Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Adams, born in 1960, smoked about a pack a day starting at age 18 and worked in coal mines at times between 1979-1995, mostly underground using a “cutting machine” in the “dustiest” areas. Adams struggled to breathe after his retirement. Adams’s 1998 application under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901(b), was denied because he failed to prove that he had pneumoconiosis. In 2008, Adams sought benefits from Wilgar. His treating physician, Dr. Alam, identified the causes of his 2013 death as cardiopulmonary arrest, emphysema, coal worker’s pneumoconiosis, throat cancer, and aspiration pneumonia.A 2019 notice in the case stated “the Court may look to the preamble to the revised” regulations in weighing conflicting medical opinions. Wilgar unsuccessfully requested discovery concerning the preamble and the scientific studies that supported its conclusions. The ALJ awarded benefits, finding that Adams had “legal pneumoconiosis” and giving Dr. Alam’s opinion that Adam’s coal mine work had substantially aggravated his disease “controlling weight.” All things being equal, a treating physician’s opinion is “entitled to more weight,” 30 C.F.R. 718.104(d)(1). Wilgar's three experts had opined that Adams’s smoking exclusively caused his disease The ALJ gave “little weight” to these opinions, believing that they conflicted with the preamble to the 2001 regulation.The Benefits Review Board and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The preamble interpreted the then-existing scientific studies to establish that coal mine work can cause obstructive diseases, either alone or in combination with smoking. The ALJ simply found the preamble more persuasive than the experts. View "Wilgar Land Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs" on Justia Law

Built in 1924, the Edenville Dam near Midland, Michigan, has earthen embankments spanning the Tittabawassee and Tobacco Rivers, forming a 2,600-acre reservoir. In 1998, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a license to Wolverine Power to operate the Dam. FERC directed Wolverine to increase the Dam’s spillway capacity. Wolverine became insolvent. In 2003, Boyce’s predecessor purchased Wolverine’s license. Boyce promised to increase spillway capacity but failed to do so and committed numerous other regulatory violations: unauthorized repairs, dredging, and land-clearing; failing to file a public safety plan; and failing to properly monitor water quality. In 2018, FERC revoked Boyce’s license. Jurisdiction over the Dam passed to Michigan’s Department of Environmental, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE), which regulates over 1,000 dams. EGLE inspected the Dam and found it to be in “fair” condition. In May 2020, the Tittabawassee portion of the Dam collapsed following heavy rain, causing another downstream dam to fail. Thousands of residents (including the Allens) were forced to evacuate. Boyce filed for bankruptcy.The Allens sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages and restitution from the United States, arguing that FERC negligently entrusted Boyce with the Dam. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. The United States was entitled to sovereign immunity and did not waive that immunity in the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a–823g. Section 803(c) imposes liability on the licensees who build and manage hydropower projects. View "Allen v. United States" on Justia Law

While L.C. was incarcerated at Federal Medical Center, Lexington, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee, Lee. L.C. alleges that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s assaults on her and other incarcerated women and failed to enforce its zero-tolerance policy for sexual assault in BOP facilities because BOP officials failed timely to report and investigate Lee’s assaults. L.C. filed a negligence claim against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The district court dismissed the assault-and-battery claim, holding that the FTCA’s exception to sovereign immunity does not apply to torts committed by federal employees who act beyond the scope of their employment. It dismissed her negligence claim under the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on other grounds. The claims fall outside the discretionary-function exception; BOP policy imposes specific and mandatory directives on all BOP officials timely to report and investigate information pertaining to sexual assault by a BOP official and deciding whether to do so is not susceptible to policy considerations. The negligence claim, however, should be dismissed for failure to allege sufficiently that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s attacks. View "L. C. v. United States" on Justia Law

