Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Under Utah’s Governmental Immunity Act, plaintiffs who have a claim against a governmental “employee” for acts committed during the performance of the employee’s duties must file a notice of claim within one year after the claim arises or the claim is barred. In the instant case, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Brigham Young University (BYU) and its traffic cadet for negligently causing a motorcycle accident Plaintiff was involved in while leaving a BYU parking lot. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the BYU Defendants were “employees” of Provo City as defined in the Act at the time of the collision, and therefore, Plaintiff failed to file a timely notice of claim as required by the Act. The court of appeals remanded for further proceedings, holding that there was insufficient evidence that the BYU Defendants were “employees” under the Act and that the district court’s dismissal was premature. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in interpreting the statutory definition of “employee” and in reversing the trial court’s dismissal. View "Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ." on Justia Law

Kelly Colvin was killed in an automobile accident while returning to Utah from a work project in Maryland. The accident occurred when Colvin was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his coworker, Joseph Giguere. Colvin’s widow and son sued Giguere, claiming that Colvin’s death was proximately caused by Giguere’s negligent driving. Giguere moved for summary judgment, asserting that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act barred this suit because the accident occurred in the course of his and Colvin’s employment. The district court agreed and granted Giguere’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the accident occurred while Colvin and Giguere were carrying out a special errand for their employer, this action was barred under the Act’s exclusive remedy provision. View "Colvin v. Giguere" on Justia Law

Robert Baird sought a civil stalking injunction against his mother, Gloria Baird, because Gloria contacted him almost every day. The district court granted a three-year injunction, determining that Gloria’s nearly daily phone calls to Robert were causing Robert emotional distress. Gloria appealed, arguing that the district court misinterpreted Utah’s Stalking Statute because it entered the injunction based on its finding that Gloria’s conduct was causing Robert emotional distress without finding that her conduct would have caused emotional distress to a reasonable person in Robert’s circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the stalking injunction, holding (1) the Stalking Statute required the district court to determine whether Gloria’s conduct would cause a reasonable person in Robert’s circumstances emotional distress; and (2) the statutory definition of emotional distress means mental or psychological suffering, and there is no requirement that the emotional distress arise from outrageous and intolerable conduct by the respondent. View "Baird v. Baird" on Justia Law

Christopher Carlton, a Pennsylvania resident, was in a relationship with Shalanda Brown, who was pregnant with Carlton’s child. Unbeknownst to Carlton, Brown traveled to Utah, where she gave birth to a baby girl and relinquished her parental rights to Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. Because no putative father was registered with respect to the child, Adoption Center commenced and adoption proceedings for the child, which were later finalized. Brown, however, had informed Carlton that the child had died. After Brown subsequently told Carlton that the baby was still alive and had been given up for adoption, Carlton filed an amended petition to establish paternity challenging the constitutionality of the Utah Adoption Act and the extent of the rights it affords to putative fathers who wish to contest adoptions in Utah. The district court dismissed Carlton’s petition based on a lack of standing. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in (1) denying Carlton leave to amend his petition to cure standing defects to assert the constitutional claims, and thereby, in dismissing Carlton's constitutional claims; and (2) dismissing Carlton’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Remanded. View "Carlton v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Church) established a help line, which Church clergy could call when they became aware of possible abuse. Plaintiff filed a personal injury suit against the Church, claiming that her Church bishop negligently failed to report her abuse as required by the reporting statute and that the Church was vicariously liable for the bishop’s negligent conduct. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Church, concluding that the Church was immune from suit under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the Church and its clergy did not voluntarily assume a duty to aid abuse victims by virtue of its help line because a clergy member’s failure to use the help line does not increase a victim’s risk of harm; and (2) the imposition of a duty based solely on the creation of the help line would be contrary to public policy because it would discourage organizations from providing services that ultimately benefit victims of abuse. View "MacGregor v. Walker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained injuries when he tripped on an uneven section of sidewalk maintained by Salt Lake City. Plaintiff sued the City, alleging that the City negligently failed to maintain the sidewalk. After Plaintiff's case in chief, the City moved for a directed verdict, arguing that Plaintiff had not produced evidence that the City had adequate notice to remedy the sidewalk defect. The trial court granted the motion. The trial court subsequently granted Plaintiff's motion for a new trial, ruling that it had erred by granting the City's motion for a directed verdict because whether the City had sufficient notice to remedy the defect in the sidewalk was a question for the jury. After a retrial, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the City in this case was not entitled to discretionary function immunity; (2) Plaintiff presented evidence at the second trial that the City had adequate notice of the sidewalk defect; and (3) the City's evidentiary arguments were either barred by the invited error doctrine or unsupported by the record. View "Kerr v. City of Salt Lake" on Justia Law

Melissa and Corey Waddoups sued Intermountain Health Care (IHC), among other defendants, alleging negligent credentialing after Dr. Barry Noorda performed several gynecological procedures on Melissa at an IHC facility. At issue in this case was Utah Code Ann. 78B-3-425, which prohibits a cause of action for negligent credentialing. Because Plaintiffs' negligent credentialing claim accrued before the enactment of the statute, the federal district court certified a question to the Supreme Court, asking whether section 78B-3-425 retroactively applied to bar negligent credentialing claims that arose prior to its enactment. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding that because section 78B-3-425 is a substantive amendment and contains no expression of retroactivity, it does not apply retroactively and therefore did not bar Plaintiffs' claim, which arose prior to its enactment. View "Waddoups v. Noorda" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were the parents of a boy killed by a bear while camping with his parents in American Fork Canyon. Plaintiffs sued the State for negligence in failing to warn Plaintiffs of the dangerous condition created by the bear. The district court dismissed the claims under the permit exception to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the district court again dismissed the case, concluding (1) the State owed no duty to Plaintiffs; and (2) even if the State did owe a duty to Plaintiffs, the natural condition exception to the Immunity Act precluded liability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State owed Plaintiffs a duty because it undertook protective actions directed specifically at Plaintiffs as the next group to use the campsite; and (2) the natural condition exception did not immunize the state from liability because the bear was not a natural condition on the land pursuant to the Immunity Act. Remanded. View "Francis v. State" on Justia Law

An injunction was entered against Ogden Trece, a criminal street gang, prohibiting Trece members from associating with one another; possessing a firearm in a public place; and harassing or assaulting a witness or victim of any activity of Trece. Weber County filed the complaint for permanent injunction to abate a public nuisance. The County personally served certain gang members as well as published service of process in the local newspaper and on a website. The Supreme Court held that the injunction was void because the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the injunction. Specifically, the Court held that although Trece was an unincorporated association and amenable to suit, service on Trece was improper where the County did not serve any of Trece's officers or managing or general agents or their functional equivalent and did not establish a sufficient factual basis for service by publication. View "Weber County v. Odgen Trece" on Justia Law

After Larry Sewell fell into a service pit at Xpress Lube, Sewell filed suit against Xpress Lube. A process server left copies of the summons and complaint with an Xpress Lube employee. Bruce Anderson, the sole proprietor of Xpress Lube, later found the summons and complaint and sent them to his insurance agent, who, in turn, attempted to fax the complaint to Travelers Insurance, Anderson's insurance carrier. Travelers, however, never received the fax. Sewell later filed a motion for default judgment. The district court granted the motion and entered judgment against Xpress Lube. The Supreme Court vacated the default judgment, holding (1) there was no proper service on Xpress Lube because the sole proprietor was not served in this case, and therefore, the default judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction; (2) the district court erred in failing to vacate the default judgment due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect; and (3) the district court erred when it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on unliquidated damages. View "Sewell v. Xpress Lube" on Justia Law