Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc. and its affiliates, former processors and distributors of industrial chemicals including talc, faced thousands of asbestos-related tort claims after selling their operating assets in 2004. In 2023, following a $29 million jury verdict in South Carolina for a plaintiff diagnosed with mesothelioma, the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas appointed a receiver to manage Whittaker’s assets. The receiver was granted broad authority to administer Whittaker’s assets and protect its interests, but the order did not explicitly remove the board’s authority over corporate affairs.Whittaker’s board, without consulting the receiver, authorized a bankruptcy filing in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. The receiver moved to dismiss the bankruptcy, arguing that only he had authority to file. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, finding the board retained authority under New Jersey law, and the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed. Meanwhile, the Official Committee of Talc Claimants intervened in an adversary proceeding, contesting whether certain successor liability claims against a nondebtor (Brenntag) were property of the bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment to the debtors, holding that these claims belonged to the estate, and certified the decision for direct appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed both lower courts. It held that an improperly filed bankruptcy petition is not a jurisdictional defect but may be grounds for dismissal. The court determined that under New Jersey law, the board retained authority to file for bankruptcy because the South Carolina receiver had not been recognized by a New Jersey court. The court also held that successor liability claims based on a “product line” theory are general claims belonging to the bankruptcy estate, not to individual creditors, following its precedent in In re Emoral. View "In re Whittaker Clark & Daniels Inc." on Justia Law

A federal immigration agent, Keith Slatowski, was injured when his Sig Sauer P320 pistol fired a bullet into his hip and out his thigh during a training session. Slatowski claimed he did not touch the trigger, only the grip, and argued that the gun's design, which lacks an external safety, made it prone to accidental discharge. He sued Sig Sauer, alleging that the gun was defectively designed and that a different safety design, such as a tabbed trigger, would have prevented the accident.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania excluded the causation testimony of Slatowski's two experts, Dr. James Tertin and Dr. William Vigilante, because their conclusions were based on speculation rather than reliable testing. The court allowed their testimony on the gun's design defects but granted summary judgment for Sig Sauer, reasoning that without expert testimony on causation, the jury could not determine what caused the gun to fire.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's exclusion of the expert testimony on causation, agreeing that the experts' conclusions were speculative. However, the Third Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the jury could still determine causation based on the admissible evidence and lay testimony. The court found that the jury, with the help of expert explanations of the gun's design, could understand the remaining causation question without further expert testimony. The case was remanded for trial. View "Slatowski v. Sig Sauer, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2015, product liability cases involving the blood-pressure medication Olmesartan were consolidated into a multidistrict litigation (MDL) in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Adam Slater and his law firm, Mazie Slater Katz & Freeman, LLC, represented over 200 plaintiffs, and the case settled for over $300 million. Subsequently, Anthony Martino, a plaintiff in the MDL, filed a class action in New Jersey state court against his former lawyers, alleging they received contingent fees in violation of New Jersey court rules. The case was removed to federal court and dismissed, with the dismissal affirmed on appeal.Following this, twenty-one individuals represented by the same defendants in the MDL filed a similar action in New Jersey state court, alleging breach of contract, legal malpractice, conversion, and unjust enrichment. Defendants removed the case to the District Court, citing diversity and federal-question jurisdiction. The District Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand, asserting ancillary enforcement jurisdiction, and granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, applying issue preclusion. The court also dismissed the parties' motions for sanctions as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that ancillary enforcement jurisdiction does not confer original jurisdiction sufficient for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The court also found that the plaintiffs' state-law claims did not necessarily raise a federal issue to establish federal-question jurisdiction. The court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case to determine if the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 for diversity jurisdiction. Additionally, the court vacated the order dismissing the motions for sanctions as moot, instructing the District Court to consider the merits of each motion. View "Johnson v. Mazie" on Justia Law