In the multidistrict National Prescription Opiate Litigation, municipalities from across the nation, Indian Tribes, and other entities allege that opioid manufacturers, distributors, pharmacies, and retailers acted in concert to mislead medical professionals into prescribing, and millions of Americans into taking and often becoming addicted to, opiates. Two northeast Ohio counties, Trumbull and Lake, alleged that national pharmaceutical chains “created, perpetuated, and maintained” the opioid epidemic by filling prescriptions for opioids without controls in place to stop the distribution of those that were illicitly prescribed and that conduct caused an absolute public nuisance remediable by abatement under Ohio common law.The district court ordered a bellwether trial, after which a jury concluded that the “oversupply of legal prescription opioids, and diversion of those opioids into the illicit market” was a public nuisance in those counties and that defendants “engaged in intentional and/or illegal conduct which was a substantial factor in producing" that nuisance. The district court entered a $650 million abatement order and an injunction requiring defendants to “ensure they are complying fully with the Controlled Substances Act and avoiding further improper dispensing conduct.” On appeal, the Sixth Circuit certified a question of law to the Ohio Supreme Court: Whether the Ohio Product Liability Act, Ohio Revised Code 2307.71, abrogates a common law claim of absolute public nuisance resulting from the sale of a product in commerce in which the plaintiffs seek equitable abatement, including both monetary and injunctive remedies? View "Trumbull County v. Purdue Pharma, L.P." on Justia Law

LG Chem manufactured the LG HG2 18650 lithium-ion batteries that exploded in Sullivan’s pocket and caused him severe second- and third-degree burns. Sullivan obtained the batteries from a vape store in Michigan to use for his e-cigarette device. In Sullivan’s suit, LG Chem, a South Korean company, opposed personal jurisdiction, arguing that exercising personal jurisdiction over it in Michigan would be improper under Michigan’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. Limited discovery revealed that LG sent at least two shipments of 18650 batteries directly into Michigan and had executed “two supplier agreements . . . with Michigan companies relating to 18650 batteries.” Neither party addressed whether any of the 18650 batteries that LG shipped into Michigan was ultimately one of the batteries that injured Sullivan.The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. LG urged too narrow a view of personal jurisdiction. The Michigan district court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over LG because it directly shipped its 18650 batteries into the state and entered into two supplier contracts with Michigan companies for 18650 batteries. The court noted that other courts have exercised personal jurisdiction over LG when LG conducts business related to its 18650 batteries in or ships its 18650 batteries into the forum state. View "Sullivan v. LG Chem Ltd." on Justia Law

In 2016, Salansky, the Great Smoky Mountains National Park’s Fire Management Officer, discovered a slow-moving fire covering less than an acre. Due to the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday, most of the Park’s staff were away. Eight days later (November 24), Salansky observed that building a fire line would be impossible. Salansky opted to let the fire burn, using the natural terrain for containment. On November 27, Salansky requested additional firefighting resources. A National Guard helicopter dropped water onto the fire. By evening, the fire had spread to 35-40 acres within Park boundaries. Salansky did not monitor the fire overnight. At 4:05 a.m., the National Weather Service issued a high-wind warning. By 7:30 a.m., Salansky estimated that the fire had grown to 250-500 acres. Burning embers created smaller fires a mile away. People in Gatlinburg observed heavy smoke and ash. A 10:58 a.m. call was the first communication between Park staff and any local official about the fire. Around 5:45 p.m., the Gatlinburg Fire Department received reports of fires within the city. Winds gusted to 87 mph and the fire grew to 5,000 acres. Total evacuation of the Gatlinburg area was ordered. Evacuation efforts were hampered by infrastructure damage. Ultimately, 14 people died, 191 were injured, 2,500 structures were damaged or destroyed, and more than 17,000 acres burned.The Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal of “failure to warn” suits under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA). Before filing suit under the FTCA, a claimant must “present” that claim to the agency, 28 U.S.C. 2675(a); the plaintiffs’ forms sufficiently enabled the Department of the Interior to investigate. On remand, to determine whether the claims are barred by the FTCA's discretionary-function exception, the district court should address whether certain publications constitute mandatory directives. View "Abbott v. United States" on Justia Law

