Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

NAMC, which buys, services, and sells residential mortgages, and GSF, a residential mortgage lender that also sells mortgages, entered into an Agreement whereby GSF would sell loans to NAMC. To use the Fannie Mae Desktop Originator System (DO), which evaluates potential mortgagors under Fannie Mae’s eligibility standards, GSF needed a sponsoring lender. GSF had several sponsors from 2006 until 2011; one was NAMC. Every time GSF downloaded a report it paid Fannie Mae a $15 fee and the sponsoring lender had to pay Fannie Mae between $20 and $28. GSF was not aware that the sponsoring lender also had to pay a fee. In 2008 NAMC terminated its Agreement with GSF, but failed to notify GSF to stop using it as a sponsoring lender. NAMC was billed by Fannie Mae for almost $278,000 for GSF’s use of the system, 2008-2011. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of GSF in a suit charging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and unjust enrichment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. “NAMC is a sophisticated enterprise... its failure to cancel its sponsorship of GSF when it severed all its other relations to that company was an inexplicable blunder for which it has only itself to blame.” View "Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Co. v. GSF Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

Sam was driving; his wife, Toni, was a passenger when their car slammed into a tree. Toni was injured and died within a week. Her estate sued Sam, claiming negligent driving, and sued the hospital and physicians, alleging malpractice. The medical defendants filed third-party actions against Sam, seeking contribution should they be held liable. State Farm is defending Sam in both suits, under a policy with indemnity of $250,000 per person ($500,000 total) for auto accidents. State Farm has offered to pay policy limits; its offer has not been accepted because of a dispute about the terms of the release. The couple had a Cincinnati Insurance excess policy ($5 million). Cincinnati unsuccessfully sought a declaratory judgment that its policy does not apply. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that Cincinnati must defend Sam in the suit between the estate and the medical defendants. The court found no prejudicial delay in notifying the company; rejected an argument that Cincinnati had no duty to defend because of State Farm’s failure to pay; and rejected Cincinnati’s argument that its policy does not apply because both Sam and Toni are insureds. The court cited the exclusion’s exception: “[w]hen a third party acquires a right of contribution against you or any relative.” Neither defense nor indemnity is appropriate in the estate’s suit against Sam. View "Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Estate of Chee" on Justia Law

Powers drove through a stop sign and caused a four-vehicle accident. The plaintiffs suffered personal injuries. Trotter was the driver of the vehicle; Jackson and Petrie were passengers. Powers was insured under a policy with liability limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. The plaintiffs settled with Powers’s insurer for the per-accident limit of $500,000; Trotter received $250,000 and Jackson and Petrie split the remaining $250,000. The plaintiffs believed that the settlement did not make them whole and submitted claims to Harleysville, Trotter’s insurer under a policy that provides that Trotter and any occupant of his vehicle is an “insured” for purposes of underinsured motorist coverage. The policy's declaration page states that underinsured motorist coverage is limited to $500,000 for “each accident.” Because the plaintiffs had together already recovered $500,000 under the Powers policy, Harleysville denied their claims, concluding that Powers was not an “underinsured motorist.” The plaintiffs argued the policy can reasonably be construed to mean that the $500,000 limit applies on a per-person, rather than a per-accident, basis. The court entered summary judgment in favor of Harleysville. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the policy unambiguously states that coverage is subject to a $500,000 per-accident maximum, regardless of the number of insureds involved. View "Trotter v. Harleysville Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Houston sued Hyatt and C.G. for breach of contract, intentional misconduct, and negligence in connection with injuries she sustained after falling at the downtown Indianapolis Hyatt hotel during a hotel‐sponsored New Year’s Eve party in 2010 and sought damages in excess of one million dollars. Discovery revealed that Hyatt had used C.G.’s security services for years. The district court granted Hyatt’s summary judgment motion in February 2014, but delayed ruling on C.G.’s motion due to Houston’s filing of three motions for sanctions against C.G. for discovery matters. A magistrate found that C.G. had engaged in a pattern of obstreperous discovery behavior by testifying falsely about its documents and discovery efforts, failing timely to correct false representations regarding its discovery, falsifying documents, and impeding the fair conduct of depositions. The district court nonetheless granted C.G summary judgment, butt declined to enter final judgment pending a determination as to the amount of sanctions to be levied against C.G. The court later adopted the magistrate’s recommendation and ordered C.G. to pay Houston $118,925.00 in attorney’s fees and $16,498.91 in costs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding “ample evidence of C.G.’s attempts to impede, delay, and frustrate Houston’s discovery efforts.” View "Houston v. C.G. Sec. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

