Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Six women filed suit against a wealthy bond trader, alleging that he recruited them to travel to New York for sadomasochistic sexual encounters in exchange for money, with the understanding that their participation would be consensual and within agreed boundaries. The plaintiffs claimed that, contrary to their understanding, the defendant engaged in conduct that was coercive, abusive, and far exceeded what they had consented to, including physical violence and other degrading acts. They brought claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and state law torts such as assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The case was heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. After extensive discovery, motion practice, and delays, the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury unanimously found the defendant liable under the TVPA for all six plaintiffs and for battery as to one plaintiff, awarding $3.85 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The defendant’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial were denied. On a prior appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the liability findings and damages award. The plaintiffs then moved for attorneys’ fees and costs, which the District Court granted in part, awarding over $4.8 million in attorneys’ fees.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees at rates above the prevailing forum rates and compensating multiple legal professionals. The Second Circuit held that the District Court correctly applied the relevant legal standards, properly considered the complexity, intensity, and duration of the litigation, and reasonably deviated from ordinary rates given the unique circumstances. The Court affirmed the attorneys’ fee award. View "Moore v. Rubin" on Justia Law

Several counties and municipalities in New York initiated lawsuits in state courts against two pharmacy benefit managers, Express Scripts, Inc. and OptumRx, Inc., alleging that these companies contributed to the opioid epidemic in their communities. The claims are based on state law and center on the defendants’ alleged practices in negotiating with opioid manufacturers and managing prescription formularies, which plaintiffs contend led to an oversupply of prescription opioids and caused substantial public harm and government expense.The defendants removed the cases to federal court—the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York—arguing removal was proper under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), because some of the challenged conduct was performed under contracts with federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense (TRICARE), the Office of Personnel Management (FEHBP), and the Veterans Health Administration. After removal, the plaintiffs amended their complaints to disclaim any claims based on the defendants’ work for federal clients, seeking to have the cases remanded to state court. The district courts accepted the disclaimers and remanded the cases.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district courts’ decisions. It concluded that the disclaimers were ineffective because the alleged wrongful conduct and resulting harms could not be separated between federal and non-federal clients; the conduct was indivisible. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, the Second Circuit held that the defendants satisfied all statutory requirements for federal officer removal: they acted under federal direction, were sued for acts relating to federal authority, and asserted colorable federal defenses. The Second Circuit therefore reversed the remand orders and returned the cases to the district courts for further proceedings. View "County of Westchester v. Express Scripts" on Justia Law

An elderly patient, after contracting COVID-19, received remote medical treatment from an out-of-state physician who prescribed multiple medications, including prednisone. Prednisone is known to carry a risk of peptic ulcer disease, especially in older individuals, and the physician did not prescribe mitigating medication to counteract these side effects. The patient subsequently developed a perforated ulcer and died from organ failure. The estate brought suit against the physician for negligence, lack of informed consent, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).The estate initially filed the action in Connecticut Superior Court, and the physician removed it to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The physician moved to dismiss, arguing immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and contending the CUTPA claim was not viable. The District Court dismissed the CUTPA claim but denied the motion to dismiss the negligence and informed consent claims, concluding PREP Act immunity did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the physician qualified for PREP Act immunity because he was a licensed health professional who prescribed a covered countermeasure (prednisone) for COVID-19, and the prescription had a causal relationship with the patient’s death. The court also held that the CUTPA claim was impermissible because it was based on alleged professional negligence rather than business or entrepreneurial conduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the CUTPA claim, reversed the District Court’s denial of PREP Act immunity, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Waters v. Kory" on Justia Law

A priest formerly affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) brought suit against various church leaders and entities, alleging defamation. He claimed that leaders within ROCOR falsely accused him of forging letters from church officials that purportedly announced his election as a bishop. The priest maintained that he had been chosen for elevation, and that the accusations of forgery, which circulated within the church and were subsequently posted online, damaged his reputation and led to his suspension and eventual removal from clerical office.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, upon reassignment to a new judge, granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court found that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence under New York defamation law linking the defendants to the public dissemination of the allegedly defamatory statements. Additionally, the court held in the alternative that the lawsuit was barred by the First Amendment’s church autonomy doctrine, as adjudicating the claims would require the court to intrude upon religious questions regarding ROCOR’s selection, supervision, and discipline of clergy, as well as its internal governance protocols.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, focusing on the constitutional ground. The Second Circuit held that the First Amendment’s church autonomy doctrine prevents civil courts from adjudicating claims that would interfere with a religious organization’s management of its ministers or require secular courts to resolve disputes over church protocols and internal governance. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s claims, whether based on internal or public statements, were barred because their resolution would necessitate unconstitutional entanglement in matters of church governance and doctrine. View "Belya v. Kapral" on Justia Law

