Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Victims of a massive ponzi scheme centered in South Carolina obtained a judgment of over $150 million against Derivium and others. Plaintiffs are now pursuing others whom they claim also participated in the scheme. The district court granted Vision International's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(2). The district court also granted Randolph Anderson, Patrick Kelley, and Total Eclipse's motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs' claim for aiding and abetting common law fraud. Plaintiffs filed separate appeals on the two rulings. The court consolidated the appeals. The court concluded that, because the parties engaged in full discovery on the jurisdictional issue and fully presented the relevant evidence to the district court, that court properly addressed Vision International’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion by weighing the evidence, finding facts by a preponderance of the evidence, and determining as a matter of law whether plaintiffs carried their burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction over Vision International. Further, the court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that South Carolina has not recognized a cause of action for aiding and abetting common law fraud and that it is not the court's role as a federal court to so expand state law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment as to both appeals. View "Grayson v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, diagnosed with leukemia, filed suit against CTS, alleging that CTS was responsible for dumping toxic solvents from an Asheville-area manufacturing plant into a local stream, and that childhood exposure to the contaminated stream water many years ago caused his leukemia. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that North Carolina General Statutes Section 1-52(16) barred his action. The court concluded that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has not yet directly resolved whether Section 1-52(16) applies to disease claims. Because the court understood that under North Carolina law a disease is not a “latent injury,” the court concluded that the Supreme Court of North Carolina would not find Section 1-52(16) applicable to plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stahle v. CTS Corp." on Justia Law

Sie Giok Giang, a passenger on a Sky Express interstate, was killed when the driver fell asleep at the wheel and ran the bus off the side of a highway. About seven weeks before the crash, Sky Express had been given an “unsatisfactory” safety rating by the FMCSA. At issue is whether the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-2680, bars an FTCA claim against the FMCSA for allowing Sky Express to continue to operate during a 10 day extension. The district court concluded that, pursuant to that exception, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The court concluded that, considering that any waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, the FMCSA’s decision to promulgate a regulation permitting 10-day extensions for passenger carriers was a permissible exercise of judgment subject to the FTCA’s discretionary function exception and thus did not waive sovereign immunity. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Pornomo v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a colonel in the Somali National Army, under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), 28 U.S.C.1350, alleging several violations of international law after a group of soldiers kidnapped him from his home in northern Somalia. The district court dismissed the ATS claims and allowed the TVPA claims to proceed, holding that defendant was not entitled to immunity as a foreign official. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that plaintiff has failed to allege a claim which touches and concerns the United States to support ATS jurisdiction, and therefore the district court did not err in dismissing the ATS counts. The court also agreed with the district court that defendant lacked foreign official immunity for jus cogens violations under Yousuf v. Samantar. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Warfaa v. Ali" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from multi-district litigation involving transvaginal mesh medical devices used to treat pelvic organ prolapse and other pelvic issues. The jury awarded plaintiff $250,000 in compensatory damages, and the punitive damages award was split pursuant to a Georgia statute, with seventy-five percent going to the State of Georgia and twenty-five percent going to plaintiff. Both parties appealed. The court affirmed the district court's exclusion of evidence that Bard had complied with the FDA's 510(k) product safety process under F.R.E. 402 for lack of relevance; affirmed the district court's decision to admit evidence of a material data safety sheet pertaining to polypropylene, a material used in the construction of the Avaulta Plus implanted in plaintiff's body, as non-hearsay, finding that any use of the evidence by plaintiff that went beyond the limited purpose for which it was admitted as non-hearsay resulted in harmless error and was not prejudicial to Bard’s defense; and concluded that the district court did not err in giving the Georgia pattern jury instruction, in denying Bard’s request for a modified instruction, or in upholding the jury’s causation finding. The court also concluded that the punitive award was not constitutionally excessive. In regard to plaintiff's challenges, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Georgia's split-recovery statute garnishing seventy-five percent of any punitive damages award arising from a product liability judgment does not violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cisson v. C. R. Bard, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Severn and its insurer filed suit against IFC, alleging breach of contract and negligence because IFC improperly applied a dangerous pesticide while fumigating Severn’s peanut dome, resulting in fire, an explosion, loss of approximately 20,000,000 pounds of peanuts, loss of business, and various cleanup costs. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to IFC because the contract’s consequential damages exclusion bars Severn’s breach of contract claim, and because North Carolina does not allow Severn to veil that claim in tort law. View "Severn Peanut Co. v. Industrial Fumigant Co." on Justia Law