Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Shakeri and Taji filed suit against ADT, alleging a breach of contract claim and tort claims under Texas law for negligence, fraud, unconscionable conduct, and breach of the implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance. Plaintiffs were robbed at gunpoint and injured at their jewelry store. During the robbery, Shakeri pushed the button to trigger the alarm system multiple times, but the alarm system and the backup alarm failed to work. The district court ultimately dismissed plaintiffs’ tort claims and limited their contractual recovery in three separate orders. Determining that plaintiffs are bound by the terms of a 1999 Contract, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' negligence claim where Shakeri's injury is the kind of physical harm that is not covered by the economic loss rule and is not defeated by the existence of a contract between the parties; plaintiffs failedto state adequate claims for breach of the implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance under Texas law; the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ unconscionable conduct claim; and plaintiffs' fraudulent inducement claim is barred under Texas law. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' negligence claim and remanded for further proceedings on this claim. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining tort claims. View "Shakeri v. ADT Security Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract, negligence, wrongful foreclosure, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 17.50(a)(1)). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of her claims, as well as her motion to join a non-diverse defendant. The court concluded that the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim was proper because she failed to allege any facts showing her own performance and did not refute the facts in documents referred to in her complaint, central to her claims, and attached to the motion to dismiss; the dismissal of the negligence claim was proper where any damages stemming from an alleged violation of those solely contractual duties are not redressable in tort; the wrongful-foreclosure claim was properly dismissed where plaintiff never alleged that Wells Fargo disposed of the house at a “grossly inadequate selling price,” nor does she allege that Wells Fargo fraudulently chilled the bidding at the foreclosure sale; and, where plaintiff bases her DTPA claims on Wells Fargo’s failure to make automatic withdrawals to pay the loan, such services cannot form the basis of a DTPA claim because they are incidental to the loan and would serve no purpose apart from facilitating the mortgage loan. Finally, in regard to the motion to join a non-diverse defendant, the district court applied the correct legal standard and its finding of fact were not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Villarreal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

These two consolidated appeals stem from suits between Donald Cuba and Julia Pylant where Julia accused Cuba of rape and Cuba was later acquitted of the charge. In No. 15-10212, Cuba sued Julia and her parents (collectively “the Pylants”) for malicious prosecution, defamation, and tortious interference with contractual relations. In No. 15-10213, Julia sued Cuba for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and Cuba counterclaimed with causes of action substantially identical to those in his suit. The Pylants moved, in both suits, to dismiss Cuba's claims under the Texas Citizens' Participation Act (Texas's anti-SLAPP statute), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 27.004. The district court eventually held that the TCPA motions were moot because they had already been denied by operation of law. The court agreed with the Pylants that, under the TCPA framework, the 30-day deadline before a motion is deemed denied by operation of law runs only from the date of the hearing on the motion. But, because no such hearing was held in these cases, the TCPA motion was not denied by operation of law. In this case, the appeals are timely where the operative date from which the 30-day clock under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ran was March 6, 2015, the date of the order denying the motion. On the merits, the court concluded that the TCPA applies in this case where, as Cuba concedes, all of the acts that the Pylants are being sued for are exercises of the right to petition as defined under the statute. The court further concluded that Cuba's claims of malicious prosecution and defamation are pleaded in sufficient detail. However, as to the defamation claim, the Pylants have established an affirmative defense as to certain of the communications at issue. Finally, Cuba’s tortious interference claim does not survive the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court vacated the orders from which these interlocutory appeals are taken, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cuba v. Pylant" on Justia Law

Trinity filed an administrative claim in 2012 and a complaint in federal court in 2013 under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), 2680(h), alleging malicious prosecution. In 1999, Trinity was indicted for illegally storing hazardous waste without a permit and the charges were dismissed in 2003. The district court dismissed Trinity's claim as time barred. The principal issue on appeal is whether equitable tolling is applicable in this case where one of the federal agents investigating Trinity intentionally concealed his extramarital affair with another investigator. Under Louisiana law, a claim of malicious prosecution requires showing both an “absence of probable cause” and “the presence of malice.” Thus, the only evidentiary basis for a viable malicious-prosecution FTCA claim “well grounded in fact” would be evidence to support the allegations that federal law enforcement officers maliciously instigated the prosecution despite a lack of probable cause. The court held that the district court erred by failing to equitably toll the statute of limitations, determining that the Government has not met its burden of conclusively establishing that Trinity would have discovered evidence to support the allegations in the complaint through the exercise of reasonable diligence prior to 2011. In this case, neither the unsealed grand jury testimony nor the amended complaint conclusively establish that Trinity would have discovered evidence to verify the allegations that federal law enforcement officials maliciously instigated the case despite a lack of probable cause. Accordingly, the court reversed as to this issue. The court concluded, however, that collateral estoppel is not applicable in this case. The court affirmed as to this issue. View "Trinity Marine Products, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