The case involves a car accident in which the plaintiff was seriously injured after colliding with a municipal bus operated by an employee of the New York City Transit Authority. The plaintiff filed a state law tort action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging negligence by both the Transit Authority and the bus driver. Both parties requested a jury trial, and a Magistrate Judge was assigned to preside over jury selection.During jury selection, defense counsel used all peremptory strikes on three Black prospective jurors. The plaintiff’s counsel raised a Batson v. Kentucky challenge, arguing that the strikes were racially motivated. The Magistrate Judge requested race-neutral explanations from defense counsel, who provided reasons related to the jurors’ perceived education, employment, and demeanor. The plaintiff contended these explanations were pretextual. The Magistrate Judge overruled the Batson objection, finding the explanations race-neutral without explicitly assessing their credibility as required by Batson's third step. The trial then proceeded before a District Judge, who, after an eight-day trial, received a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, resulting in dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the plaintiff’s claims that he was denied a fair trial and that his Batson rights were violated during jury selection. The court rejected the fair-trial claim, finding no prejudicial conduct by the trial judge. However, the Second Circuit held that the Magistrate Judge erred by not making an explicit credibility determination regarding the race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes. The court remanded the case to the District Court to conduct a Batson reconstruction hearing or, if such a hearing is no longer feasible, to order a new trial. View "Salters v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth." on Justia Law

Buyers of over-the-counter nasal decongestants containing oral phenylephrine brought numerous class actions against drug manufacturers and retailers, alleging that for years these companies sold and advertised decongestant products they knew to be ineffective. The plaintiffs claimed that scientific studies, particularly since 2016, had shown oral phenylephrine to be no better than a placebo at relieving congestion, yet the companies continued to market their products as effective decongestants and complied with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) labeling requirements. The FDA, despite mounting evidence, did not remove oral phenylephrine’s designation as an effective decongestant under its regulations.The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated nearly one hundred class actions and transferred them to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting New York statutory and common-law claims as well as a federal RICO claim. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) expressly preempted the state law claims because the drugs’ labels complied with FDA requirements, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the RICO claim. The court also dismissed a Lanham Act claim brought by one pharmacy plaintiff.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the FDCA expressly preempts most of the state law claims because the federal regime requires manufacturers to follow the FDA-approved labeling, but it vacated the dismissal for claims regarding “Maximum Strength” labeling and brand-name drugs approved via the New Drug Application process, remanding those for further proceedings. The court affirmed dismissal of the RICO claim, adopting the indirect purchaser rule, and upheld denial of the pharmacy’s motion for reconsideration regarding its Lanham Act claim. View "Yousefzadeh v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc." on Justia Law

A professional track and field athlete received a bottle of Gatorade Recovery Gummies at an award ceremony hosted by Gatorade, which were labeled as “NSF Certified for Sport,” indicating independent testing for banned substances. After consuming the gummies, the athlete submitted a routine drug test that later returned positive for cardarine, a banned performance-enhancing drug, resulting in immediate suspension from elite competition. Subsequent investigation revealed that the gummies lot the athlete received had never been NSF certified, and Gatorade was aware of the mislabeling before distributing the product. The athlete suffered significant consequences, including loss of eligibility to compete, loss of a scholarship, and forfeiture of endorsement opportunities.The athlete initiated legal action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging strict products liability, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, violation of Texas’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, tortious interference with contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed all claims. It found no “cognizable injury outside of purely economic damages” for the strict liability, negligence, and misrepresentation claims, applying New York’s economic loss doctrine. Additional claims were dismissed based on statutory definitions and insufficient allegations of extreme conduct or distress.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the tortious interference, consumer protection, and emotional distress claims. However, the court recognized uncertainty in New York law regarding tort recovery for nonconsensual bodily changes detectable only by laboratory testing and the boundaries of the economic loss doctrine. Accordingly, the Second Circuit deferred decision and certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals concerning the scope of the economic loss doctrine and whether the athlete’s injury is cognizable in tort under New York law. View "Asinga v. Gatorade Co." on Justia Law

