Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Jose Villegas, a 39-year-old inmate at Lake Correctional Institution (LCI) in Florida, died following a physical confrontation with correctional officers. The incident began when officers found Villegas unconscious in his cell. Upon regaining consciousness, Villegas resisted the officers' attempts to restrain him. The officers eventually subdued Villegas and transported him to a medical unit, but he was pronounced dead upon arrival. The autopsy reported that Villegas died from restraint asphyxia, with excited delirium as a contributing factor, and noted the presence of synthetic cannabinoids in his system.Douglas B. Stalley, representing Villegas's estate and his minor children, filed a lawsuit against the officers, their supervisors, and the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) for negligence, wrongful death, excessive force, deliberate indifference, and supervisory liability. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the constitutional claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law wrongful death claim, remanding it to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Stalley appealed the district court's decision regarding the deliberate indifference and supervisory liability claims. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the officers' decision to transport Villegas to a medical unit rather than provide on-scene care did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. Consequently, the supervisory liability claim also failed, as it was contingent on the underlying constitutional violation. View "Stalley v. Lake Correctional Institution Warden" on Justia Law

On February 11, 2021, Twitter suspended Project Veritas, an investigative journalistic organization, for allegedly violating its policy against publishing private information. Four days later, CNN's Ana Cabrera and Brian Stelter discussed the suspension on-air, with Cabrera suggesting that Twitter banned Veritas for "promoting misinformation." Veritas disputed this characterization, asserting that the suspension was due to a violation of Twitter's "doxxing" policy. When CNN refused to issue a retraction, Veritas sued for defamation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted CNN's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that Cabrera's statements were substantially true under New York defamation law and thus not actionable. The court found that the statements about misinformation were not significantly different in their impact on Veritas's reputation compared to the actual reason for the suspension.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Veritas plausibly alleged a defamation claim under New York law, as the statements made by Cabrera were not substantially true and could have a different effect on the audience's perception compared to the actual reason for the suspension. The court also determined that Veritas plausibly alleged that the statements were made with actual malice, as Cabrera had previously tweeted the correct reason for the suspension, indicating knowledge of the true facts.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the case and remanded it for further proceedings. The main holding was that Veritas's defamation claim was plausible because the statements were not substantially true and were made with actual malice. View "Project Veritas v. Cable News Network, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, co-personal representatives of the estate of Sara Schleider, filed a lawsuit in Florida state court against GVDB Operations, LLC, and JSMGV Management Company, LLC. They alleged that the defendants failed to prevent the spread of COVID-19 at their assisted living facility, resulting in Sara Schleider contracting the virus and subsequently dying. The plaintiffs asserted state-law claims for survival and wrongful death under Florida Statute § 429.28, alleging negligence and, alternatively, willful misconduct or gross negligence.The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, claiming federal subject matter jurisdiction on three grounds: acting under a federal officer, complete preemption by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, and an embedded federal question concerning the PREP Act. The district court concluded it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the case to state court, finding that the defendants' arguments did not establish federal jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the remand, holding that the defendants did not act under a federal officer, as their compliance with federal guidelines did not equate to acting under federal authority. The court also determined that the PREP Act did not completely preempt the plaintiffs' state-law claims, as the Act's willful misconduct provision did not wholly displace state-law causes of action for negligence. Lastly, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims did not raise a substantial federal question under the Grable doctrine, as the federal issues were not necessarily raised by the plaintiffs' well-pleaded complaint. Thus, the district court's remand to state court was affirmed. View "Howard Schleider v. GVDB Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, Lester Jenkins and Dwight Siples Jr., participated in the cleanup of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and later developed chronic sinusitis, which they attributed to exposure to crude oil and dispersants during the cleanup. They filed suits against BP Exploration & Production, Inc. and BP America Production Company, claiming that their medical conditions were caused by this exposure. The plaintiffs relied on expert testimony to establish general causation, which is necessary in toxic-tort cases where the medical community does not recognize the alleged toxins as harmful.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida reviewed the expert testimonies of Dr. Michael Freeman and Dr. Gina Solomon, who opined that a causal relationship existed between the cleanup work and chronic sinusitis. However, the district court excluded their testimonies, finding that neither expert identified a minimal level of exposure at which crude oil, its dispersants, or associated chemicals are hazardous to humans. The court also noted that the experts failed to identify a statistically significant association between the chronic conditions and exposure to crude oil, assess the limitations of various studies, or meaningfully consider causal factors. Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of BP.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimonies. It emphasized that in toxic-tort cases, plaintiffs must demonstrate the levels of exposure that are hazardous to humans generally. The court found that the experts failed to establish a harmful level of exposure for crude oil or its dispersants and did not adequately support their causation opinions with reliable scientific evidence. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of BP was affirmed. View "In Re Deepwater Horizon Belo Cases" on Justia Law

Candace Hensley sustained injuries from a trip and fall accident at a Westin Hotel in Indianapolis, Indiana, on May 2, 2017. She and her husband, Timothy Hensley, filed a lawsuit in the State Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia, against Westin Hotel and Westin Hotel Management, L.P. (WHM), alleging negligence and loss of consortium. Merritt Hospitality, LLC (Merritt) and WHM responded, asserting that Merritt was incorrectly named and that Westin Hotel was not a legal entity. The Hensleys amended their complaint to include Merritt and Marriott International, Inc. (Marriott). The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia based on diversity jurisdiction.Hartford Casualty Insurance Company, which had paid workers’ compensation benefits to Mrs. Hensley, intervened to protect its subrogation lien. The district court applied Indiana tort law and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that they either did not control the hotel premises or lacked actual knowledge of the hazard. The court also dismissed Hartford’s claim, as it depended on the Hensleys' success. The Hensleys appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court lost subject matter jurisdiction when Hartford, an indispensable party, intervened, destroying complete diversity. The appellate court vacated the district court’s summary judgment order and remanded the case with instructions to remand it to the State Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia. The main holding was that Hartford’s intervention as a matter of right and its status as an indispensable party required the case to be remanded to state court due to the lack of complete diversity. View "Hensley v. Westin Hotel" on Justia Law