A private fencing coach alleged that during a flight, a university’s assistant fencing coach sexually harassed and assaulted her. She reported the incident to the university’s head coach, who discouraged her from reporting it further and, along with the assistant coach, allegedly retaliated against her within the fencing community. The university later investigated and confirmed the harassment but found no policy violation. The coach sued the university, the two coaches, and the Title IX coordinator, claiming violations of Title IX and state-law torts.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina transferred the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania due to improper venue and judicial efficiency. After the transfer, the plaintiff amended her complaint, and the defendants moved to dismiss. The transferee court dismissed the entire suit, holding that the plaintiff, as neither a student nor an employee, was outside the zone of interests protected by Title IX. It also dismissed the state-law tort claims as untimely or implausible.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the zone-of-interests test applies to Title IX claims and that the plaintiff’s claims related to her exclusion from university-hosted fencing events and retaliation manifesting on campus were within that zone. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state-law tort claims against the university and its employees, except for the claims against the assistant coach, which were not time-barred under North Carolina’s three-year statute of limitations. The case was vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Oldham v. Penn State University" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that an automobile manufacturer designed, manufactured, and sold defective vehicles, specifically Dodge "muscle" cars with defective rear differentials. They filed a complaint asserting state and federal causes of action based on fraud and breach of warranty. The District Court dismissed the fraud counts and some warranty counts, allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint. After amending, the District Court dismissed the fraud counts again and some warranty counts, but allowed two warranty counts to proceed.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware initially dismissed the complaint without prejudice, allowing plaintiffs to amend it. After the plaintiffs amended their complaint, the District Court dismissed the fraud counts and some warranty counts with prejudice, but allowed two warranty counts to proceed. The plaintiffs then moved to certify the dismissal of their fraud counts for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or for final judgment under Rule 54(b). The District Court denied the request for certification under § 1292(b) but granted the request for final judgment under Rule 54(b) for the fraud counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the District Court's Rule 54(b) judgment was not final. The Court of Appeals held that the fraud and warranty counts constituted a single claim for purposes of Rule 54(b) because they were alternative theories of recovery based on the same factual situation. As a result, the judgment did not dispose of all the rights or liabilities of one or more of the parties. Consequently, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and instructed the District Court to vacate its order directing the entry of a partial final judgment. View "Diaz v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law

Promise Healthcare Group, LLC and its affiliates operated various hospital and nursing facilities. During their Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, Patrick Wassmann filed a $10 million medical malpractice claim based on treatment he received at one of the facilities between March 15 and June 9, 2017. Robert Michaelson, the liquidating trustee, objected to Wassmann’s claim, arguing it was time-barred because it became untimely by the time the Trustee objected to it and it was evaluated. The Trustee also argued that Wassmann’s claim should be barred because he failed to file a timely state court complaint in addition to his Chapter 11 proof of claim.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware set a bar date of May 31, 2019, for filing proof of claims. Wassmann filed his proof of claim on January 4, 2019. The court confirmed the Debtors’ reorganization plan on September 17, 2020, which went into effect on October 1, 2020. Wassmann had until November 1, 2020, to proceed against the Debtors in state court but chose to seek recovery in the Bankruptcy Court alone. The Bankruptcy Court denied the Trustee’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the claims allowance process under 11 U.S.C. § 502 evaluates claims as of the petition date and that a timely proof of claim does not require a separate timely non-bankruptcy complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order. The Third Circuit held that the enforceability of a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) is determined as of the petition date, not the date of the court’s evaluation. The court also held that a creditor who has filed a timely proof of claim is not required to file a separate, timely non-bankruptcy action to preserve the claim. The court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court correctly allowed Wassmann’s claim as it was timely as of the petition date. View "In re: Promise Healthcare Group LLC" on Justia Law