Parents, guardians, and children brought state law claims against manufacturers, pharmacies, and retailers of acetaminophen products, alleging that prenatal exposure to acetaminophen caused ADHD and/or autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The plaintiffs contended that the defendants failed to warn about these risks. Acetaminophen is commonly used during pregnancy, but the FDA only requires a general warning for pregnant women and does not mandate warnings about ADHD or ASD. Scientific debate exists regarding any causal relationship between prenatal acetaminophen exposure and neurodevelopmental disorders, with studies and expert opinions both supporting and questioning such links.After these cases were consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the court excluded all general causation expert testimony offered by plaintiffs in Rutledge (Drs. Baccarelli, Hollander, Pearson, Cabrera, Louie) and Phippen (Dr. Ness), determining their opinions were unreliable and not based on sufficient scientific methodology under Rule 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. The district court then granted summary judgment for the defendants. It also rejected defendants’ arguments that federal law preempted the plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims, holding that federal drug labeling regulations did not prohibit supplemental warnings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. It held that the district court erred in excluding the testimony of Drs. Baccarelli, Hollander, and Pearson, as their methodologies and interpretations were consistent with accepted scientific practices and the ongoing debate in the field. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of Drs. Cabrera and Louie. The Second Circuit also held that reconsideration of Dr. Ness’s testimony in Phippen was warranted. The court affirmed the district court’s rejection of the federal preemption defense. The judgments in both cases were vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rutledge v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

A group of parents, guardians, and children alleged that prenatal exposure to acetaminophen, the active ingredient in Tylenol and similar over-the-counter drugs, caused attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and/or autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in children. The defendants were manufacturers, pharmacies, and retailers of acetaminophen products. The plaintiffs’ claims centered on the companies’ alleged failure to warn about the risk of these neurodevelopmental disorders associated with prenatal acetaminophen use.These cases were consolidated and transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. In the Rutledge action, the district court excluded all five of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses on general causation, concluding their methodologies were unreliable, and granted summary judgment to defendants. In the Phippen action, which involved only ADHD claims, the district court excluded another expert, Dr. Ness, and again granted summary judgment to defendants. The district court also rejected defendants’ arguments that federal drug labeling law preempted the plaintiffs’ claims, holding that federal law did not bar additional, specific pregnancy-related warnings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the district court properly exercised its gatekeeping role under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in excluding the plaintiffs’ expert testimony. The Second Circuit held that the district court exceeded its discretion in excluding the testimony of Drs. Baccarelli, Hollander, and Pearson, because their methodologies were consistent with those generally accepted in their fields and their reasoning was within the range of scientific debate. The appellate court affirmed the exclusion of testimony from Drs. Cabrera and Louie. In light of its rulings, the Second Circuit vacated the summary judgments, remanded both cases for further proceedings, and directed reconsideration of Dr. Ness’s exclusion in Phippen. The court also affirmed that federal law did not preempt the plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims. View "Rutledge v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

A police sergeant was injured when his department-issued pistol accidentally discharged during a training exercise. He did not know what caused the trigger to actuate but testified that the pistol fired while holstered and his hand was not on the weapon. The injured officer and his spouse sued the firearm manufacturer, alleging that the pistol was defectively designed because it lacked an external safety, and claimed that this defect caused the injury. They sought to support their claims with expert testimony asserting that the pistol’s design was unreasonably dangerous due to its lack of external safety features and that an external safety would have prevented the incident.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York excluded the causation opinions of the plaintiffs’ experts, finding that these experts could not reliably explain how the accident happened or how an external safety would have prevented it. The district court then granted summary judgment to the manufacturer, holding that, under New York law, expert testimony was required to establish proximate causation because the issue was too complex for a jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the experts’ causation opinions, as they were insufficiently linked to the specifics of the accident. However, the appellate court determined that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The Second Circuit clarified that New York law does not require expert testimony to establish proximate causation in all product liability cases; jurors may use their common sense and the available evidence, including unchallenged expert opinions about the product’s design, to decide if the alleged defect caused the injury. The appellate court also rejected the manufacturer’s argument based on New York’s optional equipment doctrine. The judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "The Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Newsweek Digital LLC" on Justia Law