Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Sixteen-year-old Wayne Torrie's mother asked law enforcement officers to locate Wayne, who had left home in his family's vehicle, and bring him into custody. A Weber County sheriff's deputy spotted Wayne and pursued him until Wayne reached speeds up to ninety-nine miles per hour. Wayne's vehicle then left the road and rolled over, ejecting Wayne, who ultimately died from his injuries. Wayne's parents filed a lawsuit against the deputy and the county, alleging various theories of negligence in connection with the deputy's pursuit of their son. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Defendants owed no duty to Wayne. The Supreme Court (1) reversed summary judgment for the deputy, holding that law enforcement officers engaged in pursuit owe a duty of care to all persons, including fleeing suspects; and (2) affirmed summary judgment for the county, holding that the Torries failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that the district court erred in ruling that the county owes a fleeing suspect a duty of care with respect to its law enforcement agency's implementation of policies and procedures regarding vehicular pursuits and with regard to the supervision and training provided to its officers. Remanded. View "Torrie v. Weber County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were camping with their young son, Sam, when a bear pulled Sam from out of his tent and killed him. The bear was the same bear that had attacked another camper in the same campsite earlier that day. Plaintiffs sued the State, alleging that the State negligently failed to warn them of the dangerous condition created by the bear. The district court initially dismissed Plaintiffs' claims under the permit exception to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the State filed a motion for summary judgment, raising two alternative arguments that the Supreme Court declined to address in Francis I. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment for the State on both duty and immunity grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State was entitled to present its alternative arguments on remand; (2) the State owed Plaintiffs a duty because it undertook no specific action to protect them as the next group to use the campsite; and (3) the natural condition exception to the Immunity Act did not immunize the State from liability because a bear is not a "natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands." View "Francis v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured at ShopKo Stores, Inc. when she sat on a display office chair and the chair collapsed. Plaintiff sued ShopKo for negligence. A jury found ShopKo negligent but awarded Plaintiff much less than she requested in damages. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in giving an instruction to the jury that it should apportion damages between those attributable to ShopKo's negligence and those attributable to Plaintiff's preexisting conditions. The court of appeals concluded that ShopKo was not entitled to the apportionment jury instruction because Plaintiff's preexisting conditions were asymptomatic on the date of the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' grant of a new trial, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in taking a bright-line approach to analyzing preexisting conditions, which risks holding defendants liable for more damages than they proximately caused; but (2) the apportionment instruction was erroneous and prejudicial because ShopKo did not present evidence sufficient for the jury to apportion damages on a nonarbitrary basis. Remanded for a new trial. View "Harris v. ShopKo Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, Plaintiff was negotiating the sale of three limited liability companies of which he was the sole shareholder. The companies were S Corporations. Plaintiff retained an Accounting Firm to advise him on his tax liability from the contemplated sale. Altaview Concrete, one of the companies, was named as the client. Jeffrey Bickel, a partner at the Accounting Firm, advised Plaintiff that he could restructure the deal to reduce his tax liability to $663,000. The buyer agreed to the restructuring proposals, and the sale closed. Later Bickel and the Accounting Firm (collectively, Defendants) discovered they had greatly underestimated Plaintiff's tax liability. Plaintiff filed a professional negligence claim in district court. The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that Plaintiff's claim failed to satisfy the writing requirement of Utah Code 58-26-602, which provides that accountants are not liable to third parties unless the accountant identified in writing to the client that the professional services were intended to be relief upon by the third party. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendants were liable to Plaintiff as a third party under section 602 because Defendants identified in writing that the professional services were intended to be relied upon by Plaintiff. View "Reynolds v. Bickel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while participating in a guided horseback ride near Sundance Resort. Prior to the ride, Plaintiff signed a release (waiver) waiving her right to sue Defendants, Sundance-related entities (collectively, Sundance) for injuries caused by Sundance's ordinary negligence. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the waiver was unenforceable under the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act (Equine Act) and that it violated the public policy expressed in the Equine Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Equine Act does not invalidate preinjury releases for ordinary negligence, nor does the Equine Act evidence a public policy bargain struck by the legislature; and (2) therefore, the waiver is enforceable. View "Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. " on Justia Law

