Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In this case brought by an alleged victim of child-sex abuse years after the alleged abuse occurred, the Supreme Court held that the Utah Legislature is constitutionally prohibited from retroactively reviving a time-barred claim in a manner depriving a defendant of a vested statute of limitations defense.Plaintiff, who alleged that Defendant sexually abused her in 1981, conceded that each of her claims had expired under the original statute of limitations. Plaintiff, however, argued that (1) her claims were revived when the legislature, in 2016, enacted Utah Code 78B-2-308(7), and (2) her claims against Defendant were timely filed under this statue. The federal court certified this case to the Supreme Court asking the Court to clarify whether the legislature had the authority to expressly revive time-barred claims through a statute. The Supreme Court held (1) the legislature lacks the power to retroactively vitiate a ripened statute of limitations defense under the Utah Constitution; and (2) therefore, section 78B-2-308(7) is an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. View "Mitchell v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the professional rescuer rule that this Court adopted in Fordham v. Oldroyd, 171 P.3d 411 (Utah 2007), extends no further than Fordham's detailed formulation and that a person does owe a duty of care to a professional rescuer for injury that was sustained by the gross negligence or intentional tort that caused the rescuer's presence.Plaintiff, a firefighter, was severely injured while responding to a mulch fire that occurred on Defendant's property. At the time of the fire, Defendant was in knowing violation of several ordinances, including the fire code, and of industry standards regarding the safe storage of mulch. Plaintiff sued Defendant for gross negligence, intentional harm, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to Plaintiff under the professional rescuer rule. The district court agreed and dismissed Plaintiff's claim. The Supreme Court partially reversed the summary judgment order, holding (1) a person owes professional rescuers a duty of care when that person's gross negligence or intentional tort triggers the rescuers' presence; and (2) the case is remanded to the district court to rule whether Defendant's actions were grossly negligent, creating a duty to Plaintiff. View "Ipsen v. Diamond Tree Experts, Inc" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court excluding Plaintiffs' proximate cause expert's testimony, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiffs brought suit against the University of Utah Hospital alleging that the Hospital's treatment of their daughter's baclofen withdrawal caused the daughter's permanent injuries. The Hospital filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs' causation expert, arguing that the testimony should be barred under Utah R. Evid. 702 because the expert's opinion was not based upon sufficient facts or data. The district court agreed and excluded the testimony. At issue on appeal was whether the threshold showing that the principles or methods underlying in the expert's testimony were based upon sufficient facts or data where the method - logical deduction - was based upon broad and attenuated facts. The Supreme Court held that the showing was not present in this case, and therefore, the district court properly excluded the expert testimony on proximate cause. View "Taylor v. University of Utah" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's personal injury lawsuit, holding that Plaintiff produced evidence in support of the disputed elements of her claim.Plaintiff, who tripped and fell while walking across a park strip, asserted that she tripped over a metal rod protruding out of a hole in the ground. Plaintiff sued Defendants, including Herriman City, for negligence. In granting summary judgment for Defendants the district court ruled that Plaintiff had failed to produce enough evidence to create a disputed issue of fact as to when the unsafe condition arose, and therefore, Plaintiff could not show that Defendants had constructive notice of the unsafe condition and an opportunity to remedy the condition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the durable, non transitory nature of the unsafe condition itself is evidence from which a fact-finder could infer longevity, which is sufficient to create a genuine dispute as to the length of time the condition existed; and (2) in conjunction with evidence relevant to the noticeability of the metal rod, Plaintiff produced evidence in support of the contested elements of her claim. View "Cochegrus v. Herriman City" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's claim for failure to timely file a notice of claim, holding that Plaintiff, a Utah resident injured in Utah by an Arizona municipal employee, may not file a claim against the employee and the municipality after the time to do so has expired under Arizona law but not under Utah law.Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident in Utah with a driver who was acting in the course and scope of her employment with the City of Flagstaff, Arizona. When Plaintiff filed suit, the City and the driver moved to dismiss arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff did not file her notice of claim within six months as required by Arizona's governmental immunity statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-821.01. The district court applied the statute as a matter of comity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) comity was rightfully extended, and the district court correctly applied the statute; and (2) Plaintiff failed to comply with the statute's notice of claim requirement, and therefore, the action was untimely and required dismissal. View "Galindo v. Flagstaff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the award of benefits entered by the Utah Labor Commission in favor of Jessica Wilson, holding that the Commission did not err in concluding that Wilson's injuries arose out of, and in the course of, her employment with her employer, Intercontinental Hotels Group (IHG).Wilson sustained injuries after tripping and falling in a parking lot while walking into work. Wilson requested benefits from IHG. IHG denied Wilson's claim, concluding that, under the going-and-coming rule, Wilson's accident did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. An ALJ with the Commission reviewed Wilson's claim and concluded that Wilson was entitled to benefits under the premises rule. The Commission affirmed, concluding that the communal parking area where the accident occurred was proof IHG's premises for purposes of determining compensability. