Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Two individuals became involved in a public dispute relating to allegations of Russian interference and the passage of the Magnitsky Act. One party, a British citizen, made several statements in media interviews and social media posts from New York, characterizing the other party—a Russian-American lobbyist—as a “spy operator in Washington, D.C.” and linking him to a controversial meeting at Trump Tower in New York. The lobbyist claimed these statements were defamatory and brought suit in the District of Columbia, arguing that the statements caused harm to his reputation in D.C. and that the speaker’s comments established personal jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the claim and dismissed the case, holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the British citizen. The district court also denied the speaker’s request for attorney’s fees under the D.C. Anti–SLAPP Act, finding that such fees were not warranted because the dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction rather than on a motion under the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the British citizen did not “purposefully avail” himself of the benefits and protections of D.C. law, as required under the minimum-contacts test from International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The statements at issue did not focus on D.C. or create jurisdictionally significant contacts with the forum. The court also affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees, ruling that the D.C. Anti–SLAPP Act does not apply when the dismissal is for lack of personal jurisdiction rather than under the statute’s special motion to dismiss. The court denied the request for jurisdictional discovery. View "Akhmetshin v. Browder" on Justia Law

Zia Chishti, formerly CEO of a technology company, and his wife brought claims against Tatiana Spottiswoode, her attorneys, and related parties. Chishti and Spottiswoode had a prior romantic relationship, and Spottiswoode was later employed by Chishti’s company under an arbitration agreement. In 2017, Spottiswoode accused Chishti of harassment and assault, leading to confidential arbitration, which resulted in an arbitral award in her favor. Years later, Spottiswoode was subpoenaed to testify before Congress about forced arbitration in sexual assault cases, where she recounted her experiences involving Chishti. After her testimony, Spottiswoode and her attorney made public statements to the media and on social media regarding the matter. Chishti alleged these statements were defamatory and part of a campaign to damage his reputation, causing him to resign from his executive roles. His wife also claimed loss of consortium.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court found that Spottiswoode’s statements before Congress were protected by legislative privilege under District of Columbia law, and that the post-hearing public statements were protected opinions or shielded by the fair reporting privilege and the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the other tort claims were duplicative of defamation, that the conspiracy and loss of consortium claims failed without a viable underlying tort, and that the breach of contract claims were barred by privilege or insufficiently pleaded.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that witness statements to Congress and related communications were absolutely privileged under District of Columbia law. It further held that post-hearing statements were protected as opinion or by fair reporting, and that related tort and contract claims failed for lack of an actionable underlying claim. The dismissal with prejudice was affirmed. View "Chishti v. Spottiswoode" on Justia Law

A former State Department employee and his family alleged that two law enforcement officers from the State Department arrived unannounced at their home in Virginia, banged on the door, and engaged in aggressive behavior. One officer, previously known to have harassed the employee at work, cursed and shouted at him, grabbed him by the wrist in front of his family, and pointed his fingers in the shape of a gun at the employee’s young son, pretending to shoot and calling him a racial slur. The family claimed they were traumatized by the encounter, with children crying, experiencing nightmares, and the in-laws suffering insomnia and depression.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the family’s claim of common law assault under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), applying Virginia law. The district court concluded that while the officer’s conduct was threatening, it did not plausibly place any family member in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical harm—an essential element for assault under Virginia law. The court stayed other FTCA claims pending Department of Labor review, then dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction when the plaintiff declined to seek a ruling under the Federal Employees Compensation Act.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed de novo the dismissal of the family’s FTCA assault claim. The appellate court held that the facts alleged, if true, plausibly established all elements of assault under Virginia law: overt acts intended to cause harmful or offensive contact or apprehension thereof, and reasonable apprehension of imminent contact, including through the doctrine of transferred intent. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, holding the family’s claim could proceed. View "He v. Rubio" on Justia Law

