Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Noboa, while living in Illinois, booked a trip to Mexico by using the Orbitz website. In the lobby of the Barcelo hotel, she booked an eco-tour, operated by Rancho. During the tour, the all-terrain vehicle in which Noboa was riding overturned. She died as a result of her injuries. The district court dismissed her estate's suit against Barcelo and Rancho, finding neither company subject to jurisdiction in Illinois. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Noboa's death was connected to Illinois through a causal chain that began with her booking the trip while in Illinois. View "Noboa v. Barcelo Corp. Empresaria, SA" on Justia Law

ALL leased a crane to White Construction. Carson worked for White, providing general maintenance and serving as the “eyes and ears” of crane operator Dowell. Carson and Dowell were told to move the crane to a wind turbine platform several miles away. As the crane approached a road with overhead power lines. Carson signaled for Dowell to stop at the base of some wood matting placed to help the crane cross the road. Dowell stopped, but the crane began moving again, onto the matting where Carson was standing. As the crane pushed one end down, the other end rose. Carson slid down the slope. The crane’s treads crushed his foot, which had to be amputated. Dowell testified that he took the crane out of its “travel detent,” meaning that the crane should not have moved. The crane was inspected by Scholl, hired by White, and by a crane mechanic employed by ALL. Both concluded that the crane had moved forward because a malfunction in the controls caused the throttles to re‐engage without action by Dowell. The problem was intermittent and difficult to replicate and to detect. In his negligence suit, Carson argued that ALL had a duty to reasonably inspect the crane upon delivering it to White. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding no evidence that ALL’s alleged breach was the proximate cause of Carson’s injury. View "Carson v. All Erection & Crane Rental Co" on Justia Law

While Latoya was pregnant with Arianna, she received prenatal care during 12 visits at the Will County Community Health Center, which received grant funding from the U.S. Public Health Service, 42 U.S.C. 254b. On September 2, 2008, Latoya entered Silver Cross Hospital emergency room, suffering from abdominal pain. In the labor and delivery unit, Dr. Marsheh decided to induce labor. Although Dr. Marsheh was also affiliated with the Health Center, he did not treat Latoya during her prenatal care appointments. During the delivery, Arianna became stuck in the birth canal. Arianna was born on September 4 and weighed 11.7 pounds. Arianna taken to the Intensive Care Unit; her right arm was put in a splint, having sustained an injury during birth. Before leaving the hospital, Arianna was diagnosed with Erb’s Palsy, involving the weakness of the arm as a result of an injury to the brachial plexus, the nerves surrounding the shoulder. On May 4, 2011, Latoya, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Finding the claims not timely under the FTCA’s statute of limitations, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting all of Latoya’s claims of equitable tolling. View "Blanche v. United States" on Justia Law

For 20 years Heard has suffered from inguinal hernias in his groin. When Heard’s imprisonment began in 1995, he had been diagnosed with one painful hernia. A second hernia was diagnosed in 2000. Outside physicians concluded that both hernias required surgical repair, but the Illinois Department of Corrections and Wexford, which provides medical care for inmates stalled until May 2007, when both hernias required emergency surgery. By then Heard had brought his first lawsuit, claiming deliberate indifference in not authorizing surgery sooner. Heard settled with Wexford in 2012 for $273,250, agreeing to release Wexford and the doctors from all claims. After his 2007 surgery, Heard developed a “recurrent” hernia. A second surgery did not occur until 2013. Heard again sued, claiming that Wexford had been deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need by delaying the second surgery under its policy to classify hernia surgeries as elective, unnecessary procedures. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that Heard’s release, and the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion, foreclosed the section 1983 action. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The release cannot mean that Wexford was free to ignore the recurrent hernia as it grew increasingly painful over time. View "Heard v. Tilden" on Justia Law