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission properly determined that Wilson's accident occurred on IHG's premises and that, under case law, this constituted an accident in the course of her employment. View "Intercontinental Hotels Group v. Utah Labor Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court ruling against Appellant in this declaratory judgment action and holding that the Office of Recovery Services (ORS) was entitled to recover from the portion of Appellant's settlement award representing all medical expenses, both past and future, holding that ORS may recover from only that portion of an award representing past medical expenses.Appellant brought malpractice and negligence claims against a hospital, alleging that the hospital's failure to diagnose his stroke caused severe injuries. At the time of his injuries, Appellant received Medicaid through the State, and Medicaid paid for Appellant's treatment. At issue here was what portion of Appellant's settlement award the ORS was permitted to collect. The district court held that ORS was entitled to recover from the portion of Appellant's settlement award representing all medical expenses, both past and future. The Supreme Court disagreed and remanded the case, holding that ORS may place a lien on and recover from only that portion of Appellant's settlement representing past medical expenses. View "Latham v. Office of Recovery Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against the University of Utah, holding that the district court properly found that Plaintiff's notice of claim was untimely.Plaintiff sought damages for injuries she suffered during a surgery performed by a University of Utah School of Medicine professor at LDS Hospital. Under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA), Plaintiff was required to give notice of her claim to the State within one year of the date Plaintiff knew or should of known that she had a claim against a State entity or employee. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that her notice of claim was timely because it was filed within one year of when she knew or should have known she had a claim against the University. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) Plaintiff had sufficient information to put a reasonable person on notice that her claim might be against the State, instead of LDS Hospital; (2) because Plaintiff had reason to inquire long before she filed her notice of claim, her notice was untimely under the UGIA; and (3) Plaintiff's arguments based on the doctrine of res judicata and the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution were without merit. View "Amundsen v. University of Utah" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision reversing the district court's order granting Provo City's motion to dismiss this wrongful death suit on the ground that an estate lacks the legal capacity to assert a claim sounding in wrongful death, holding that the district court erred in dismissing the case on the basis of a lack of capacity.Helen Faucheaux died of a drug overdose in an incident in which Provo City police officers were dispatched to her home. Faucheaux's heirs brought a wrongful death suit against the City. The caption of the complaint listed "The Estate of Helen M. Faucheaux" as the plaintiff. The district court dismissed the case on the ground that an estate lacks the legal capacity to assert a claim sounding in wrongful death. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed on alternative grounds, holding (1) the caption of a complaint has no controlling significance, and because the complaint made clear that the action was being pursued by the personal representative on behalf of the heirs the district court erred in dismissing the case on the basis of a lack of capacity; and (2) even if this action had been initiated by the estate, the estate's lack of capacity could have been corrected by substitution. View "Estate of Faucheaux v. Provo City" on Justia Law

In this tort suit arising out of a basketball game the Supreme Court affirmed as modified the district court's determination that Plaintiff's injury arose out of conduct that was not willful or reckless but was inherent in the game of basketball, holding that participants in any sport are not liable for injuries caused by their conduct if their conduct was inherent in the sport.The district court held that Defendant, another player in the basketball game, owed no duty to Plaintiff because Plaintiff's injury arose out of conduct that was inherent in the game of basketball. The district court adopted a "contact sports exception" providing that participants in bodily contact sports are liable for injuries only when the injuries are the result of conduct that demonstrates a willful or reckless disregard for the safety of the other player. The Supreme Court affirmed on a modified basis, holding (1) the exception to liability arising out of sports injuries should not turn on the defendant's state of mind or be limited just to contact sports; (2) instead, voluntary participants in sports have no duty of care to avoid contact that is inherent in the activity; and (3) Defendant's conduct was inherent in the game of basketball. View "Nixon v. Clay" on Justia Law