG's agent, at least for personal jurisdiction purposes, and that exercise of personal jurisdiction was reasonable under the circumstances of the case.

Defendant appealed a restitution order directing him to pay the victim's mother to cover costs that she incurred in making a series of trips between her home and the victim's boarding school 150 miles away after defendant pleaded guilty to one count of abusive sexual contact and was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment. At issue was whether the mother's travel expenses were "incurred by the victim" and subject to restitution under the applicable statute. Also at issue was whether the restitution award was issued in violation of the procedural and evidentiary requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3664. The court initially held that defendant's waiver of appeal was ineffective as to the restitution order and so would consider his challenges to that order on the merits. The court then held that the mother's travel expenses could have been "incurred by the victim" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 2248(b)(3) where the mother could have made trips in her capacity as a loved family member but she incurred the costs of the trips in her capacity as legal guardian, on behalf of her daughter. The court also held that the district court's restitution order violated the requirements of section 3664 where the district court set forth no explanation of its reasoning and where a spreadsheet was an inadequate evidentiary basis to support the restitution award.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging that defendant negligently allowed an unreasonably dangerous condition to exist in its store after she fell over an end cap and injured herself. The district court prohibited plaintiff's medical experts from testifying about causation in her case-in-chief due to her failure to comply with expert disclosure rules. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant on the grounds that plaintiff failed to establish that defendant breached its duty to her and that plaintiff's injuries were caused by her fall. Also at issue was whether the district court properly precluded nonmedical expert testimony. The court reversed summary judgment on the breach of duty ruling and held that there were genuine issues of material facts as to whether the end cap was an open and obvious condition and, even assuming obviousness, whether defendant should have anticipated the danger nevertheless. The court also held that when a treating physician morphs into a witness hired to render expert opinions that go beyond the usual scope of a treating doctor's testimony, the proponent of the testimony must comply with Federal Rule of Evidence 26(a)(2). Therefore, the court reversed summary judgment on the causation ruling and held as a matter of discretion that plaintiff should be allowed to rectify her error by disclosing reports for her treating physicians. The court further held that, because plaintiff's failure to disclose her nonmedical experts' reports in a timely manner was neither substantially justified nor harmless, the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding those experts from testifying in plaintiff's case-in-chief.

Plaintiffs, Ecuadorian members of a fishing boat, sued the United States for damages that resulted from the United States Coast Guard's ("Coast Guard") stop of plaintiffs' boat in international waters near the Galapagos Islands under suspicion of plaintiffs' involvement with smuggling drugs. The Coast Guard performed tests on plaintiffs' boat that yielded inconclusive results and the Ecuadorian government conducted further tests which resulted in no contraband and no charges filed against plaintiffs. At issue was whether the United States waived its sovereign immunity under numerous sources. The court held that non-congressional sources were not acts of Congress and did not effect a waiver of sovereign immunity. The court also held that the Military Claims Act, Alien Tort Statute, and a bilateral treaty concerning the Air Force base at Manta, Ecuador did not waive sovereign immunity. The court further held that the Public Vessels Act ("PVA"), Suits in Admiralty Act, and Federal Tort Claims Act provided waivers of sovereign immunity. The court finally held that if a suit falls within the scope of the PVA, 46 U.S.C. 31102, plaintiffs must meet the reciprocity requirement of the PVA regardless of the type of claim they assert. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded to give the parties and the district court additional opportunity to determine whether reciprocity exists under Ecuadorian Law.

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their complaint on forum non conveniens grounds where plaintiffs developed eye infections after surgery in Mexico and initially brought suit in the Central District of California. At issue was whether the district court erred in finding that Mexico was an available alternative forum by not placing conditions on the dismissal of the case. The court held that, based on the evidence before it at the time, the district court did not err in its initial forum non conveniens analysis by not imposing return conditions. The court also held that, in light of the subsequent changes in the factual circumstances, a new forum non conveniens analysis was compelled and therefore, the court vacated and remanded the case.