Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

While working amidst a high-wall mining (HWM) system at Southern Coal’s Harlan County mine, Smith, disengaging a conveyor car from the system, inadvertently placed his foot in a “pinch point” that existed between a hydraulic pusher used to launch cars into the mine and an outer guide rail on the mining platform. When the hydraulic pusher was prematurely activated by another worker, it crushed Smith’s foot against the guide rail. The injury resulted in the amputation of his lower left leg. In Smith’s suit, alleging negligence and strict liability for defective design and failure to warn, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the HWM manufacturer (Joy). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Smith's arguments that the district court erred by instructing the jury that Joy could be liable for negligent failure to warn only if Smith was unaware of the danger he faced and regarding a rebuttable presumption of nondefectiveness. The court declined a request to certify to the Kentucky Supreme Court questions of state law concerning both of those jury instructions. View "Smith v. Joy Techs., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, Hogan sued the Life Insurance Company of North America for violating the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, by denying her benefits claim under a disability insurance policy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant of judgment against her. While appeal was pending, Hogan filed a state court suit against two nurses who worked for the Life Insurance Company and who had provided opinions regarding Hogan’s eligibility for benefits after reviewing her claim. Hogan carefully pleaded her claims in the second suit to avoid reference to the Life Insurance Company or ERISA, alleging only that the nurses committed negligence per se by giving medical advice without being licensed under Kentucky’s medical-licensure laws. The defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis of ERISA’s complete-preemptive effect. The district court denied Hogan’s attempts to remand the case to state court and later granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of remand and the dismissal. Hogan’s artfully pleaded state-law claims are simply claims for the wrongful denial of benefits under an ERISA plan that arise solely from the relationship created by that plan. The court denied defendants’ motion for sanctions on appeal because Hogan’s arguments were not frivolous. View "Hogan v. Jacobson" on Justia Law

Inmate Koprowski was cleaning a fry hood in the prison's food-service area when he fell off a ladder and landed on his back. Koprowski lost feeling in his legs for several minutes and experienced severe pain when he stood up. He had difficulty walking for several days; intense pain persisted even while lying down. Koprowski alleges that medical staff treated his injuries as minor and temporary, thereby causing him unnecessary pain and further aggravating his condition, by delaying x-rays and refusing to perform an MRI, which would have shown that he had broken his back. Koprowski also claims that prison staff denied him access to specialized care, surgery, and ambulatory aids. Koprowski brought a “Bivens” suit against prison officials, alleging deliberate indifference. The court dismissed, finding that the Inmate Accident Compensation Act, 18 U.S.C. 4126(c), a workers’ compensation scheme for federal prisoners injured during the course of their prison employment, is the exclusive vehicle by which a federal inmate may receive compensation for injuries suffered during the course of prison employment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The IACA does not displace this otherwise available claim just because the alleged unconstitutional conduct occurred in the context of prison employment. View "Koprowski v. Baker" on Justia Law

Edwards worked as a CSX train engineer for 31 years. He arrived at work on May 28, 2012, with an upset stomach. The bathroom in the lead locomotive was “nasty,” Edwards saw and smelled:“[U]rine, human waste, . . . [and] blue chemical” splattered all over the toilet and floor. Edwards sprayed disinfectant, closed the door, and started the trip. During a stop, about 80 miles and six hours later, Edwards’ nausea escalated. Unwilling to use a foul bathroom, he sprinted to a catwalk, outside of the locomotive. He threw up over the side. Then he vomited a second time and, in the process, fell over the handrail onto the ground below. He broke two of his vertebrae and cracked a rib, ending his career with CSX. Edwards sought damages under Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51; its regulations required CSX to keep its locomotive bathroom sanitary. On remand, CSX again obtained summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. CSX complied with the rules the day before Edwards’ injury, when it inspected and cleaned the bathroom; the regulations do not require railroads to ensure that the toilets are clean at any given moment between inspections. Edwards had abandoned his other negligence claims. View "Edwards v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Fakhouri, a resident of Michigan who uses a wheelchair, traveled to Tennessee for a vacation in summer, 2012. She visited Ober Gatlinburg, a ski resort that also has a year-round amusement park, restaurant, lounge, and shopping center alongside the ski paths and mountain trails. To bring visitors to and from the ski area and associated attractions, Ober Gatlinburg operates a tramway, which Fakhouri rode without incident up the mountain when she arrived at the site. When she tried to enter the tram for her return trip, her wheelchair caught on the tram, breaking one of the wheels and causing her leg to buckle underneath the chair. She sought medical treatment for injuries to her leg and neck, and she continues to experience swelling, weakness, poor blood flow, and discoloration in the affected leg. The district court rejected her negligence suit on summary judgment, relying on a Tennessee statute that precludes liability for ski resort operators under certain conditions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Fakhouri’s lawsuit was precluded because she was a “skier or passenger,” Ober Gatlinburg is a “ski area operator,” and her injuries “aris[e] out of” her “use of any passenger tramways associated with Alpine or downhill skiing.” View "Fakhouri v. Ober Gatlinburg, Inc." on Justia Law

