Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A welder was injured while working on a launch site on the Mississippi River, operated by two closely related companies. The injury occurred when a defective hook, lacking a required safety latch, struck him during a crane operation, causing him to fall and sustain multiple injuries, including a fractured eye socket and a cervical disk injury. Over the following months, he underwent surgery and was prescribed pain medications. After his prescriptions ran out, he attempted to manage his pain with over-the-counter drugs, but ultimately died from an overdose of street fentanyl mixed with Xylazine, a non-prescribed animal tranquilizer.The estate of the deceased sued the two companies for personal injury under the Jones Act, general maritime law, and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. After a bench trial, the district court found the companies liable for vessel negligence under the LHWCA, determining that the defective hook was an appurtenance of the vessel and the proximate cause of the initial injury. The court also found the two companies to be essentially the same entity and awarded damages to the decedent’s children and mother, including for wrongful death and loss of consortium.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that while the defective hook was the proximate cause of the workplace injury, the ingestion of illegal drugs was a superseding cause of death, breaking the chain of causation from the workplace injury. The court reversed the award of damages stemming from the death and loss of consortium, concluding that the companies were not liable for the decedent’s death, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bommarito v. Belle Chasse Marine Trans" on Justia Law

An attorney who represented a client in a high-profile employment discrimination case against Louisiana State University (LSU) officials later brought suit against two attorneys and their law firm who had served as outside counsel to LSU. The plaintiff alleged that these attorneys engaged in misconduct during a Title IX investigation and, during subsequent state court litigation, made defamatory statements about him, including accusations of fabricating evidence. The state court had previously imposed significant monetary sanctions against the plaintiff and his client, citing, among other things, the plaintiff’s alleged fabrication of evidence and abusive litigation tactics.After the state court proceedings, the plaintiff filed a new lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, asserting claims for defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy under Louisiana law. The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice. It found the defamation claim barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which limits federal review of state court judgments, and determined that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was inadequately pleaded. The court also dismissed the conspiracy claim for lack of an underlying tort and denied leave to amend the complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine did not bar the defamation claim because the plaintiff’s alleged injury arose from the defendants’ conduct, not from the state court judgment itself. The court vacated the dismissal of the defamation and conspiracy claims and remanded for further proceedings. However, it affirmed the dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, finding the alleged conduct did not meet the required legal standard. The court also vacated the denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "English v. Crochet" on Justia Law

A woman brought suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) after her child suffered severe and permanent nerve damage during childbirth at a Texas hospital. She alleged that the resident physician who delivered her baby used excessive force in responding to a complication known as shoulder dystocia, and that the attending physician failed to properly supervise. The plaintiff sought compensatory damages for medical care and related expenses.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, determined that shoulder dystocia is always an obstetrical emergency under Texas law. It concluded that, in such emergencies, Texas law requires proof of “willful and wanton negligence” (a heightened standard akin to gross negligence). The court further reasoned that because the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for punitive damages, and because damages for willful and wanton negligence are punitive, it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in two respects: first, by presuming as a matter of law that the physician provided emergency medical care in every instance of shoulder dystocia, rather than treating it as a factual question; and second, by conflating the heightened standard of liability (willful and wanton negligence) with the nature of damages recoverable. The Fifth Circuit clarified that compensatory damages for gross negligence are available under Texas law and are not barred by the FTCA, which only precludes punitive damages. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Robledo v. USA" on Justia Law

William Carter, a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair, was arrested for unauthorized use of 911 and spent eight days in the Shreveport City Jail. During his incarceration, Carter, who had pre-existing bedsores, did not receive adequate medical care for his wounds, which allegedly led to their infection and his subsequent hospitalization. Carter's mother, suing on his behalf, filed claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act (RA), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Louisiana state negligence law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana excluded the expert testimony of Dr. Joel Nitzkin before trial. After a jury trial, the court granted the defendants' Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on the ADA/RA claim, concluding that the claim was about medical treatment rather than an actionable disability claim. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants on the § 1983 and state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the ADA/RA claim amounted to a complaint about medical negligence, which is not actionable under the ADA. The court found that the failure to change Carter's bandages was a medical treatment issue, not a failure to accommodate under the ADA. Additionally, the court held that Carter's placement in a segregated cell for his safety did not constitute intentional discrimination under the ADA. The court also did not address the exclusion of Dr. Nitzkin's testimony, as it was only relevant to the ADA claims, which failed as a matter of law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Carter v. City of Shreveport" on Justia Law