After the American Association of Neurological Surgeons' (AANS) Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) recommended that plaintiff's membership be suspended for six months, he appealed to the AANS Board of Directors. The Board downgraded the suspension to a censure, but plaintiff subsequently resigned from the AANS and filed suit, claiming that the censure harmed his future employment opportunities as an expert witness. Plaintiff filed suit against the AANS for tortious interference with prospective business relations; breach of contract (the AANS bylaws); and impairment of an important economic interest from denial of due process. The court concluded that plaintiff received sufficient due process, including notice, a hearing, and multiple levels of appeal, before he was censured for failing to review all pertinent and available records prior to testifying. Because the district court found only one basis of the censure to be unsupported by due process, the district court was correct in setting aside only that portion of the censure. The court further concluded that no Texas court has recognized a breach of contract challenge to a private association’s disciplinary process. Therefore, plaintiff failed to state a plausible breach of contract claim on which relief could be granted, and the district court properly dismissed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Barrash v. Amer. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a technician employed by Tiger, filed suit against Triton and W&T after he was injured on board a vessel. W&T hired Triton to provide a vessel, staff, and equipment for W&T's offshore pipeline project, and also hired Tiger as a safety contractor. The district court interpreted the parties’ Master Service Contract (MSC) to place the burden of payment for plaintiff's injuries on W&T alone. The court concluded that the district court properly determined that plaintiff was W&T’s invitee; the district court's factual findings compel the conclusion that plaintiff was not Triton’s invitee; and the district court was correct to hold that W&T was liable under the MSC for Triton’s settlement and defense costs related to plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Grogan v. Triton Diving Services, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against C.R.E.S. alleging that it had a duty to protect him from unreasonable and foreseeable harm due to the criminal acts of third parties. Plaintiff was shot by an unknown assailant in the doorway of his apartment and C.R.E.S. is the premises owner. The district court granted summary judgment for C.R.E.S. The court held that while the district court did not err in refining the complex’s relevant criminal history prior to analyzing foreseeability, it did err in categorically excluding the residential burglaries from its foreseeability analysis. In this case, the occurrence of fourteen residential burglaries within the twelve months preceding the incident in which plaintiff was injured, and C.R.E.S.’s knowledge of these crimes, when considered in conjunction with the other crimes that the district court denominated violent crimes relevant to its analysis, raises a fact question as to whether that incident was reasonably foreseeable. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jenkins v. C.R.E.S. Mgmt. LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife filed suit against FEMA under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680, after plaintiff was injured from a fall while exiting a trailer owned by FEMA. The district court granted summary judgment for FEMA, concluding that plaintiff's claims are barred by the FTCA’s discretionary function exception. The court held, however, that FEMA’s decision about how customers would enter and exit the trailers was not the type of judgment the discretionary function exception was designed to protect. Because plaintiff has not overcome the presumption that this was a sufficiently policy-laden decision by alleging facts that show the conduct was not grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gibson v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a personal injury suit against defendants for alleged workplace injuries to Helen Allen. Defendants argued that the suit should be barred by judicial estoppel because plaintiffs failed to disclose the personal injury claim during their concurrent Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding.The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that its precedent clearly establishes that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed plaintiffs’ claims based on judicial estoppel and provided a trustee with the opportunity to “pursue for the benefit of creditors a judgment or cause of action that the debtor fails to disclose in bankruptcy.” The court modified the district court’s judgment to clarify that the district court may reopen the present case and substitute a Chapter 7 trustee for plaintiffs if the trustee decides to pursue the claim within a reasonable period of time. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Allen v. C & H Distributors, L.L.C.," on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against defendants after he was injured while employed as a boilermaker by Wyatt. CP entered into a contract with Wyatt to perform work on a vacuum tower. CP and Wyatt signed a Master Services Agreement (MSA). At issue was whether a non-operating partner in a joint-venture qualifies as a “statutory employer” as that term is used in the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act (LWCA), LA. Stat. Ann. 23:1021 et seq., even though the operating partner signed a contract with a contractor that did not specifically designate the non-operating partner as a “statutory employer.” Whether viewed in terms of the inherent legal relationships among CP, Excel, and the joint venture and Wyatt, or proper inferences drawn from the MSA, the court did not think the parties’ failure to name or require the signature of Excel in the MSA can overcome the broad presumption of statutory employer status approved by Louisiana courts. The very purpose of CP and Excel in creating the joint venture was to give CP the exact operational authority it exercised on behalf of the joint venture when it signed the MSA with Wyatt. The parties’ written contract, in essence, “recognized” the parties to the joint venture as the statutory employers through their authorized agent. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wright v. Excel Paralubes" on Justia Law