Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The class representatives in three suits had purchased the Smoothing Kit, a hair product that supposedly would smooth hair and coat it with Keratin, a protein found naturally in hair. The Smoothing Kit was a disaster. Its active ingredient is extremely corrosive; if left on long enough, can dissolve the hair and burn the scalp. Asserting claims for breach of warranty, violations of state consumer fraud and deceptive practices laws, and unjust enrichment, plaintiffs in several states filed class action lawsuits. The cases were consolidated in the Northern District of Illinois, resulting in a settlement agreement. Martin objected to its approval which would provide a one‐time payment of $10 per person (the cost of the Smoothing Kit) plus payment to who suffered bodily injury. The Seventh Circuit upheld the approval, rejecting Martin’s argument that the personal injury settlement’s value was too low because it failed to recog‐ nize that there are a number of different applicable laws. The district court reasonably concluded that it had enough data for an informed decision and that the dollar amounts were within a reasonable range and reasonably considered and rejected injunctive relief. View "Reid v. Unilever United States, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s 1998 dislocation of a kneecap required implantation of a steel plate; a year later a shattered femur required implantation of a steel rod from hip to knee. In 2011, he fractured an ankle. A podiatrist inserted a bar with pins in the ankle and later repeated the procedure. Months later, plaintiff’s ankle pain returned and he was prescribed Vicodin and Percocet, providing limited relief. Two treating physicians reported that he could sit, stand, and walk for only 15 minutes at a time and for no more than one hour in an eight-hour work day; that he could lift a weight of 10-20 pounds only occasionally; and that he could not reach up with his right arm at all. One reported that plaintiff was “fully and completely disabled” with constant and worsening pain that caused constipation, drowsiness, and upset stomach, with a “poor” prognosis. An ALJ denied social security disability benefits, noting that the medical records varied from the reports and finding that plaintiff’s injuries were severe, but he could perform unskilled sedentary jobs. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The question was not whether plaintiff was less disabled than he was four years ago, but whether he was sufficiently recovered to hold down a 40-hour-a-week job; the ALJ did not adequately explain what jobs plaintiff might be capable of. View "Forsythe v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Diagnosed with laryngeal cancer in 2003, Glisson underwent surgery that removed his larynx, part of his pharynx, portions of his mandible and 13 teeth. The surgery left him with a permanent opening in his throat, with a tracheostomy tube. He was later fitted with a voice prosthesis, and received postoperative radiation treatment. In 2008, doctors inserted a gastrojejunostomy tube through his stomach to help with nutrition. In 2010, a cancerous lesion was found on his tongue, but was successfully excised. Glisson also suffered ongoing memory issues, hypothyroidism, depression, smoking, and alcohol abuse. In 2010, Glisson was sentenced to incarceration for dealing in a controlled substance. Prison medical personnel noted spikes in Glisson’s blood pressure, an occasional low pulse, low oxygen saturation level, confusion, and anger. He was at one point deemed a suicide risk. His condition worsened: his symptoms suggested acute renal failure. After a short stay a local hospital, Glisson died in prison. The district court rejected his mother’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that failure to implement a particular Indiana Department of Corrections Health Care Service Directive, requiring a plan for management of chronic diseases, violated Glisson’s Eighth Amendment rights. View "Glisson v. Corr. Med. Servs, Inc." on Justia Law

Noboa, while living in Illinois, booked a trip to Mexico by using the Orbitz website. In the lobby of the Barcelo hotel, she booked an eco-tour, operated by Rancho. During the tour, the all-terrain vehicle in which Noboa was riding overturned. She died as a result of her injuries. The district court dismissed her estate's suit against Barcelo and Rancho, finding neither company subject to jurisdiction in Illinois. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Noboa's death was connected to Illinois through a causal chain that began with her booking the trip while in Illinois. View "Noboa v. Barcelo Corp. Empresaria, SA" on Justia Law

ALL leased a crane to White Construction. Carson worked for White, providing general maintenance and serving as the “eyes and ears” of crane operator Dowell. Carson and Dowell were told to move the crane to a wind turbine platform several miles away. As the crane approached a road with overhead power lines. Carson signaled for Dowell to stop at the base of some wood matting placed to help the crane cross the road. Dowell stopped, but the crane began moving again, onto the matting where Carson was standing. As the crane pushed one end down, the other end rose. Carson slid down the slope. The crane’s treads crushed his foot, which had to be amputated. Dowell testified that he took the crane out of its “travel detent,” meaning that the crane should not have moved. The crane was inspected by Scholl, hired by White, and by a crane mechanic employed by ALL. Both concluded that the crane had moved forward because a malfunction in the controls caused the throttles to re‐engage without action by Dowell. The problem was intermittent and difficult to replicate and to detect. In his negligence suit, Carson argued that ALL had a duty to reasonably inspect the crane upon delivering it to White. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding no evidence that ALL’s alleged breach was the proximate cause of Carson’s injury. View "Carson v. All Erection & Crane Rental Co" on Justia Law

