Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

After a motor vehicle collision, the plaintiff sued both the driver, who was allegedly intoxicated, and five bars under Utah’s Alcoholic Product Liability Act, claiming the bars overserved the driver prior to the crash. The plaintiff settled with the driver and three of the bars for a combined $1 million, resulting in dismissal of all claims against those parties. Two of the bars that participated in the settlement then sought contribution from the driver under Utah Code section 32B-15-302(1)(a), arguing they were entitled to recover part of the settlement amount from him.The Third District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the driver, finding that the term “award” in the Dramshop Act’s contribution provision refers to an amount imposed by a court or authority, not to payments made in voluntary settlements. Since the bars settled the claims, the court concluded no “award” was made against them, and dismissed their crossclaims. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, determining that “award” in the statute does not encompass voluntary settlements and supporting its interpretation with reference to the statute’s language and context.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah granted certiorari and reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The Court held that the Dramshop Act’s contribution provision permits contribution claims only when a party has an award imposed against them, not when they make voluntary settlement payments. The Court rejected arguments that common law or policy required a broader reading. Accordingly, it affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, holding that parties who settle claims under the Act cannot pursue contribution against other alleged wrongdoers. View "RMB v. Celotto" on Justia Law

An employee filed a workers’ compensation claim with the Utah Labor Commission, alleging significant injuries, including complex regional pain syndrome, sustained while working for her employer. As part of the claim process, she was ordered by an administrative law judge (ALJ) to attend independent medical examinations (IMEs) with three different physicians selected by her employer. Each exam failed to be completed due to disputes or complications involving her cooperation, including refusal to sign paperwork, attempts to record the exam, and disagreements over exam conditions.The employer moved for sanctions after repeated failed IMEs. The ALJ found that the employee and her attorneys had hindered the employer’s right to conduct a medical exam and dismissed her claim, also ordering her attorneys to pay the resulting costs. On appeal, the Labor Commission Appeals Board initially reversed the dismissal, ruling that the statutory sanction for obstructing an IME is suspension of the claim, not dismissal. However, after a third failed exam, the Board changed its position, concluding that the employee’s pattern of obstruction warranted dismissal under rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and imposed monetary sanctions on her attorneys.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case on certification from the Court of Appeals. The court held that dismissal is not an available sanction for obstructing a medical examination under Utah Code section 34A-2-602(2); instead, the only permissible sanction is suspension of the claim during the period of obstruction. The court also found that the employee herself did not have standing to challenge the monetary sanctions imposed on her attorneys. The court reversed the Board’s order dismissing the claim but left the monetary sanctions undisturbed, to be challenged by the proper party. View "Hooker v. Labor Commission" on Justia Law

A fatal collision occurred when a Volkswagen Jetta, driven by Raul Lopez with Emilio Martinez-Arroyo as a passenger, rear-ended a utility trailer owned by Ron J. Peterson Construction, Inc. (RJP) on a Utah highway. The trailer, which was transporting construction equipment and did not have underride protection, was traveling significantly below the speed limit with its emergency flashers on. Both occupants of the Jetta died instantly after their car slid under the trailer. Yesneiri Maldonado-Velasquez, the decedent’s wife, sued RJP alleging negligence both in operating the vehicle and in using a trailer that lacked safety features that could have mitigated the injuries.In the Third District Court, Summit County, RJP moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had no duty to upgrade the trailer beyond federal safety standards and that the crash was solely caused by Lopez. The district court found a general statutory duty to operate safe equipment but determined that there was no specific duty to alter the trailer, based on federal preemption and application of factors from B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West. As a result, the court excluded much of the plaintiff's expert testimony on enhanced injury and trailer design, allowing only claims related to negligent operation. The jury ultimately found RJP not at fault.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that the district court erred by applying the Jeffs factors to narrow an already established broad statutory duty to operate safe vehicles. The Supreme Court clarified that federal regulations set a minimum standard, not a ceiling, and that state law may impose greater obligations unless direct conflict preemption applies. The court also held that the exclusion of expert testimony premised on the erroneous duty ruling was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Maldonado-Velasquez v. Ron J Peterson Construction" on Justia Law