In 2006, 12 U.S. Marshals waited in Khan’s apartment, then arrested her at gunpoint for making false statements to HUD. When she asked to use the bathroom, a marshal patted her down and watched her pull down her underwear, urinate, and cleanse herself according to a Muslim ritual. The marshals refused to allow her to cover her head; while attempting to secure her in the squad car, a marshal touched her breasts, apparently unintentionally. She was convicted and sentenced to probation. Khan wrote to the Marshals Office of Professional Responsibility describing the indignities to which she was subjected and complaining about the absence of any female agents. The Office stated she was not entitled to know the outcome of the investigation. Three years later, Khan learned that the Service had found no evidence of misconduct. The Service did not respond to a second letter. In 2013, Khan mailed an administrative claim, requesting damages. She had not previously requested damages. The Service replied that the claim was untimely under the Federal Tort Claims Act two-year limit on filing claims alleging misconduct by federal officers, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of her suit as time-barred, noting that it is also barred by state law. View "Khan v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1956, Ephrem, a Catholic nun, experienced apparitions of the Virgin Mary. Devotions to Our Lady of America was launched. Ephrem joined a cloistered house, approved by the Pope. Fuller entered the cloister in 1965. In 1979 its three members (including Fuller and Ephrem) formed a new congregation. In 1993 Ephrem founded Our Lady of America Center. Upon her death in 2000, she was succeeded by Fuller and willed her property to Fuller. Most had been created by Ephrem or donated to the cloister or the Center. Fuller registered trademarks for artifacts, including Ephrem’s diary, medallions, and statues. In 2005 McCarthy, a lawyer, and Langsenkamp, “a Papal Knight,” began helping Fuller promote devotions to Our Lady. Fuller gave them a statue and other artifacts. In 2007, the three had a disagreement that resulted in this lawsuit. The men claim to be the authentic promoters of devotions to Our Lady and the lawful owners of the artifacts. Another layman, Hartman, began a campaign to smear McCarthy’s and Langsenkamp’s reputations. Fuller is no longer a nun. A jury returned a verdict in favor of McCarthy and Langsenkamp. The Seventh Circuit affirmed awards: $150,000 in compensatory damages, $200,000 in punitive damages (against Hartman only), plus $295,000 in attorney’s fees and sanctions and $281,000 in costs, to be paid by Fuller, Hartman, and their lawyer. The court vacated an injunction concerning the defamation. View "McCarthy v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Cincinnati Insurance issued a liability policy to Painters, which allowed the insured to add an “additional insured” by oral agreement, if that agreement preceded the occurrence and “a certificate of insurance ... has been issued.” No permission from Cincinnati is required, if the insureds have a relationship consistent with the policy. Painters was hired to paint Vita’s premises and orally agreed to add Vita as an additional insurer. Painters’ worker fell, before there was any written confirmation of the oral agreement, and remains in a coma. In a suit by the insurer, seeking a declaration that Vita was not covered based on a certificate issued to Vita the day after the accident, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Cincinnati. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Summary judgment was premature. The policy is ambiguous. A certificate could be regarded a prerequisite to coverage of the additional insured, but also could be intended merely to memorialize the oral agreement. The policy could also mean that the oral agreement must be memorialized in writing before the insured can file a claim. Oral agreements are valid contracts and the policy is explicit that an oral agreement is sufficient to add an insured. The certificate is not a contract, but “a matter of information only” that “confers no rights upon the certificate holder.” View "Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Vita Food Prods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested for an alleged sexual assault, which allegation turned out to be false. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against Defendants, Polk County and a Polk County investigator, advancing claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest and false imprisonment, and state common law claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, negligence, and defamation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the investigator had arguable probable cause to effect Plaintiff’s arrest and was entitled to qualified immunity and that Polk County could not be held liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. The court declined to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the investigator was entitled to qualified immunity because she reasonably believed probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff; (2) there was no dispute as to any material fact with regard to Plaintiff’s Monell claims; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without prejudice Plaintiff’s state law claims; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. View "Burritt v. Ditlefsen" on Justia Law

Francis Foster filed suit against Principal Life Insurance Company, alleging, inter alia, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. Principal filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Foster lacked standing to sue and that he failed to state a claim. The district court dismissed the complaint but did so on the theory that Foster’s claims were “derivative” of a related lawsuit and that his settlement of that lawsuit barred his claim against Principal. The district court also denied Foster’s motion to amend his complaint. The Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment, holding (1) Foster’s complaint stated a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and Foster’s claim was not precluded by any other litigation; and (2) on remand, the district court should consider anew Foster’s motion to amend the complaint. View "Foster v. Principal Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Anthony Zimmerman, the president and owner of Premier Forest Products Products, Inc. (together, Plaintiffs), was hired to harvest trees on certain property. When the landowner discovered that Zimmerman had been harvesting trees without regard to fence lines and had taken more trees than he was supposed to, the landowner warned Zimmerman to leave the property. When Zimmerman refused to do so, the landowner sought help from the Carroll County Sheriff’s Office. The sheriff’s office arrested Zimmerman for criminal trespass. Plaintiffs sued the sheriff’s office and its sheriff, deputy, chief deputy, and detective (collectively, Defendants), alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights in arresting him for criminal trespass. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Defendant and, alternatively, that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Zimmerman failed to establish that probable cause was lacking under the circumstances presented in this case or that Defendants engaged in arbitrary conduct unjustifiable by any government interest. View "Zimmerman v. Doran" on Justia Law