While Latoya was pregnant with Arianna, she received prenatal care during 12 visits at the Will County Community Health Center, which received grant funding from the U.S. Public Health Service, 42 U.S.C. 254b. On September 2, 2008, Latoya entered Silver Cross Hospital emergency room, suffering from abdominal pain. In the labor and delivery unit, Dr. Marsheh decided to induce labor. Although Dr. Marsheh was also affiliated with the Health Center, he did not treat Latoya during her prenatal care appointments. During the delivery, Arianna became stuck in the birth canal. Arianna was born on September 4 and weighed 11.7 pounds. Arianna taken to the Intensive Care Unit; her right arm was put in a splint, having sustained an injury during birth. Before leaving the hospital, Arianna was diagnosed with Erb’s Palsy, involving the weakness of the arm as a result of an injury to the brachial plexus, the nerves surrounding the shoulder. On May 4, 2011, Latoya, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Finding the claims not timely under the FTCA’s statute of limitations, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting all of Latoya’s claims of equitable tolling. View "Blanche v. United States" on Justia Law

For 20 years Heard has suffered from inguinal hernias in his groin. When Heard’s imprisonment began in 1995, he had been diagnosed with one painful hernia. A second hernia was diagnosed in 2000. Outside physicians concluded that both hernias required surgical repair, but the Illinois Department of Corrections and Wexford, which provides medical care for inmates stalled until May 2007, when both hernias required emergency surgery. By then Heard had brought his first lawsuit, claiming deliberate indifference in not authorizing surgery sooner. Heard settled with Wexford in 2012 for $273,250, agreeing to release Wexford and the doctors from all claims. After his 2007 surgery, Heard developed a “recurrent” hernia. A second surgery did not occur until 2013. Heard again sued, claiming that Wexford had been deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need by delaying the second surgery under its policy to classify hernia surgeries as elective, unnecessary procedures. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that Heard’s release, and the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion, foreclosed the section 1983 action. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The release cannot mean that Wexford was free to ignore the recurrent hernia as it grew increasingly painful over time. View "Heard v. Tilden" on Justia Law

In 2006, 12 U.S. Marshals waited in Khan’s apartment, then arrested her at gunpoint for making false statements to HUD. When she asked to use the bathroom, a marshal patted her down and watched her pull down her underwear, urinate, and cleanse herself according to a Muslim ritual. The marshals refused to allow her to cover her head; while attempting to secure her in the squad car, a marshal touched her breasts, apparently unintentionally. She was convicted and sentenced to probation. Khan wrote to the Marshals Office of Professional Responsibility describing the indignities to which she was subjected and complaining about the absence of any female agents. The Office stated she was not entitled to know the outcome of the investigation. Three years later, Khan learned that the Service had found no evidence of misconduct. The Service did not respond to a second letter. In 2013, Khan mailed an administrative claim, requesting damages. She had not previously requested damages. The Service replied that the claim was untimely under the Federal Tort Claims Act two-year limit on filing claims alleging misconduct by federal officers, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of her suit as time-barred, noting that it is also barred by state law. View "Khan v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1956, Ephrem, a Catholic nun, experienced apparitions of the Virgin Mary. Devotions to Our Lady of America was launched. Ephrem joined a cloistered house, approved by the Pope. Fuller entered the cloister in 1965. In 1979 its three members (including Fuller and Ephrem) formed a new congregation. In 1993 Ephrem founded Our Lady of America Center. Upon her death in 2000, she was succeeded by Fuller and willed her property to Fuller. Most had been created by Ephrem or donated to the cloister or the Center. Fuller registered trademarks for artifacts, including Ephrem’s diary, medallions, and statues. In 2005 McCarthy, a lawyer, and Langsenkamp, “a Papal Knight,” began helping Fuller promote devotions to Our Lady. Fuller gave them a statue and other artifacts. In 2007, the three had a disagreement that resulted in this lawsuit. The men claim to be the authentic promoters of devotions to Our Lady and the lawful owners of the artifacts. Another layman, Hartman, began a campaign to smear McCarthy’s and Langsenkamp’s reputations. Fuller is no longer a nun. A jury returned a verdict in favor of McCarthy and Langsenkamp. The Seventh Circuit affirmed awards: $150,000 in compensatory damages, $200,000 in punitive damages (against Hartman only), plus $295,000 in attorney’s fees and sanctions and $281,000 in costs, to be paid by Fuller, Hartman, and their lawyer. The court vacated an injunction concerning the defamation. View "McCarthy v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Cincinnati Insurance issued a liability policy to Painters, which allowed the insured to add an “additional insured” by oral agreement, if that agreement preceded the occurrence and “a certificate of insurance ... has been issued.” No permission from Cincinnati is required, if the insureds have a relationship consistent with the policy. Painters was hired to paint Vita’s premises and orally agreed to add Vita as an additional insurer. Painters’ worker fell, before there was any written confirmation of the oral agreement, and remains in a coma. In a suit by the insurer, seeking a declaration that Vita was not covered based on a certificate issued to Vita the day after the accident, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Cincinnati. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Summary judgment was premature. The policy is ambiguous. A certificate could be regarded a prerequisite to coverage of the additional insured, but also could be intended merely to memorialize the oral agreement. The policy could also mean that the oral agreement must be memorialized in writing before the insured can file a claim. Oral agreements are valid contracts and the policy is explicit that an oral agreement is sufficient to add an insured. The certificate is not a contract, but “a matter of information only” that “confers no rights upon the certificate holder.” View "Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Vita Food Prods, Inc." on Justia Law