Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a shooting incident at the Pride of St. Lucie Lodge 1189, Inc. (the "Lodge") on March 2, 2015, where Tanya Oliver was shot in the forehead and later died from her injuries. The Lodge was insured by Kinsale Insurance Company ("Kinsale"), which had a $50,000 policy sublimit for claims arising out of assault and battery. The Estate of Tanya Oliver sued the Lodge for negligent security, and a jury awarded damages exceeding $3.348 million.The Lodge and the Estate then sued Kinsale for common law bad faith under Florida law, claiming Kinsale breached its duty of good faith by failing to make a settlement offer within the policy limits before the Estate’s claim was filed. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment to Kinsale, concluding that Kinsale had no duty to initiate settlement negotiations because no reasonable jury could find that this was a case of "clear liability."The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Lodge and the Estate, a jury could reasonably find that Kinsale knew or should have known that liability was clear. The court noted that the Lodge's security guards had failed to prevent a second fight in the parking lot, which led to the shooting, and that Kinsale was aware of the severity of Oliver's injuries and the potential for damages far exceeding the policy limit.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for trial by jury, holding that a jury could reasonably find that Kinsale acted in bad faith by failing to tender its policy limit before the Estate filed suit. View "Kinsale Insurance Company v. Pride of St. Lucie Lodge 1189, Inc." on Justia Law

On Thanksgiving night in 2018, Officer David Alexander, a policeman with the City of Hoover, was on foot patrol at the Galleria Mall in Birmingham, Alabama. During a suspected active shooting situation, Officer Alexander saw Emantic "E.J." Fitzgerald Bradford moving towards two men with a gun in his hand. Without issuing a verbal warning, Officer Alexander shot and killed Mr. Bradford, who was legally authorized to carry his gun and was attempting to provide assistance.April Pipkins, Mr. Bradford's mother and representative of his estate, filed a lawsuit against Officer Alexander, the City of Hoover, and other defendants, asserting Fourth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims for negligence and wantonness. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed the state law claims and granted summary judgment on the § 1983 claims, ruling that Officer Alexander's use of deadly force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that a verbal warning was not feasible under the circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that Officer Alexander acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment given the circumstances, which included a crowded mall, the sound of gunshots, and Mr. Bradford running with a gun towards two men. The court also found that a verbal warning was not feasible due to the immediate threat perceived by Officer Alexander. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the state law claims, concluding that the Mall defendants did not owe a duty to protect Mr. Bradford from the criminal acts of a third party and that the complaint did not plausibly allege foreseeability or incompetency in hiring, training, and supervising Officer Alexander. View "Pipkins v. City of Hoover, Alabama" on Justia Law

Ronald Rubin filed a lawsuit naming Kimberly Grippa as part of a criminal enterprise. His lawyer sent allegedly defamatory letters to state officials, asking them to investigate the alleged criminal enterprise and included copies of the complaint. Grippa sued Rubin for defamation, claiming the letters harmed her reputation and professional standing. Rubin moved for summary judgment, arguing the letters were protected by Florida’s absolute and qualified litigation privileges and that he could not be held vicariously liable for his lawyer’s actions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida denied Rubin’s motion for summary judgment on all grounds. The court found that the letters were not protected by the absolute litigation privilege because they were sent outside the litigation process and included additional statements beyond those in the complaint. The court also determined that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the statements were made with express malice, precluding the qualified litigation privilege. Lastly, the court rejected Rubin’s vicarious liability argument, suggesting that Rubin directed his lawyer’s actions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the denial of Florida’s absolute litigation privilege is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine but lacked jurisdiction to consider the denial of the qualified litigation privilege or the vicarious liability issue. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the absolute litigation privilege, concluding that the letters were sent outside the judicial process and included additional defamatory statements. The court dismissed the appeal regarding the qualified litigation privilege and vicarious liability for lack of jurisdiction. View "Grippa v. Rubin" on Justia Law