OSU hired Szeinbach in 1999 as a tenured professor in the College of Pharmacy, which then included doctors Vazquez (of Spanish origin) and Balkrishnan (of Indian origin). In 2005-2006, Szeinbach allegedly observed Balkrishnan and others discriminate against Seoane and that Balkrishnan favored Indian students. Szeinbach emailed the dean, stating that an evaluation of Seoane was “intentionally very biased.” Seoane filed an EEOC charge. Szeinbach later alleged that she had supported Seoane’s efforts by providing a copy of her email to the dean. She filed an internal complaint, alleging retaliation for her support of Seoane. In 2007 Balkrishnan wrote to the Primary Care Respiratory Journal, claiming that an article that Szeinbach had published was nearly identical to an article that Szeinbach had published in 2005. Balkrishnan sent similar correspondence to the dean and others and filed an internal complaint. A Committee concluded that Szeinbach’s use of and failure to cite her 2005 article demonstrated the “poorest of scholarly practices,” but closed its investigation. Balkrishnan continued to pursue the matter and, in a faculty meeting, called Szeinbach a “bitch.” In her suit for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, the jury awarded her $300,000 in damages for emotional suffering and harm to her professional reputation and $213,368 to account for income that Szeinbach allegedly would have earned absent OSU’s illegal conduct. The court reduced Szeinbach’s damages by $213,368. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding her evidence “wholly speculative.” View "Szeinbach v. Ohio State Univ." on Justia Law

Taskila, age 37, has several health issues. She was involved in serious car accidents in 1996, 2006, and 2010; underwent successful treatment in 2011 for a mass in her breast; and sought treatment for knee pain. She claims, the injuries have led to unremitting pain in her neck and back, to anxiety and depression, to memory problems, to incontinence, to carpal tunnel syndrome, to an inability to work. Taskila sought Social Security disability insurance and supplemental security income. An initial disability examiner denied her applications. After a hearing, an ALJ did the same. The appeals council denied review. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the denial supported by substantial evidence that Taskila could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. View "Taskila v. Comm'r of Social Sec." on Justia Law

A guest at Ohio social gathering, Grimm, brought a rifle and ammunition to the Sunbury house, where he assembled and invited guests to shoot. At Grimm's direction, Rote loaded the rifle; before the bolt moved into a closed-and-secured position, the round exploded and a “loud sound” was heard. Rote sustained severe damage to his right hand. The round that exploded came from a box bearing marks identifying it as being manufactured by DGFM. The allegedly defective ammunition was purchased online through a New Jersey-based company. Rote and his wife filed a negligence and products-liability suit against several defendants, including DGFM. DGFM argued that, as an instrumentality of the Republic of Argentina, it is immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602. The district court denied its motion to dismiss, finding that the “commercial activity” exception to the Act applies. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the design and manufacture of a product constitutes a “commercial activity” under the FSIA and that a court need not find that a foreign state has minimum contacts with the United States in order to conclude that the state’s acts have a direct effect here. View "Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg., LLC" on Justia Law

Kent’s parents, Rick and Pamela, were visiting Kent's family. Kent’s father had suffered serious health problems for years; he spent most of his visit in bed. One morning, Kent, a physician, found his father unresponsive, but breathing. Rick had executed a living will and did not want life-sustaining procedures. Kent made his father comfortable. At 7:08 p.m., Kent determined that his father had died. Firefighter-EMT Oryszczak arrived and examined the body. Kent stated that he was a physician and that his father had passed away about 15 minutes earlier. Deputy Lopez arrived. Pamela stated that she did not have power-of-attorney paperwork with her. Oryszczak explained that without paperwork, protocol required them to “do everything.” Kent began yelling and gesturing. Oryszczak asked for assistance, stating that he was afraid of Kent intervening. Kent told deputies that “they were not going to assault my dead father in my home.” Lopez pulled out his taser. Kent undisputedly said, “Go ahead and Taze me” Lopez deployed the taser. The prongs struck Kent and he fell. Kent remained handcuffed, with the taser probes attached, during 15-20 minutes of questioning. Kent sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court denied defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants felt they were faced with an emergency, whether they thought they had a legal obligation to attempt resuscitation, and whether Kent was non-compliant, and that case law clearly established that using a taser on an individual who was not under arrest, posed no safety threat, made no threats, and was not physically resistant, constituted excessive force. View "Kent v. County of Oakland" on Justia Law

Hawver claims that the Jackson, Michigan, Center for Family Health a federally qualified health center, caused her mother’s death by providing negligent medical care. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides the exclusive remedy for claims against federally qualified health centers such as Family Health, 42 U.S.C. 233. By the time Hawver filed suit, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to claims under the Act had run. The district court dismissed, holding that failure to satisfy the Act’s statute of limitations requirements doubles as a failure to satisfy the subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the federal courts and precludes equitable tolling. After the district court’s decision, the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, held that the Act’s statute of limitations requirements do not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts and that equitable tolling may save a late claim in some circumstances. The Sixth Circuit remanded to the district court to determine whether equitable tolling saves Hawver’s claim. View "Hawver v. United States" on Justia Law