On January 18, 2019, then-16-year-old Sandmann and his classmates, attending the March for Life, had an interaction with a Native American man, Phillips, by the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. The boys were wearing “MAGA” hats and were impeding Phillips, who was attempting to exit the situation, which was becoming confrontational. A chaperone dispersed the students. Video of the incident went viral, and national news organizations, including the five defendants, published stories about the day’s events and the ensuing public reaction.Sandmann sued, alleging that the reporting, which included statements from Phillips about the encounter, was defamatory. The district court granted the news organizations’ joint motion for summary judgment, finding that the challenged statements were opinion, not fact, and therefore nonactionable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The articles at issue did not “embrace” Phillips’s version of events; they describe a contentious encounter, the meaning of which was hotly disputed by participants and witnesses. The online articles embedded a video of the incident. Whether Sandmann “blocked” Phillips, did not “allow” him to retreat, or “decided” that he would not move aside and “positioned himself” so that he “stopped” Phillips are all dependent on perspective and are not “susceptible” of being proven true or false under the circumstances. View "Sandmann v. New York Times Co." on Justia Law

United provided Patterson's medical insurance under a plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1101. Patterson received a summary plan description, an ERISA-mandated synopsis of important plan terms but was not given a plan document with all of a plan’s governing language. The summary said that if a beneficiary recovered from a third party for an insured incident, the plan had a right to reimbursement. Patterson was injured in a traffic accident. United covered his medical expenses and notified Patterson it would invoke the reimbursement right. Patterson sued the other driver in state court and joined the plan, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no reimbursement right. United’s lawyers claimed that no plan document existed. Patterson recovered and settled with the plan for $25,000. Months later, Patterson’s wife suffered injuries in another traffic accident. United paid her medical expenses. Patterson’s wife sued the driver in state court. She obtained a declaratory judgment after the plan's lawyers produced a plan document, stating that it took precedence over the summary and not including a reimbursement right.Patterson then filed a purported class action under ERISA, seeking the return of the $25,000. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Patterson had standing to sue only on his own behalf but has cognizable claims for breach of fiduciary duty and engagement in prohibited transactions. View "Patterson v. United Healthcare Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Appalachian runs Whitesburg Hospital. In 2007, Hospital nurses went on strike. Appalachian entered into an agreement, under which Nursing provided nurses and agreed to indemnify and defend Appalachian for the negligence of any of its employees assigned to the Hospital.Profitt, injured at work, was taken by fellow employees to the Hospital. Profitt alleged that his injuries were exacerbated by a nurse who moved him from the car without stabilizing and immobilizing him. Nurses Hurt and Parsons, Appalachian's employees, were dismissed from the suit, based on the lack of evidence that either was the nurse in question. Nurse Foote, a Nursing employee, remained. In a settlement, Appalachian paid Profitt $2 million and incurred $823,522.71 in legal fees and costs.In an ensuing indemnity lawsuit, Appalachian requested that the court preclude testimony that Hurt or Parsons transported Profitt into the ER. Nursing did not address Appalachian’s issue preclusion argument but argued that the alleged conduct of the unknown female, was not a breach of the standard of care nor did it cause an injury. The court granted the motion. A jury ruled in favor of Appalachian.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court erred in giving preclusive effect to the state court’s ruling; Nursing did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue at the state court level. However, the relevant evidence was not “closely balanced” but clearly identified Nurse Foote. View "Appalachian Regional Healthcare v. U.S. Nursing Corp." on Justia Law

Cash died when a hammermill shredder exploded at his workplace. The Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration (TOSHA) determined that the explosion was primarily caused by the accumulation of combustible aluminum dust produced by the shredding process. The personal representative of his estate sued REI, the company that assembled and sold the shredder to LR, Cash’s employer, asserting four product-liability claims. The district court granted REI summary judgment, because it “did not design the hammermill system at issue, and instead assisted LR with locating primarily used components that LR requested based on the design of LR’s existing system, REI is not legally responsible for any alleged defect in the system as a whole.”The Sixth Circuit reversed. A key requirement of the contract-specification defense is that the customer provided the manufacturer with detailed plans or specifications directing how the product should be built. The district court erred in holding that no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether REI followed LR’s design specifications. There was evidence to suggest that REI contemplated incorporating a dust-collection bin in the design, one that had not been requested. View "Cash-Darling v. Recycling Equipment, Inc." on Justia Law