Edward Burrell, an inmate at Clarke County Jail, suffered a heart attack while serving a sentence. Chief Deputy Sheriff and Jail Administrator Tyler Norris drove Burrell to the hospital instead of calling an ambulance and released him from jail to avoid medical costs. Burrell died shortly after arriving at the hospital. Barbara Donald, administratrix of Burrell's estate, claimed that Norris's actions delayed medical care and caused Burrell's death, bringing a federal constitutional claim and an Alabama wrongful-death claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama denied Norris's motion for summary judgment on both claims. The court held that Norris was not entitled to qualified immunity because he acted outside his discretionary authority by releasing Burrell early. The court also found that a reasonable jury could determine Norris's actions violated Burrell's constitutional rights. The court did not address whether Norris's actions violated clearly established law. For the wrongful-death claim, the court denied summary judgment under Alabama’s jailer immunity statute, concluding Norris was not acting within the scope of his duties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Norris acted within his discretionary authority when he decided to drive Burrell to the hospital. The court emphasized that the discretionary-authority inquiry focuses on the general nature of the action, not whether the officer made the correct decision. The court found that Norris's actions did not violate any clearly established constitutional right and concluded that Norris was entitled to qualified immunity for the federal claim, reversing the district court's denial of summary judgment.Regarding the state wrongful-death claim, the court noted that the district court conflated state immunity with statutory jailer immunity. The court vacated the district court's denial of summary judgment on the state claim and remanded for the district court to determine whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and, if so, to decide the issue of state immunity. View "Donald v. Norris" on Justia Law

James Wilson III used earplugs manufactured by Hearos, LLC at a shooting range and subsequently suffered significant hearing loss. He filed a lawsuit against Hearos in state court, alleging various tort claims. Protective Industrial Products, Inc. (PIP), a non-party, removed the case to federal court. The district court noted the unusual removal by a non-party but proceeded as neither Wilson nor Hearos objected to the court's jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Wilson's claims as time-barred under Georgia law.The district court for the Southern District of Georgia found that Wilson filed his complaint three days before the statute of limitations expired but did not serve Hearos until 117 days after the limitations period ended. The court concluded that Wilson failed to demonstrate the required diligence in serving Hearos, leading to the dismissal of his claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that removal by a non-party is a procedural defect, not a jurisdictional one, and must be objected to within 30 days under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Since Wilson did not object within this period, he waived his right to challenge the removal. The court also affirmed that Georgia's service-and-diligence rule, rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), applied to determine if Wilson's claims were time-barred. The court concluded that Wilson did not act with the required diligence to serve Hearos, affirming the district court's dismissal of his claims. View "Wilson v. Hearos, LLC" on Justia Law

Barbara Bobo's husband, who worked for the TVA for more than 22 years, was diagnosed with asbestos-induced lung cancer and in 1997 died from a heart attack. Mrs. Bobo was diagnosed with malignant pleural mesothelioma in 2011 and died from mesothelioma in 2013. Before her death, Mrs. Bobo filed suit claiming that the TVA's negligence resulted in her being exposed to "take-home" asbestos when she washed her husband's work clothes over the years. The district court entered judgment against the TVA. The court concluded that, assuming that the district court erred in considering the state court deposition testimony of Mr. Bobo to support its finding that he had been exposed to asbestos while employed by TVA, the error was harmless because there was plenty of other evidence proving the same fact; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of plaintiff's expert; under Alabama law, TVA owed a duty to Mrs. Bobo to prevent take-home asbestos exposure and TVA violated that duty; the court rejected TVA's argument that the district court applied the wrong exposure standard, concluding that which standard applies does not matter because the evidence of exposure was enough to satisfy either tests at issue; and TVA is not shielded from liability under the discretionary function exception. The court affirmed as to these issues. The court vacated the award of damages, remanding to the district court for it to recalculate the damages award in order to exclude from it any amounts that were written off by Mrs. Bobo's providers and to correct any other errors that may appear to the court when the parties have a chance to focus exclusively on the medical expenses component of the damages award. View "Bobo v. Tennessee Valley Authority" on Justia Law