In 2017, Roy Moore, a Republican candidate for a U.S. Senate seat in Alabama, faced allegations of sexual misconduct with minors. Following his election loss, Moore filed a defamation lawsuit against Guy Cecil, Priorities USA, and Bully Pulpit Interactive LLC. The claims involved tweets by Cecil, a press release by Priorities USA, and a digital ad. Moore argued that the tweets were defamatory and that the press release and digital ad falsely labeled him a "child molester" and "child predator."The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed the tweet-based claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, as Cecil had no significant contacts with Alabama. The court also dismissed the press release and digital ad claims for failure to state a claim, concluding that Moore did not sufficiently allege actual malice, a requirement for defamation claims involving public figures. The court allowed Moore to amend his complaint, but the amended complaint was also dismissed for the same reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the tweet-based claims, agreeing that Cecil's tweets were not aimed at Alabama but rather at a national audience. The court also upheld the dismissal of the press release and digital ad claims, finding that Moore failed to allege facts showing that the defendants acted with actual malice. The court noted that ill-will or improper motive does not equate to actual malice, which requires knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, affirming the lower court's decision. View "Moore v. Cecil" on Justia Law

Charles Johnson, Jr. was arrested by Officer Garrett Rolfe for driving while intoxicated. Johnson alleged that Rolfe used excessive force during the arrest, resulting in a broken collarbone. Johnson sued Rolfe and the City of Atlanta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state law, claiming excessive force and battery. Johnson's complaint stated that he was respectful and did not resist arrest, but Rolfe threw him to the ground, causing his injury.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed the case. The City moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to state a claim for Monell liability. Rolfe moved for judgment on the pleadings, submitting body camera and dashcam footage showing Johnson resisting arrest. The district court considered the video evidence, determining it was central to Johnson's claims and its authenticity was not disputed. The court found that Rolfe did not use excessive force and was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. Consequently, the court dismissed the Monell claim against the City, as there was no underlying constitutional violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the video evidence was properly considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The court found that Rolfe's use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including Johnson's resistance and the dangerous location of the arrest. Therefore, Rolfe was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the City, as no constitutional violation occurred. View "Johnson v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a products liability lawsuit filed by Virginia Redding against Coloplast Corporation. Redding alleged that vaginal mesh devices inserted inside her body were defectively designed. Coloplast argued that Redding's suit was time-barred under Florida's four-year statute of limitations for products liability lawsuits, as her claim accrued more than four years before she filed suit. The district court sided with Redding, and Coloplast appealed.The case was previously reviewed by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The district court denied Coloplast's motion for summary judgment, arguing that Redding's suit was time-barred. The court found that the facts in a similar case, Eghnayem v. Boston Scientific Corporation, were "strikingly similar" to Redding's case and compelled the conclusion that Redding's injuries were not sufficiently different from the symptoms that could have occurred as a result of the surgeries to put her on notice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Redding, did not overwhelmingly establish that she knew or should have known about a compensable injury arising out of Coloplast's mesh before September 18, 2010, such that a reasonable jury could not conclude otherwise. As a result, Redding's claims were not time-barred under Florida's four-year statute of limitations. View "Redding v. Coloplast Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves a personal injury action brought by Earlene McBride against Carnival Corporation. McBride fell out of her wheelchair while being assisted by a Carnival crewmember, Fritz Charles, during disembarkation from a Carnival cruise ship. McBride claimed that she suffered severe injuries due to the fall and sued Carnival for negligence.The case was initially heard in the Southern District of Florida. During the trial, the court allowed the deposition testimony of Charles to be presented to the jury over McBride's objection. The jury awarded McBride economic damages for past medical expenses related to the fall but did not award her any damages for past pain and suffering. McBride appealed the district court's judgment, arguing that the court erred in allowing Charles's deposition testimony to be presented to the jury and that the jury's verdict was inadequate because it did not award her past pain and suffering damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to allow Charles's deposition testimony to be presented to the jury. The court found that McBride had waived her objection to the use of the deposition by not raising it at the appropriate time during the trial. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of McBride's motion for a new trial on the issue of past pain and suffering damages related to the past medical expenses the jury awarded. The court found that the jury's verdict was inadequate as a matter of law because there was uncontradicted evidence that McBride suffered at least some pain in the immediate aftermath of the wheelchair incident. The case was remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of past pain and suffering damages related to the past medical expenses the jury awarded. View "McBride v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves Maria Acosta, who sued six Miami-Dade officers involved in the arrest of her son, Maykel Barrera, who died after the encounter. Acosta alleged federal excessive-force claims and state wrongful-death claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, and Acosta appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to five of the six officers on Acosta’s excessive-force claims and to all of the officers on Acosta’s wrongful-death claims.The Court of Appeals found that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Acosta, the officers used excessive force when they tased and kicked Barrera while he was subdued, on the ground, and no longer resisting arrest, violating clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.Furthermore, the court vacated the summary judgment on Acosta’s wrongful-death claim, concluding that there was enough evidence for the case to go to trial. The court ruled that the district court erred in emphasizing Acosta’s lack of expert evidence directed to the cause of Barrera’s death since she did not have to present expert testimony to show causation. View "Acosta v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law