In this case, the families of Michael Jackson, Carl Wiley, Jr., and Rashad Henderson, who were killed during high-speed police chases in Houston, Texas, sued the City of Houston. They alleged that the Houston Police Department (HPD) has a policy of racial profiling that leads to more high-speed chases in predominantly black neighborhoods, resulting in the deaths of their loved ones. The plaintiffs brought several federal municipal liability claims, including violations of equal protection, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, and substantive due process, as well as state tort claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted in part and denied in part Houston's motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for judgment on the pleadings. The court dismissed all claims except the equal protection claims and Jackson’s state law claims. Houston then filed an interlocutory appeal, raising issues regarding standing, failure to state federal claims, capacity to sue, and governmental immunity for Jackson’s state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review non-final district court orders except under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The court found that it could only review whether the plaintiffs had standing to assert their equal protection claims. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their injuries did not stem from unequal treatment based on race. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s order regarding standing for the equal protection claims and vacated the district court’s decision on governmental immunity for Jackson’s negligence claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

In 2010, the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill released crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico. Matthew Williams, the plaintiff, performed oil spill clean-up work in the Gulf that summer. On September 24, 2020, Williams was diagnosed with chronic pansinusitis, an inflammatory condition of the nasal passages. Williams filed a lawsuit against BP Exploration & Production Inc. and BP America Production Co., alleging that his condition was caused by exposure to oil, dispersants, and other chemicals during the cleanup work. Williams presented two expert witnesses, Dr. Michael Freeman and Dr. James Clark, to establish causation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi reviewed the case. BP filed motions to exclude the expert reports under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert, and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Williams lacked admissible expert testimony to establish causation. The district court granted BP’s motions to exclude the expert testimonies and the motion for summary judgment, leading Williams to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the district court’s exclusion of Dr. Freeman’s testimony, finding it unreliable as it did not properly apply the differential etiology approach. Similarly, the court found Dr. Clark’s testimony unreliable due to errors in his report, including references to another case and incorrect assumptions about benzene concentrations. Without admissible expert testimony, Williams could not establish specific causation, a necessary element in toxic tort cases. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of BP. View "Williams v. BP Expl & Prod" on Justia Law