A real estate developer and his company sought to develop a large project in Fillmore, Utah, but encountered significant obstacles, including difficulties in securing land, water, and city approvals. The developer promoted the project publicly and requested city support, which drew media attention. A local newspaper and its reporter investigated the developer’s history and published a series of articles portraying him in a negative light, referencing past lawsuits, bankruptcies, and failed ventures. After the city rejected the project, the developer sued the newspaper and reporter for defamation, alleging that the articles contained false statements that caused lenders to withdraw support, resulting in substantial financial losses.The case was heard in Utah’s Fourth District Court. The defendants responded to the complaints and filed a special motion for expedited relief under Utah’s Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), arguing that the challenged statements were true, opinion, or otherwise protected. The district court granted the special motion, dismissing the defamation claims after a detailed review of each statement and finding them either true, vague, opinion, or privileged. The court admonished the plaintiff for certain litigation tactics and subsequently, upon the defendants’ request, awarded them nearly $400,000 in attorney fees and costs, accepting their submission without a task-by-task analysis of whether each fee was “related to” the special motion.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the fee award. The court held that a prevailing defendant in a UPEPA special motion must demonstrate that each fee was reasonably necessary to prosecute the special motion, not simply related to the case as a whole. Fees not meeting this standard are not awardable. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s fee award, excluded certain fees, and remanded for further proceedings to determine relatedness and reasonableness consistent with its opinion. View "Aston v. Chronicle-Progress" on Justia Law

Two former seasonal employees of a ski resort were injured in a snowmobile accident after being laid off from their jobs. The accident occurred when, two days after their termination, they returned to the resort to drop off uniforms and accepted a ride from a current employee on a company snowmobile to attend a gathering organized by other former employees. The snowmobile crashed, causing serious injuries. Prior to their employment, both injured parties had signed a release agreement that waived the resort’s liability for injuries sustained from activities on resort property, including those caused by the resort’s negligence. The agreement specified that a free ski pass was consideration for the waiver.Both individuals brought lawsuits against the resort alleging vicarious liability for the employee’s negligence and direct liability for its own negligence. The Third District Court, Summit County, granted summary judgment in favor of the resort on the vicarious liability claims, finding no evidence the employee was acting within the scope of employment during the snowmobile ride. However, the district court denied summary judgment on the direct liability claims, relying on Pugmire v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., a 1907 Utah Supreme Court decision holding that employer-employee agreements waiving liability for employer negligence are void as contrary to public policy.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the dismissal of the vicarious liability claims, concluding that there was no factual basis for a jury to find the employee acted within the course and scope of his employment. The court reversed the district court’s ruling on direct liability, holding that Pugmire applies only to releases for work-related injuries and does not bar enforcement of the waiver in this case, where the injuries occurred outside the employment context. The case was remanded for consideration of any other arguments regarding the release agreement. View "Deer Valley v. Olson" on Justia Law

An employee suffered a severe workplace injury in 2013 while working for a construction company, resulting in permanent and total disability with ongoing medical needs. The employee brought a third-party tort action against entities other than his employer involved in the accident and settled for $5 million. From the settlement, over $2.1 million was used to pay attorney fees and litigation expenses, with the remainder placed in trust. By the time of settlement, the employer and its workers’ compensation carrier had already paid over $1.5 million in benefits but stopped payments after the settlement, leaving the employee responsible for his ongoing care. The value of anticipated future medical costs was estimated at over $7 million.The administrative law judge (ALJ) initially found that only past benefits paid by the employer should be included in calculating the employer’s proportionate share of the legal expenses associated with the third-party settlement, setting that share at 31.6%. On review, the Commissioner disagreed, concluding that future anticipated benefits should also be included, as the employer’s interest in the recovery included the right to offset future benefits. The ALJ recalculated, finding the employer’s proportional share exceeded the total legal expenses, and ordered reimbursement to the employee for expenses already paid. The Appeals Board of the Labor Commission affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed these decisions. It held that when an employer or insurance carrier seeks both reimbursement for past payments and an offset against future workers’ compensation liability from a third-party recovery, both past-paid and future-anticipated benefits must be considered in calculating the employer’s proportionate share of the legal expenses associated with that recovery. The court also held that the employer must reimburse the employee for its share of legal expenses before offsetting future benefits. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Labor Commission. View "Auto Owners Insurance v. Labor Commission" on Justia Law

A property management company leased a single-family home to a tenant under an agreement that limited pets to “outside cat & chickens,” as handwritten in the lease. Despite this, the tenant kept two large dogs—a pit bull and a German shepherd—at the property. Neighbors described these dogs as aggressive, vicious, and frequently unrestrained, with some reporting prior biting incidents and expressing fear for their children’s safety. The landlord regularly visited the property but claimed to be unaware of the dogs' presence or their behavior. One day, while retrieving a baseball from the yard, a young boy was bitten by the pit bull.The boy’s father, acting as his guardian, sued the landlord in the Second District Court, Weber County, alleging negligence for allowing a dangerous condition—the pit bull—on the premises. Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to the landlord, holding that, as a matter of law, the landlord did not owe a duty to protect third parties from injuries caused by the tenant’s dog. The court also denied the plaintiff’s postjudgment motion challenging this ruling.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah considered whether Utah law recognizes circumstances in which a landlord may be held liable in negligence for injuries inflicted by a tenant’s dog. The court examined several premises liability theories, including those treating the dog as a dangerous condition or activity on the land, and reviewed relevant provisions from the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Ultimately, the court found no basis under Utah law, or the proposed extensions, to impose a duty on the landlord in this context. The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the landlord did not owe a duty to protect third parties from injuries caused by a tenant’s dog under the facts presented. View "Tesch v. Bonneville" on Justia Law

