Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court answered a certified question posed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit regarding the reach of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Act), Utah Code 78B-3-401 through 426, by concluding that the Act applied in this case involving an injury sustained while climbing a rock formation during a "wilderness therapy" excursion.Jacob Scott sued Wingate Wilderness Therapy, LLC seeking relief for injuries he sustained as a minor while rock climbing during a wilderness therapy hiking excursion. The federal district court granted Wingate's motion to dismiss, concluding that the Act applied to Scott's claims and that Scott (1) failed to file his action within the two-year statute of limitations, and (2) failed to comply with the Act's procedural requirements. Scott appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding that his injuries arose out of the health care provided by Wingate. The circuit court certified a question to the Utah Supreme Court, which answered by holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the Act applied to Scott's claims. View "Scott v. Wingate Wilderness Therapy, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court in this trust and estate dispute, holding that, under certain circumstances, a party may assert a claim for intentional interference with inheritance.A dozen years after the decedent's death, his children sued David Rudd - the attorney who represented the decedent in various matters - and Ballard Spahr, LLP - the law firm where Rudd was a partner - claiming that Defendants improperly influenced the decedent to amend his will and trust in a way that shifted a portion of the children's expected inheritance to other beneficiaries, engaged in improper and/or misleading conduct, and mishandled estate assets after the decedent's death. On appeal were the district court's grant of (1) Defendants' motion to dismiss the children's claim for intentional interference with inheritance, (2) summary judgment on several tort claims the children wanted to assert on behalf of the decedent's estate, and (3) a motion in limine preventing the children from impeaching Rudd with certain statements. The Supreme Court held that the district court (1) erred in dismissing the intentional interference with inheritance claim; (2) did not err by not assigning the estate's claims to the children; and (3) erred in granting the motion in limine. View "In re Estate of D.A. Osguthorpe, D.V.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Shree Ganesh, LLC's contract and tort claims against Weston Logan, Inc., and Matthew Weston, an individual, holding that there remained a genuine dispute as to material facts, precluding summary judgment.Shree Ganesh entered into a contract with Weston Logan to purchase Weston Logan's Best Western Inn. After the sale of the property closed, Shree Ganesh learned about Weston Logan's plans to build a competing hotel across the street. Shree Ganesh subsequently sued Weston Logan for its failure to disclose its plans to develop the competing hotel. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Weston Logan on all claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the purchase agreement was ambiguous as to Weston Logan's disclosure obligations; and (2) there remained a genuine dispute as to material facts relevant to Shree Ganesh's tort claims. View "Shree Ganesh, LLC v. Weston Logan, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the district court concluding that the adjudication of Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against a church must be dismissed on the grounds that the adjudication of this claim would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, holding that recent changes in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence required further development of the facts and legal arguments presented in this case.Plaintiff and her family attended the Roy Congregation of the Jehovah's Witnesses Church. When Plaintiff was sexually assaulted by another Jehovah's Witnesses congregant the Church investigated Plaintiff to determine whether she had engaged in the sin of "porneia." During the investigation, four Elders in the Church convened a disciplinary hearing in which they played an audio recording of the other congregant raping Plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed her complaint against the Church for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the Establishment Clause barred the claim. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's decision, holding that because the district court relied on a test that has recently been displaced by the Supreme Court, the case must be remanded for additional proceedings. View "Williams v. Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing this wrongful death suit against Salt Lake City on the grounds that the action was barred by Utah's Limitations on Landowner Liability Act's prohibition on claims for personal injury caused by the inherent risks of participating in an activity with a recreational purpose, holding that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the death in this case was not caused by a risk inherent in a recreational activity.Liudmila Feldman drowned in a creek at a City park when walking her dogs. Feldman tried to get the dogs out of the creek within the park but was caught in a dangerous current and drowned. Plaintiffs sued the City for wrongful death and other causes of action, asserting that the dangerous current at the creek resulted from manmade developments. