Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Rebecca Blakesley, a nurse, ended her marriage with Andrew Blakesley in early 2021 after a tumultuous relationship marked by alleged abuse. Shortly after she obtained a protective order and filed for divorce, Andrew’s mother, Colleen Marcus, and his sister-in-law, Jennifer Marcus, reported Rebecca to various public and private organizations. They accused her of violating patient confidentiality, fraudulent billing, academic dishonesty, and faking a COVID test. These reports led to investigations, the loss of Rebecca’s employment, and the suspension of her application for a professional license.Rebecca filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging defamation and intentional interference with business relations. She claimed the Marcuses’ actions were motivated by retaliation for her divorce. The Marcuses responded with a special motion to dismiss under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, which is designed to protect individuals from lawsuits intended to chill their right to petition the government. The district court denied the motion, finding that Rebecca’s claims were not based solely on petitioning activity because the Marcuses’ reports to private employers and a nursing school did not qualify as protected petitioning under the statute.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether the anti-SLAPP statute applied. The court held that the Marcuses failed to show their conduct was solely petitioning activity, as required by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s recent clarification in Bristol Asphalt, Co. v. Rochester Bituminous Prods., Inc. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, holding that mixed claims involving both petitioning and non-petitioning conduct are not subject to dismissal under the statute, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Blakesley v. Marcus" on Justia Law

A 68-year-old man experiencing abdominal pain was brought to a hospital emergency room in Bayamón, Puerto Rico, in January 2016. After a delayed CT scan revealed a perforated intestine, he underwent surgery and remained in intensive care until his death in February 2016. His son, a physician residing in Florida, later learned of the seriousness of his father’s condition during a visit. The son filed a lawsuit against several doctors, the hospital, and related entities, alleging that negligent medical care led to his father’s death.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico reviewed the case after a contentious discovery period. The court granted summary judgment in favor of five defendants: three doctors, a corporate entity managing the emergency room, and the emergency room’s medical director. The court found that the claims against the doctors and the corporate entity were time-barred under Puerto Rico’s one-year statute of limitations for tort claims, and that Puerto Rico law did not provide a basis for liability against the medical director, as he had not directly treated the patient. The court also disregarded certain evidence submitted by the plaintiff and denied his motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the district court erred in converting two doctors’ motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment without giving the plaintiff adequate notice or an opportunity to present evidence. The appellate court also held that the district court abused its discretion in disregarding the plaintiff’s declaration regarding when he learned of one doctor’s involvement. The court vacated and remanded the summary judgments for the three doctors and the medical director on the first cause of action, but affirmed summary judgment for the corporate entity and the medical director on the second cause of action. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "Calderon-Amezquita v. Rivera-Cruz" on Justia Law