A professor of archaeology at a Peruvian university was elected as an international member of a prominent American scientific organization. In 2021, following a sexual harassment complaint filed by a former student, the organization revoked his membership for an alleged violation of its Code of Conduct. Shortly after, the organization’s president notified members via email that an international member’s membership was rescinded for a Code violation, and a public announcement was posted stating the professor’s name and referencing the specific Code section. That section broadly prohibits harassment, discrimination, bullying, and disrespect. A media outlet subsequently reported the professor’s ejection, linking it to sexual harassment, and included a general statement from the organization’s president about role modeling professional conduct.The professor sued the organization and its president in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, raising claims of defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and defamation by implication. The district court dismissed all claims. It held that the statements were not false because the professor admitted the organization expelled him based on allegations that, if true, would have violated the Code of Conduct; thus, it found no actionable false statement. The court also found insufficient factual allegations to support defamation by implication and denied further leave to amend the complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the defamation by implication claim, finding no plausible allegation that the defendants intended or endorsed a defamatory inference. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the defamation and false light claims, holding that the professor had sufficiently alleged that the statements were false and capable of a defamatory meaning. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings on those claims. View "Butters v. National Academy of Sciences" on Justia Law

On Christmas Eve, Bruce Bunting slipped and fell outside a CVS store in the District of Columbia on a walkway covered with a mix of water and salt or de-icing material, resulting in a serious ankle injury. Photographs taken soon after showed a wet but not icy surface. Bunting and his wife sued CVS in D.C. Superior Court, alleging negligence, negligence per se, and loss of consortium under D.C. law. They argued CVS failed to maintain a safe walkway and did not adequately warn of the hazard. Both sides retained expert witnesses to address whether the walkway met the standard of care, focusing on its static coefficient of friction (COF); the parties agreed a COF below 0.50 indicated a dangerously slippery surface.After CVS removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, that court granted summary judgment to CVS. The district court concluded the plaintiffs were required to present expert testimony showing the walkway was below the COF standard, and found the plaintiffs’ expert testing insufficient because it did not replicate the precise mix of salt and water present at the time of the fall. The court also granted CVS summary judgment on the negligence per se claim, holding that the cited municipal safety regulation did not establish a duty different from the common law standard of care.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that the parties’ expert evidence created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the walkway was unreasonably slippery, making summary judgment inappropriate on the negligence claim. However, the court affirmed summary judgment for CVS on the negligence per se claim, finding that the municipal regulation at issue merely repeated the common law duty of reasonable care. The court vacated the district court’s judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bunting v. District of Columbia CVS Pharmacy, LLC" on Justia Law

A Liechtenstein-based satellite company was developing a network of low-Earth-orbit satellites and had obtained radio-frequency usage rights through a contract with another company, TRION AG. In 2021, a competitor, Rivada Networks, Inc., took over TRION and TRION’s board terminated the contract with the satellite company, transferring the frequency rights to Rivada. The legality of this transfer is being contested in European litigation. Shortly after the contract termination, Rivada’s CEO made public statements on an industry podcast, asserting that the satellite company no longer had usage rights and suggesting it planned to move its operations to China. These statements were broadcast during a major satellite industry conference, after which manufacturers expressed doubts about the satellite company’s viability and some refused to partner with it.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the satellite company’s defamation lawsuit against Rivada. The court assumed, without deciding, that the statements were false and defamatory, but found they were not defamatory per se and that the complaint failed to adequately allege special damages, specifically a causal link between the statements and any harm suffered.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court agreed with the district court that the statements were not defamatory per se, as they did not inherently impute professional misconduct or dishonesty. However, the appellate court found that the complaint plausibly alleged special damages, specifically that the statements caused the loss of business relationships with satellite manufacturers, leading to identifiable economic harm. The court held that the complaint’s factual allegations were sufficient to support a plausible inference of causation at the pleading stage.The appellate court affirmed the dismissal in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings on the special damages theory. View "KLEO AG v. Rivada Networks, Inc." on Justia Law