The class representatives in three suits had purchased the Smoothing Kit, a hair product that supposedly would smooth hair and coat it with Keratin, a protein found naturally in hair. The Smoothing Kit was a disaster. Its active ingredient is extremely corrosive; if left on long enough, can dissolve the hair and burn the scalp. Asserting claims for breach of warranty, violations of state consumer fraud and deceptive practices laws, and unjust enrichment, plaintiffs in several states filed class action lawsuits. The cases were consolidated in the Northern District of Illinois, resulting in a settlement agreement. Martin objected to its approval which would provide a one‐time payment of $10 per person (the cost of the Smoothing Kit) plus payment to who suffered bodily injury. The Seventh Circuit upheld the approval, rejecting Martin’s argument that the personal injury settlement’s value was too low because it failed to recog‐ nize that there are a number of different applicable laws. The district court reasonably concluded that it had enough data for an informed decision and that the dollar amounts were within a reasonable range and reasonably considered and rejected injunctive relief. View "Reid v. Unilever United States, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s 1998 dislocation of a kneecap required implantation of a steel plate; a year later a shattered femur required implantation of a steel rod from hip to knee. In 2011, he fractured an ankle. A podiatrist inserted a bar with pins in the ankle and later repeated the procedure. Months later, plaintiff’s ankle pain returned and he was prescribed Vicodin and Percocet, providing limited relief. Two treating physicians reported that he could sit, stand, and walk for only 15 minutes at a time and for no more than one hour in an eight-hour work day; that he could lift a weight of 10-20 pounds only occasionally; and that he could not reach up with his right arm at all. One reported that plaintiff was “fully and completely disabled” with constant and worsening pain that caused constipation, drowsiness, and upset stomach, with a “poor” prognosis. An ALJ denied social security disability benefits, noting that the medical records varied from the reports and finding that plaintiff’s injuries were severe, but he could perform unskilled sedentary jobs. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The question was not whether plaintiff was less disabled than he was four years ago, but whether he was sufficiently recovered to hold down a 40-hour-a-week job; the ALJ did not adequately explain what jobs plaintiff might be capable of. View "Forsythe v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Diagnosed with laryngeal cancer in 2003, Glisson underwent surgery that removed his larynx, part of his pharynx, portions of his mandible and 13 teeth. The surgery left him with a permanent opening in his throat, with a tracheostomy tube. He was later fitted with a voice prosthesis, and received postoperative radiation treatment. In 2008, doctors inserted a gastrojejunostomy tube through his stomach to help with nutrition. In 2010, a cancerous lesion was found on his tongue, but was successfully excised. Glisson also suffered ongoing memory issues, hypothyroidism, depression, smoking, and alcohol abuse. In 2010, Glisson was sentenced to incarceration for dealing in a controlled substance. Prison medical personnel noted spikes in Glisson’s blood pressure, an occasional low pulse, low oxygen saturation level, confusion, and anger. He was at one point deemed a suicide risk. His condition worsened: his symptoms suggested acute renal failure. After a short stay a local hospital, Glisson died in prison. The district court rejected his mother’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that failure to implement a particular Indiana Department of Corrections Health Care Service Directive, requiring a plan for management of chronic diseases, violated Glisson’s Eighth Amendment rights. View "Glisson v. Corr. Med. Servs, Inc." on Justia Law

Noboa, while living in Illinois, booked a trip to Mexico by using the Orbitz website. In the lobby of the Barcelo hotel, she booked an eco-tour, operated by Rancho. During the tour, the all-terrain vehicle in which Noboa was riding overturned. She died as a result of her injuries. The district court dismissed her estate's suit against Barcelo and Rancho, finding neither company subject to jurisdiction in Illinois. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Noboa's death was connected to Illinois through a causal chain that began with her booking the trip while in Illinois. View "Noboa v. Barcelo Corp. Empresaria, SA" on Justia Law

ALL leased a crane to White Construction. Carson worked for White, providing general maintenance and serving as the “eyes and ears” of crane operator Dowell. Carson and Dowell were told to move the crane to a wind turbine platform several miles away. As the crane approached a road with overhead power lines. Carson signaled for Dowell to stop at the base of some wood matting placed to help the crane cross the road. Dowell stopped, but the crane began moving again, onto the matting where Carson was standing. As the crane pushed one end down, the other end rose. Carson slid down the slope. The crane’s treads crushed his foot, which had to be amputated. Dowell testified that he took the crane out of its “travel detent,” meaning that the crane should not have moved. The crane was inspected by Scholl, hired by White, and by a crane mechanic employed by ALL. Both concluded that the crane had moved forward because a malfunction in the controls caused the throttles to re‐engage without action by Dowell. The problem was intermittent and difficult to replicate and to detect. In his negligence suit, Carson argued that ALL had a duty to reasonably inspect the crane upon delivering it to White. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding no evidence that ALL’s alleged breach was the proximate cause of Carson’s injury. View "Carson v. All Erection & Crane Rental Co" on Justia Law

While Latoya was pregnant with Arianna, she received prenatal care during 12 visits at the Will County Community Health Center, which received grant funding from the U.S. Public Health Service, 42 U.S.C. 254b. On September 2, 2008, Latoya entered Silver Cross Hospital emergency room, suffering from abdominal pain. In the labor and delivery unit, Dr. Marsheh decided to induce labor. Although Dr. Marsheh was also affiliated with the Health Center, he did not treat Latoya during her prenatal care appointments. During the delivery, Arianna became stuck in the birth canal. Arianna was born on September 4 and weighed 11.7 pounds. Arianna taken to the Intensive Care Unit; her right arm was put in a splint, having sustained an injury during birth. Before leaving the hospital, Arianna was diagnosed with Erb’s Palsy, involving the weakness of the arm as a result of an injury to the brachial plexus, the nerves surrounding the shoulder. On May 4, 2011, Latoya, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Finding the claims not timely under the FTCA’s statute of limitations, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting all of Latoya’s claims of equitable tolling. View "Blanche v. United States" on Justia Law