After a car accident in which the defendant, while driving a marked police vehicle, rear-ended the plaintiff’s car, the plaintiff sought medical treatment at a hospital and received an initial bill for $7,175.77 for emergency care and $92 for an eye exam. However, due to a preexisting contract between the plaintiff’s health insurer and the hospital, the insurer paid a reduced, negotiated amount—$4,395.75 for the emergency care—which fully satisfied the bill. The plaintiff then sued the defendant for negligence, seeking special damages for past medical expenses based on the gross charges listed on the hospital bill.In the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, both parties filed motions in limine regarding the admissibility of the gross charges versus the negotiated charges. The district court ruled that, under the collateral source rule, evidence of the negotiated charges paid by the plaintiff’s insurance was inadmissible, and only the gross charges could be considered. At a bench trial, the court awarded the plaintiff special damages based on the gross charges, less a deduction for amounts already reimbursed by the defendant to the plaintiff’s car insurance provider.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah addressed whether the collateral source rule requires exclusion of evidence of the negotiated charges for an insured plaintiff’s medical care. The court held that the collateral source rule does not require exclusion of the negotiated charges, because the gross charge does not reflect the plaintiff’s actual loss; neither the plaintiff nor the insurer was ever obligated to pay the gross amount. The court concluded that only the negotiated charge represents the compensable loss for special damages. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Utah vacated the special damages award and remanded for a new trial on that issue. View "Gardner v. Norman" on Justia Law

This case arises from a 2004 automobile accident in which one driver, LaMoin Larkin, died. Larkin’s insurer paid benefits to his estate and then sued the surviving driver, Jared Weston, for negligence, also seeking a declaratory judgment that Weston was insured by Farmers Insurance Exchange at the time of the accident. Farmers Insurance Exchange denied coverage, claiming the policy had been cancelled prior to the accident. Weston filed a crossclaim against Farmers, alleging breach of the duty to defend. Weston and Larkin’s insurer arbitrated the negligence claim, resulting in a finding of liability against Weston and a judgment entered in 2009.The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, confirmed the arbitration award and entered judgment. It later held a bench trial to resolve whether Farmers had properly cancelled Weston’s policy, ultimately finding the cancellation was valid and that Weston was not insured at the time of the accident. The court also granted summary judgment that Farmers had breached its duty to defend Weston, as the complaint raised a genuine issue regarding cancellation. Subsequent proceedings addressed damages, including emotional distress and attorney fees. The district court found Weston failed to prove emotional distress caused by the breach and reduced damages to zero. The court also ruled that the 2009 judgment had not expired, allowing it to be amended to include interest and costs.The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s findings on cancellation, breach of duty to defend, and emotional distress, but reversed on consequential damages, holding Farmers liable for the arbitration judgment and related attorney fees. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that the 2009 judgment expired in 2017 under Utah law, reversing the court of appeals on that issue and vacating the award of damages and attorney fees based on the expired judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed that Farmers breached its duty to defend but found no basis for damages or attorney fees due to the expiration of the judgment. View "Farm Bureau v. Weston" on Justia Law

A man with severe chronic pain had long been prescribed oxycodone. When he visited his doctor for an unrelated issue, he was also prescribed clonazepam, a benzodiazepine. The combination of these two drugs carries a significant risk of respiratory depression and death, a fact underscored by an FDA-mandated black box warning. The man and his wife expressed concern about the new prescription, but his doctor reassured them. When the prescription for clonazepam was filled at a pharmacy, the pharmacist’s computer system flagged a warning about the dangerous interaction with oxycodone. The pharmacist overrode the warning and dispensed the medication. The man died the next day from toxicity due to both drugs.The man’s family and estate sued the pharmacy, alleging negligence, including a failure to warn about the drug interaction. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, denied the pharmacy’s motion for summary judgment, which was based on the “learned intermediary rule.” This rule generally exempts pharmacists from warning patients about the general risks of FDA-approved drugs, on the assumption that the prescribing physician is best positioned to provide such warnings. The district court found that there were material factual disputes about whether the pharmacist knew of a patient-specific risk and whether the learned intermediary rule applied.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. It held that the learned intermediary rule does not shield a pharmacist from liability when the pharmacist is aware of a patient-specific risk, as opposed to general risks associated with a drug. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, clarifying that pharmacists retain a duty to act as a reasonably prudent pharmacist would when aware of such risks. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Walgreen v. Jensen" on Justia Law