This case concerned the first of over 500 cases regarding the Wright Medical Conserve "metal-on-metal" hip replacement device designed and manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff filed a products liability suit alleging, among other things, that defendant was liable for design defect based on strict liability and negligence. On appeal, defendant challenged the entry of a $2,100,000 judgment. The court rejected defendant's argument that the district court erred in ordering the jury to continue deliberations after the jury had already begun to deliver its verdict. In this case, upon recognizing the inconsistency in the jury verdict, the district court immediately halted publication of the verdict and instructed the jury that an error had been made; the district court acted in a neutral and non-biased manner in acknowledging and addressing the inconsistent verdict; and the district court also recharged the jury. The court also rejected defendant's argument that the district court erred in its instructions on Utah's products liability law with regard to the unavoidably unsafe product defense in Comment k of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court explained that any categorical bar to liability for an unavoidably unsafe product was not available to defendant and thus the district court did not err in failing to give such an instruction to the jury. Furthermore, any error by the district court in instructing the jury on the unavoidably unsafe defense did not affect the result in this case because the jury found that defendant had not proven the defense. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court's error was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Christiansen v. Wright Medical Technology Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury found CSX solely liable for injuries suffered by an employee of General Mills and awarded the employee damages, CSX filed this action for indemnification from General Mills. The district court dismissed on the ground that the contract between the parties barred indemnification for damages arising from CSX's sole negligence. In reaching this result, the district court applied a federal rule of collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of the relative fault of General Mills for the injury suffered by its employee. The court held, however, that federal common law adopts the state rule of collateral estoppel to determine the preclusive effect of a judgment of a federal court that exercised diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine whether collateral estoppel bars the complaint of CSX for indemnification. The court declined to decide the dispute regarding one element of collateral estoppel as defined by Georgia law: the earlier litigation must have been between identical parties. The court also declined to decide the alternative argument raised by CSX, whether the Sidetrack Agreement requires indemnification assuming CSX was solely at fault. View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants James and Karen Feggestad appealed the district court’s order dismissing their complaint against defendants-appellees, Kerzner International Bahamas Limited, Kerzner International Limited, Island Hotel Company Limited, Paradise Island Limited, and Brookfield Asset Management Inc. (collectively, "Kerzner"), on the basis of a valid forum selection clause. The Feggestads made reservations at the Atlantis Resort on Paradise Island, Bahamas (Atlantis) and received a reservation confirmation via their email address. The confirmation contained a section titled "Terms and Conditions" and included a hyperlink advising guests to view the other terms and conditions. This link provided advance notification that any dispute between the guest and the hotel or any affiliated company must be litigated exclusively in the Bahamas and that upon arrival at the Atlantis, the guest would be required to sign a registration form that included a Bahamian forum selection clause. When the Feggestads checked into the hotel, the resort asked them to sign a registration card, which also included an "acknowledgement, agreement and release," which also listed the clause at issue here. Several days after their arrival at the Atlantis, Mr. Feggestad slipped and fell on a wet sidewalk and sustained severe personal injuries. He later sued, and the forum-selection clause became an issue. After reviewing the record, reading the parties briefs and having the benefit of oral argument, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Feggestad v. Kerzner International Bahamas Limited, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration of its earlier order denying on futility grounds plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint. Plaintiff asserted in his motion that he had developed facts in discovery which showed that (1) a Bank employee knew that Charles Gordon, the chief executive officer of OPT Title and Escrow, Inc., had assisted Gordon in opening a bank account called an “escrow account” into which funds were to be wired by third parties with the expectation that the funds would be held in escrow by OPT Title; (2) the Bank employee knew that Gordon was stealing from the account; (3) the Bank employee assisted Gordon in committing the fraud; and (4) the Bank received at least a short-term financial benefit from allowing Gordon to use OPT Title’s account as a vehicle for his fraud. The court held that the district court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration on the basis that even considering his new allegations set forth in his motion for reconsideration, he failed to state claims for relief. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hsi Chang v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law