A husband and wife brought a lawsuit after the wife suffered a pelvic fracture during a forceps-assisted delivery performed by a doctor at a women’s health group. They alleged that the doctor failed to obtain the wife’s informed consent by not disclosing the risks associated with the procedure. The plaintiffs claimed that this omission violated Massachusetts law and sought damages for the resulting injury.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts handled the case initially. During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, arguing that the plaintiffs had not made their experts available for deposition as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs did not respond to this motion, and the District Court granted it, excluding the expert testimony. The plaintiffs later failed to appear at a pretrial conference, citing email issues, and only addressed the missed conference, not the exclusion of their experts. The District Court declined to vacate its order striking the experts, finding the plaintiffs’ delay and lack of explanation unjustified. Subsequently, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that expert testimony was necessary to support the informed consent claim under Massachusetts law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reconsider the order striking the expert witnesses, given the plaintiffs’ prolonged inaction and failure to address the underlying issues. The First Circuit also held that, under Massachusetts law, expert testimony was required to establish that the risk of pelvic fracture from a forceps-assisted delivery was more than negligible, and thus, summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Meka v. Haddad" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was indicted by a Rhode Island grand jury, along with several co-defendants, on charges related to an alleged mortgage fraud conspiracy. He filed multiple motions to dismiss the charges in Rhode Island Superior Court, arguing that the indictment was tainted by prosecutorial misconduct and the presentation of misleading or missing evidence. After evidentiary hearings, a Magistrate denied his motions, and an Associate Justice of the Superior Court, on de novo review, adopted the Magistrate’s decision and added that the plaintiff had not shown sufficient prosecutorial misconduct to justify dismissal. The plaintiff did not appeal this ruling. Later, the charges against him were dismissed by the state as part of a plea agreement with a co-defendant.Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a malicious prosecution suit in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island against state law enforcement defendants. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that collateral estoppel barred the plaintiff from relitigating whether the indictment was procured by fraud or misconduct, since that issue had already been decided in state court. The plaintiff responded only that the issues were not identical, and did not contest the “final judgment” or “full and fair opportunity to litigate” elements of collateral estoppel.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff had waived his arguments regarding the “final judgment” and “full and fair opportunity” elements by failing to raise them in the district court, and that no exceptional circumstances justified excusing this waiver. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, holding that collateral estoppel applied and barred the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim. Costs were awarded to the defendants. View "Shabshelowitz v. Rhode Island Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Melissa Allen experienced multiple seizures at home and was taken to Lowell General Hospital, where she was found to be seven months pregnant and suffering from severe hypertension. Dr. Fernando Roca, an obstetrician affiliated with Lowell Community Health Center (LCHC), determined an emergency caesarian section was necessary. After the procedure, Allen suffered a devastating neurological injury and died eleven days later at a Boston hospital. The cause of death was listed as intracranial hemorrhage and eclampsia.Brad O'Brien, as personal representative of Allen’s estate, initially filed a wrongful death medical malpractice suit in Massachusetts state court against Dr. Roca and the hospital. At the time of the incident, Dr. Roca was employed by LCHC, a federally funded health center deemed under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) to have federal employee status for certain purposes. The United States substituted itself as defendant and removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which dismissed the suit as time-barred under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). On O'Brien’s first appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the substitution order due to reliance on the wrong statutory basis and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court again substituted the United States as defendant and dismissed the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Secretary’s regulation allowing for “pre-deeming” FTCA coverage in certain hospital on-call scenarios was consistent with the PHSA, and that Dr. Roca’s treatment of Allen fell within this coverage. The court also held that O’Brien’s claim was untimely under the FTCA’s statute of limitations and that the FTCA’s savings clause did not apply. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "O'Brien v. United States" on Justia Law

Peterson’s Oil Service, Inc. supplied heating fuel to customers in Massachusetts between 2012 and 2019. The fuel contained higher-than-standard levels of biodiesel, averaging 35% between 2015 and 2018, exceeding the 5% industry standard for ordinary heating oil. Customers alleged that this biodiesel-blended fuel was incompatible with conventional heating systems, caused repeated heat loss, and resulted in permanent damage to their equipment. They brought a class action in Massachusetts state court against Peterson’s and its officers, asserting claims for breach of contract, fraud, and negligence, including allegations that Peterson’s continued supplying the fuel despite customer complaints and only later disclosed the high biodiesel content.United States Fire Insurance Company and The North River Insurance Company had issued Peterson’s a series of commercial general liability and umbrella policies. The insurers initially defended Peterson’s in the class action under a reservation of rights, then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts seeking a declaration that they owed no duty to defend or indemnify Peterson’s. The insurers moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims did not arise from a covered “occurrence” and that policy provisions limiting or excluding coverage for failure to supply applied. The district court denied summary judgment, finding a genuine dispute as to whether Peterson’s actions were accidental and holding that the failure-to-supply provisions were ambiguous and did not apply.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The court held that the underlying complaint alleged a potentially covered “occurrence” because it was possible Peterson’s did not intend or expect the property damage alleged. The court also held that the failure-to-supply provisions were ambiguous and, under Massachusetts law, must be construed in favor of coverage. The district court’s summary judgment rulings were affirmed. View "United States Fire Insurance Company v. Peterson's Oil Service, Inc." on Justia Law