Following Hurricane Ida in 2021, Terrebonne Parish requested assistance from Lafayette Utilities Systems (LUS) to help restore power in Houma, Louisiana. LUS, in turn, requested help from the City of Wilson, North Carolina. Agreements were signed to facilitate emergency assistance, and the City of Wilson dispatched employees to Louisiana. Due to a shortage of hotels in Houma, the employees stayed in Lafayette and commuted daily. Kevin Worrell, a City of Wilson employee, was involved in a vehicle collision while driving from Houma to Lafayette, resulting in injuries to Edward and Linda Breaux and Jessie and Vickie Blanchard.The plaintiffs filed separate negligence lawsuits in Louisiana state court, which were removed to the federal district court in the Western District of Louisiana. The cases were consolidated, and the defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act. The district court granted summary judgment, finding statutory immunity, and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the district court's interpretation of the Act's immunity provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted the need to interpret the Louisiana emergency preparedness law and expressed doubt about its ability to make a reliable Erie guess. Consequently, the court certified two questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court: (1) whether an employee of a city from another state working under an emergency assistance agreement is a "representative" of Louisiana or its political subdivisions, and (2) whether an individual providing emergency assistance is "engaging in emergency preparedness and recovery activities" while commuting from the recovery site to lodging. The Fifth Circuit will resolve the case based on the Louisiana Supreme Court's guidance. View "Breaux v. Worrell" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Jose Gonzalez visited a Walgreens store in Austin, Texas. An unidentified customer had clogged the toilet in the men's restroom and was given a plunger by a Walgreens employee to fix it. While the customer was attempting to unclog the toilet, Gonzalez entered the restroom and slipped on water that had accumulated on the floor. Gonzalez sued Walgreens for his injuries.The case was initially filed in Texas state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas based on diversity jurisdiction. Gonzalez asserted a theory of vicarious liability and a claim for premises liability against Walgreens. The district court dismissed the vicarious liability theory and denied Walgreens's motion for summary judgment on the premises liability claim. After Gonzalez presented his case at trial, Walgreens moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), which the district court granted, finding that Walgreens had no actual or constructive knowledge of the wet floor. Gonzalez's motion for a new trial was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's JMOL, holding that no reasonable jury could find that Walgreens had actual or constructive knowledge of the wet floor. The court found that Gonzalez failed to provide sufficient evidence that Walgreens knew or should have known about the hazardous condition. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Gonzalez's vicarious liability theory, stating that the allegations constituted a premises liability claim, not a basis for vicarious liability. The court concluded that Walgreens did not have a policy or practice that it knew routinely created an unreasonable risk of harm, distinguishing this case from others where such knowledge was established. View "Gonzalez v. Walgreen" on Justia Law

Casey Cotton rear-ended Caleb Crabtree, causing significant injuries. Cotton, insured by Allstate, faced potential liability exceeding his policy limit. Allstate allegedly refused to settle with Crabtree and failed to inform Cotton of the settlement negotiations or his potential liability, giving Cotton a potential bad-faith claim against Allstate. The Crabtrees sued Cotton, who declared bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court allowed the personal-injury action to proceed, resulting in a $4 million judgment for the Crabtrees, making them judgment creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding. Cotton’s bad-faith claim was classified as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court allowed the Crabtrees to purchase Cotton’s bad-faith claim for $10,000, which they financed through Court Properties, Inc.The Crabtrees sued Allstate, asserting Cotton’s bad-faith claim. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the assignments of Cotton’s claim to Court Properties and then to the Crabtrees were champertous and void under Mississippi law. Consequently, the court found that the Crabtrees lacked Article III standing as they had not suffered any injury from Allstate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court certified a question to the Supreme Court of Mississippi regarding the validity of the assignments under Mississippi’s champerty statute. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the statute prohibits a disinterested third party engaged by a bankruptcy creditor from purchasing a cause of action from a debtor’s estate. Based on this ruling, the Fifth Circuit held that the assignment of Cotton’s claim to Court Properties was void, and thus, the Crabtrees did not possess Cotton’s bad-faith claim. Therefore, the Crabtrees lacked standing to sue Allstate, and the district court’s dismissal was affirmed. View "Crabtree v. Allstate Property" on Justia Law

Karen Orr tripped on a soft drink display at a Dollar General store in Ackerman, Mississippi, and subsequently fell. After Orr's death, Sandie Keister, on behalf of Orr's estate, sued Dolgencorp for premises-liability negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. During discovery, Dolgencorp failed to produce security camera footage, data from the store’s daily planner, and safety-check data. The district court found that Dolgencorp lost or could not access this evidence. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and Keister also filed a motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi granted summary judgment for Dolgencorp on all claims and denied Keister’s motions for summary judgment and sanctions. Keister appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Dolgencorp on her premises liability claim and in denying her motion for sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and affirmed the decision. The court held that Keister failed to provide evidence that Dolgencorp breached its duty to warn Orr of the dangerous condition. Keister's arguments, including the mode-of-operation theory and the duration of the dangerous condition, were insufficient to establish Dolgencorp's liability. The court also affirmed the denial of Keister’s motion for sanctions, finding no evidence that Dolgencorp intended to deprive her of the missing evidence and noting that the request for a jury instruction became moot after summary judgment was granted.The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Keister v. Dolgencorp" on Justia Law