A high school student in the District of Columbia was sexually assaulted by a classmate in a school bathroom. The student’s mother reported the incident to school officials, prompting an investigation by the District. The District ultimately found the assault claim credible and took steps to support the student, including offering counseling and a school transfer. However, the school principal, before any investigation, expressed disbelief in the student’s claim, made derogatory remarks about her, and attempted to undermine the investigation, even after video evidence corroborated the student’s account. The principal’s conduct included misleading superiors and withholding information. The student and her mother later learned of these actions, which caused them significant distress.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the student’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) for failure to state a claim, finding that the school-student relationship alone did not create a special duty under D.C. law. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and Title IX claims, holding that the District’s response was not deliberately indifferent and that the principal’s conduct did not meet the standard for IIED because the remarks were made outside the student’s presence.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the NIED claim and the grant of summary judgment to the District on the Title IX claims, finding the District’s overall response was not clearly unreasonable and that the principal’s actions could not be attributed to the District for Title IX retaliation. However, the appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the IIED claim against the principal, holding that a reasonable jury could find her conduct was extreme and outrageous, intended or recklessly caused severe emotional distress, and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "Doe v. DC" on Justia Law

In this case, Iran provided material support for a Taliban attack that killed thirty Americans, including Navy special forces operator Kraig Vickers. Vickers' family sued Iran under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which allows for such suits against state sponsors of terrorism. The district court awarded damages to most of Vickers' family but dismissed the claim of his daughter, K.E.F.V., who was born two months after his death.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held a three-day evidentiary hearing and concluded that Iran was a state sponsor of terrorism that had provided material support for the attack. The court then determined damages for twenty-three plaintiffs and appointed special masters to recommend damages for the remaining plaintiffs, including the Vickers family. The special master recommended solatium damages for each family member, but the district court dismissed K.E.F.V.'s claim, stating that she could not recover solatium because she was born after her father's death.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the FSIA does not preclude after-born plaintiffs from recovering solatium and that well-established state tort law, including wrongful death statutes, supports the recovery of damages by children born after a parent's death. The court concluded that K.E.F.V. is entitled to solatium for the loss of her father's comfort and society, regardless of her birth date relative to his death. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "K.E.F.V. v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law

Smith sued the United States and Capitol Officers Rogers and Anyaso, alleging that while working for a federal agency on November 5, 2009, he drove officials to Capitol Hill, and, at an attended barricade, Rogers, in uniform, “began to chastise and yell at him for dropping off his passengers at that location.” Smith made a U-turn and left the area. Rogers radioed other officers, allegedly stating that Smith’s car struck Rogers’s leg. Minutes later, Anyaso arrested Smith for assault with a deadly weapon and assault on a police officer. Charges were dismissed months later. The defense provided a video recording (no audio) of the incident and an audio recording of Rogers’ radio transmission, which had been provided to Smith while his criminal case was pending. On the audio recording, Rogers states that Smith “intentionally almost struck this officer.” The video showed aggressive driving by Smith. The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, upholding a determination that no material facts were in dispute and the court’s refusal to allow Smith to conduct discovery before its ruling. The officers had probable cause to arrest Smith. A “reasonable officer” would have felt threatened by the proximity of the fast-moving vehicle. The existence of probable cause foreclosed Smith’s claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, Fourth Amendment violations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit claiming that the OCC’s enforcement action against him was trumped-up and retaliatory. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of the case on the pleadings. At issue is whether the Constitution places any limit on the governmental policy-making discretion immunized by the discretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq. The court concluded, in line with the majority of its sister circuits to have considered the question, that the discretionary-function exception does not categorically bar FTCA tort claims where the challenged exercise of discretion allegedly exceeded the government’s constitutional authority to act. The court also concluded that plaintiff's Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics claims are not time-barred because the continuing-violations doctrine applies to extend the applicable statute of limitations where, as here, a plaintiff alleges continuing conduct causing cumulative harm. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Loumiet v. United States" on Justia Law