In October 2016, parents sought emergency medical care for their nineteen-month-old son, who was experiencing convulsions and seizures. The child was treated at three different medical facilities in Puerto Rico, including by Dr. Fernando Vega-Moral at HIMA San Pablo Bayamón hospital. After being transferred between hospitals, the child suffered cardiac arrest and died. The parents, along with other family members, initially filed a medical malpractice and negligence suit in Puerto Rico Commonwealth court against the medical centers and unnamed doctors, but did not specifically name Dr. Vega. That case was dismissed without prejudice in May 2018.Subsequently, in May 2019, the parents filed a new lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, this time naming Dr. Vega and others as defendants and asserting claims under Puerto Rico’s tort statutes. The district court dismissed some defendants and granted summary judgment to Dr. Vega, finding that the claims against him were time-barred. The court determined that, although the parents’ initial Commonwealth complaint was timely due to extensions following Hurricane María, the federal complaint did not toll the statute of limitations as to Dr. Vega because he was not named in the earlier suit. The court also denied the parents’ motion for reconsideration, holding that their new arguments and evidence should have been presented earlier.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The First Circuit held that Dr. Vega properly raised the statute of limitations defense and that, under Puerto Rico law, the burden shifted to the parents to show that the limitations period was tolled as to Dr. Vega. The parents failed to provide competent evidence to meet this burden. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying reconsideration, as the parents’ new arguments and evidence were untimely. View "Cruz-Cedeno v. Vega-Moral" on Justia Law

Orlando Miguel Martínez-Ramos pleaded guilty to carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury and aiding and abetting the same, following a home invasion, robbery, and brutal physical attack on a 77-year-old woman who died nine days later. The advisory guideline sentencing range was up to fourteen years, but Martínez-Ramos acknowledged that an upward variance was warranted due to the victim's death. At sentencing, Martínez-Ramos argued for a fifteen-year sentence, while the government requested sixteen years.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico did not accept either recommendation. Instead, it considered a higher advisory guideline range based on the first-degree murder cross-reference, which would have recommended a life sentence, reduced to twenty-five years due to the statutory maximum. However, the court did not apply this cross-reference, citing insufficient causation evidence and the belief that a twenty-five-year sentence was too harsh given Martínez-Ramos's youth. The court imposed an eighteen-year sentence, a substantial upward variance from the guideline range, due to the physical attack contributing to the victim's death.Martínez-Ramos appealed, arguing that the upward variance was substantively unreasonable and that the court applied too lenient a standard of causation. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Martínez-Ramos had acknowledged the victim's death as a factor in his plea agreement and that the autopsy listed facial and bodily trauma as contributory factors to the death. The court concluded that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous and affirmed the eighteen-year sentence. View "United States v. Martinez-Ramos" on Justia Law

Scott Cannon, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Blaise Cannon, filed a wrongful death and punitive damages claim against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts (BCBS). Cannon alleged that BCBS's denial of coverage for a specific inhaler led to asthma-related complications that contributed to Blaise's death. Blaise was a beneficiary of his partner's BCBS health insurance policy, which was governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment to BCBS on the grounds of ERISA preemption. The court found that Cannon's wrongful death claim was preempted by ERISA because it related to an employee benefit plan and arose from the denial of benefits under that plan. The court also held that the claim conflicted with the remedial scheme established by ERISA, which provides specific civil enforcement mechanisms.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Cannon's claim was statutorily preempted under ERISA because it had a connection with the ERISA-regulated health insurance plan. The court also found that the claim was preempted under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions, as it sought remedies for the denial of benefits under the plan. The court rejected Cannon's argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Association altered the preemption analysis, reaffirming that ERISA preempts state laws that relate to employee benefit plans. The court concluded that Cannon's wrongful death claim was derivative of Blaise's potential claim for benefits, which would have been preempted by ERISA. View "Cannon v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and Series PMPI filed a lawsuit in September 2018 against Fresenius Medical Care Holdings and related entities, alleging negligence, product liability, and design defect claims related to the GranuFlo product used in hemodialysis treatments. The claims arose from a 2012 public memorandum by Fresenius that GranuFlo could lead to cardiopulmonary arrest. The plaintiffs argued that the statute of limitations was tolled by a putative class action filed in 2013 (the Berzas action) in the Eastern District of Louisiana, which was later transferred to the District of Massachusetts as part of multidistrict litigation (MDL).The District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as time-barred, concluding that the Berzas action ceased to be a class action by June 2014 when the named plaintiffs filed Short Form Complaints or stipulations of dismissal, which did not include class allegations. The court also noted that the Berzas plaintiffs did not pursue class certification actively, and the case was administratively closed in April 2019.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The First Circuit held that the Berzas action lost its class action status by June 2014, and any tolling under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah ended at that time. The court reasoned that allowing indefinite tolling based on an inactive class certification request would contravene the principles of efficiency and economy in litigation. Therefore, the plaintiffs' 2018 complaint was untimely, and the district court's dismissal was upheld. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law