Hundreds of plaintiffs sued the drug manufacturer Merck, alleging that the osteoporosis drug Fosamax caused them to suffer serious thigh bone fractures. Each brought a state-law tort claim alleging that Merck failed to add an adequate warning of the risk to Fosamax’s FDA-approved drug label. Many also brought claims including defective design, negligence, and breach of warranty. Plaintiffs’ suits were consolidated in multi-district litigation in the District of New Jersey. Following discovery and a bellwether trial, the court granted Merck summary judgment, based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Wyeth v. Levine, that state-law failure-to-warn claims are preempted when there is “clear evidence” that the FDA would not have approved the warning that plaintiffs claim was necessary. The Third Circuit vacated. Preemption is an affirmative defense; Merck did not carry its burden to prove that it is entitled to that defense. The Wyeth “clear evidence” standard is demanding and fact-sensitive. It requires a court sitting in summary judgment to anticipate the range of conclusions that a reasonable juror might reach and the certainty with which the juror would reach them. Here, plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the FDA would have approved a properly-worded warning about the risk of thigh fractures—or to conclude that the odds of FDA rejection were less than highly probable. View "In Re: Fosamax Products Liability Litigation" on Justia Law

Papp alleged that his late wife suffered secondary “take home” asbestos exposure while washing the work clothes of her first husband, Keck. Keck had several jobs that exposed him to asbestos. Papp sued multiple companies in New Jersey. In a deposition, he indicated that the landing gear Keck sandblasted was for a C-47 military cargo plane, built by Boeing’s predecessor. Boeing removed the case, citing the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Boeing asserted that it was entitled to government contractor immunity because the C-47 was produced for, and under the specific supervision of, the U.S. military and that the supervision extended to labels and warnings for all parts of the aircraft, including those parts laden with the asbestos to which Keck would later be exposed. The district court remanded, reasoning that Boeing, as a contractor and not a federal officer, had a “special burden” to demonstrate “that a federal officer or agency directly prohibited Boeing from issuing, or otherwise providing, warnings as to the risks associated with exposure to asbestos contained in products on which third-parties … worked or otherwise provided services.” The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the statute extends to contractors who possess a colorable federal defense and that Boeing made a sufficient showing of such a defense. View "Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co Inc" on Justia Law

Hargus and others rented F&I's 26-foot ship, One Love, to travel throughout the U.S. Virgin Islands. F&I had hired Coleman as a captain. At Cruz Bay, Coleman anchored close to the shore. Most of the passengers disembarked. Later, members of the group, standing on the beach approximately 25 feet away from the boat, threw beer cans at Hargus while he was standing on the One Love’s deck. Coleman threw an empty insulated plastic coffee cup that hit Hargus on the side of his head. Hargus did not lose consciousness, nor complain of any injury. One Love resumed its journey. Days later, Hargus, having experienced pain and vision impairments, was diagnosed with a concussion and a mild contusion. Hargus had previously suffered 10-12 head injuries. The doctor allowed Hargus to return to work that day without restrictions. Hargus did not seek further medical treatment until a year later, when he was examined for headaches, memory loss, mood swings, and neck pain. Hargus filed suit, claiming a maritime lien against the One Love, negligence, and negligent entrustment. The district court awarded $50,000, concluding that it had admiralty jurisdiction, that Coleman was negligent and that the One Love was liable in rem. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that the act giving rise to Hargus’ claim was insufficient to invoke maritime jurisdiction because it was not of the type that could potentially disrupt maritime commerce. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. View "Hargus v. Ferocious & Impetuous, LLC" on Justia Law

From approximately 1953-1999, Frankenberger worked as a pipefitter at various facilities in Illinois and Indiana. In 1996, Frankenberger was diagnosed with a lung condition consistent with asbestos-related pleural disease. He was diagnosed with lung cancer in 2004, and died from the disease in 2005. A medical expert determined Frankenberger’s lung cancer was caused, at least in part, by his exposure to asbestos. Frankenberger’s estate alleged his asbestos exposure occurred as a result of his work in the State Line, Romeoville, and Acme facilities, and his exposure to asbestos-containing: turbines and switchgears. Both pieces of equipment were manufactured and maintained by Westinghouse, a predecessor to CBS. The district court granted CBS summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed in part, agreeing that Frankenberger’s turbine-related claim failed to demonstrate CBS was a cause of his asbestos exposure, but disagreeing with the conclusion that the switchgear-related claim is deficient. Unlike his turbine-related claim, Frankenberger’s switchgear-related claim relies on specific evidence Westinghouse switchgears were likely to contain asbestos that resulted in respirable dust. View "In Re: Asbestos Prods. Liability Litig." on Justia Law