Appellants were defrauded by an individual on parole from a Utah prison. Appellants filed a complaint alleging causes of action against the State for negligent supervision, gross negligence, failure to warn, and negligent misrepresentation. Under the Governmental Immunity Act, the State is immune from a suit where the injury arises out of deceit. The district court dismissed the case based on the State's governmental immunity, finding that Appellants' injury was the result of a third-party's deceit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State was immune under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's deceit exception; and (2) the dismissal of Appellants' complaint on the basis of governmental immunity was timely. View "Van De Grift v. State" on Justia Law

Michael Howe, an employee of Peak Alarm Company, filed a complaint against the City and several of its employees, presenting ten federal and state claims, including false arrest and defamation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on these and other state claims on the ground that Howe failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA). The supreme Court reversed, holding that the claims were timely brought under the UGIA. On remand, Defendants again moved for summary judgment, arguing that the state defamation and false arrest claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The district court denied the motion on the ground that the claims had been timely brought under the UGIA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the UGIA comprehensively governs claims against governmental parties such that plaintiffs are not bound to observe the statute of limitations that would apply to claims against private parties. View "Peak Alarm v. Salt Lake City Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Defendants mailed Plaintiff a letter asking for her authorization to permit the release of her medical and employment records for the last twenty years. Plaintiff declined. The district court granted a motion to compel Plaintiff to sign the authorizations. On an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the district court's order granting the motion to compel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not misstate or misconstrue the factual background in evaluating the issues on appeal; (2) because Defendants did not comply with the procedural requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 34 in serving the letters, the district court abused its discretion by compelling Plaintiff to sign the authorizations under Utah R. Civ. P. 37; and (3) the court of appeals did not err when it suggested that Defendants may use the subpoena process to obtain records from out-of-state third parties. Remanded. View "Rahofy v. Steadman Land & Livestock, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff underwent several medical procedures performed by Defendants, two medical doctors. Two years and three months after the treatment ended, Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice claim against Defendants. Upon a motion by Dr. Grigsby, one of the doctors, the district court dismissed Plaintiff's claim, finding that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly found that, as a matter of law, Dr. Grigsby failed to show Plaintiff filed her claim more than two years after she discovered or should have discovered her legal injury; but (2) when a plaintiff alleges a course of negligent treatment, a defendant may show that the claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations without identifying the specific procedure within the course of treatment that caused the patient's injury. Rather, to prevail, a defendant need only show that the plaintiff filed her claim more than two years after she discovered that the course of treatment was negligent. Remanded. View "Arnold v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

Shawn Adel, a former employee of Westgate Resorts, a timeshare company, formed Consumer Protection Group (CPG) to right perceived wrongs stemming from Westgate's offer of certificates to consumers that were virtually irredemable. CPG solicited people who had received certificates to assign their claims to CPG. Westgate sued Adel, claiming intentional interference with existing and potential economic relations, conversion, breach of contract, and violation of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Adel and CPG counterclaimed on behalf of 500 claimants, alleging breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, and violation of the Utah Consumer Protection Act. The jury awarded actual economic damages of between $5 and $550 for each claimant and awarded each claimant punitive damages of $66,666. The Supreme Court vacated the jury's punitive damages award, holding that the award violated Westgate's procedural due process rights under Philip Morris USA v. Williams because the statements made by CPG's counsel during closing argument created a risk that the jury would improperly consider harm allegedly caused by Westgate to nonparties when it fixed its punitive damages award. Remanded for a new evaluation of the punitive damages award only. View "WestGate Resorts, Ltd. v. Adel" on Justia Law