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss, concluding that Utah Code 57-14-401 barred Plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court correctly held that application of section 401 does not violate the wrongful death clause of the Utah Constitution; but (2) Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Feldman's death was not caused by an inherent risk in her recreational activity of walking in the park with her dogs. View "Feldman v. Salt Lake City Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Maria Luna on Luis Luna's negligence claim, holding that the court of appeals improperly adopted the judicial admission doctrine as applied to a party's deposition testimony.Luis was a passenger in his sister Maria's car when it collided with a vehicle driven by Antonio Arias in a Salt Lake City intersection. Luis sued Maria and Antonio. Maria moved for summary judgment based in part on Luis's testimony that Maria had entered the intersection on a green light. Luis sought to introduce Antonio's testimony that he had the green light, but the district court refused to allow Luis to create a genuine issue of material fact by introducing evidence contradicting his own sworn deposition testimony. The district court granted summary judgment for Maria. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Luis's statement should be considered a judicial admission not capable of being rebutted by other evidence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that a party's deposition testimony is like any other evidentiary admission and can be contradicted with other credible evidence. View "Luna v. Luna" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court in favor of Plaintiff in this personal injury action, holding that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Plaintiff's expert witness to offer undisclosed causation testimony, and the error was harmful.Plaintiff, who was injured while working on a highway construction site, sued the general contractor for failing to take necessary safety measures to protect workers from highway traffic. The jury found that the general contractor was partially liable for Plaintiff's injury. On appeal, the general contractor argued that the district court erred when it allowed Plaintiff's expert witness to offer an undisclosed opinion on causation. The court of appeals agreed, determining that the error was harmful enough to warrant reversal and a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the testimony was erroneously admitted and that the error was not harmless. View "Arreguin-Leon v. Hadco Construction, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying a civil stalking injunction sought by Kristi Ragsdale against George Fishler, holding that the district court erred.Ragsdale ran Eva Carlton Academy (ECA), a residential treatment program for young women, out of her home in a suburb. Fishler, Ragsdale's neighbor, expressed his objection to ECA's presence in the neighborhood by flipping off and swearing at Ragsdale and others entering or exiting ECA and by placing provocative signs in his yard. The district court denied Ragsdale's request for an injunction. The Supreme Court reversed on each issue raised by Ragsdale and vacated the district court's ruling on Fishler's fee request, holding that the district court erred by (1) concluding that Fishler's conduct was directed only at ECA; (2) failing to determine whether Fishler's conduct would cause a reasonable person in Ragsdale's circumstances to suffer fear or emotional distress; and (3) denying Ragsdale's injunction on the ground that the First Amendment protects Fishler's conduct. Because the Court's reversal of these issues may affect the basis for the district court's denial of Fishler's attorney-fees request, the Court vacated that decision and remanded for a new determination. View "Ragsdale v. Fishler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Commission awarding Appellant permanent partial disability under the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), Utah Code 34A-2-101 to -1005, holding that the Commission's process for determining permanent partial disability benefits is constitutional and that the administrative law judge (ALJ) was not permitted to increase the amount of the award based on Appellant's subjective pain.Based on Commission guidelines, the ALJ based the amount of Appellant's award on a report provided by an assigned medical panel. Appellant argued on appeal that the process for determining permanent partial disability benefits was unconstitutional and that the ALJ erred in failing to augment the medical panel's impairment rating by three percent, resulting in an increased compensation award. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the adjudicative authority of ALJs has not been unconstitutionally delegated to medical panels; and (2) the Commission expressly precludes ALJs from augmenting an impairment rating based on a claimant's subjective pain. View "Ramos v. Cobblestone Centre" on Justia Law

In this automobile accident case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's general-damages award granted to Plaintiff, holding that Plaintiff satisfied the requirements of Utah Code 31A-22-309 and that the district court correctly denied Defendant's new trial motion.On appeal, Defendant argued (1) Plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements set forth in section 31A-22-309, a prerequisite to receiving general damages in most automobile accident cases, because Plaintiff did not show that she sustained a "permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings"; and (2) under Utah R. Civ. P. 59, a new trial on the amount of damages should be granted because the award of general damages Plaintiff was awarded was excessively disproportionate to the economic damages awarded. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in interpreting the phrase "objective findings"; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in affirming Plaintiff's damage award because the award was supported by sufficient evidence and was not so excessive as to appear to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. View "Pinney v. Carrera" on Justia Law