Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Bill Simmon, an employee of Vermont Community Access Media, Inc. (VCAM), invited Ciara Kilburn and her minor sister Brona to VCAM’s premises to record a commercial. Simmon secretly recorded the sisters changing clothes using VCAM’s equipment and shared the videos online, where they were viewed millions of times. In 2020, the Kilburns filed a lawsuit against Simmon for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligence per se, and against VCAM for vicarious liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed claims against Vermont State Colleges and did not instruct the jury on vicarious liability or NIED. The jury found Simmon liable for invasion of privacy and IIED, and VCAM liable for negligent supervision. Each plaintiff was awarded $1.75 million in compensatory damages against both Simmon and VCAM, and $2 million in punitive damages against Simmon. The court denied VCAM’s motions to exclude evidence, for a new trial, and for remittitur, and also denied plaintiffs’ request to hold VCAM jointly and severally liable for Simmon’s damages.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that emotional-distress damages were available to plaintiffs for VCAM’s negligent supervision because the claim was based on intentional torts (invasion of privacy and IIED) for which such damages are recoverable. The court found no error in the jury’s award of damages, concluding that the evidence supported the verdict and that the damages were not excessive. The court also ruled that plaintiffs waived their claim for joint and several liability by not objecting to the jury instructions or verdict form before deliberations. View "Kilburn v. Simmon" on Justia Law

The case involves a wrongful-death action brought by the Estate of Jared Shaffer, through Daniel Shaffer as administrator, against Northeast Kingdom Human Services, Inc. Jared Shaffer, a developmentally disabled adult, died on April 18, 2017, from a sudden pulmonary embolism caused by metastatic testicular cancer. The estate claimed that the defendant, responsible for overseeing Jared's Medicaid waiver funds and coordinating his care, was negligent in its duties, leading to Jared's death.Initially, the estate sued Heartbeet Lifesharing, Dr. Peter Sher, and the defendant in federal court, but the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after a settlement with Dr. Sher’s medical practice. The estate then filed the wrongful-death action in the civil division against the defendant and Heartbeet. Before the trial, the estate settled with Heartbeet, leaving the case to be tried solely against the defendant. The defendant asserted a comparative negligence defense, implicating Daniel Shaffer, Jared's father and co-guardian, in Jared's death.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case after the estate appealed a jury verdict in favor of the defendant. The estate argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on comparative negligence, providing misleading jury instructions, and sustaining objections to certain questions posed to the defendant’s corporate representative. The estate also contended that the jury deliberated too quickly and that the evidence overwhelmingly supported its claim of negligence.The Vermont Supreme Court found that while the trial court erred in conflating the identity of the plaintiff with Daniel Shaffer, the estate was not prejudiced because the jury never reached the question of comparative negligence, having found no negligence on the defendant's part. The court also upheld the trial court's evidentiary rulings and found no error in the jury's deliberation process. The jury's verdict in favor of the defendant was affirmed. View "Shaffer v. Northeast Kingdom Human Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Kristina and Stephen Polak, and defendants, Felipe Ramirez-Diaz and Yesica Sanchez de Ramirez, are neighbors in St. Albans. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants alleging defamation, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) after defendants allegedly made false reports to police and the court accusing plaintiffs of criminal activity. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants falsely reported an assault and a gun threat, leading to anti-stalking complaints and an Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) petition against Kristina Polak, which were ultimately denied. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants repeated these false claims to neighbors and community members.The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Civil Division, granted defendants’ special motion to strike plaintiffs’ claims under Vermont’s anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that defendants’ statements were protected petitioning activity in connection with public issues. The court also imposed a discovery sanction on plaintiffs for failing to respond to defendants’ interrogatories and requests for production, prohibiting plaintiffs from introducing evidence that should have been disclosed. The court subsequently awarded summary judgment to defendants on the remaining defamation claim, noting plaintiffs’ failure to identify specific defamatory statements or produce evidence of actual harm.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in granting the special motion to strike. The Supreme Court held that defendants’ statements were not made in connection with a public issue, as they concerned a private dispute between neighbors and did not affect a large number of people or involve a matter of widespread public interest. The Supreme Court reversed the order granting the motion to strike and remanded for further proceedings on the stricken claims. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s imposition of the discovery sanction and the award of summary judgment on the remaining defamation claim, finding no abuse of discretion. View "Polak v. Ramirez-Diaz" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a civil suit against the defendant, alleging defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) after the defendant reported to the police that the plaintiff had sexually and physically assaulted her. This report led to the plaintiff being criminally charged, arrested, and held without bail for almost two years before being acquitted. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's report was false and made with malicious intent to harm him.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the defendant's statements to the police were absolutely privileged as communications preliminary to a judicial proceeding. The court also granted the defendant's special motion to strike under Vermont's anti-SLAPP statute, 12 V.S.A. § 1041, and awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant. The court reasoned that the defendant's statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute as an exercise of her right to petition the government.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of judgment on the pleadings, agreeing that the defendant's statements to the police were absolutely privileged. The Court held that public policy supports extending absolute privilege to such statements to encourage free and full disclosure to law enforcement without fear of civil liability. The Court also affirmed the trial court's application of the anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the defendant's statements were made in connection with a public issue and were an exercise of her constitutional rights. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the trial court to consider the plaintiff's constitutional challenges to the anti-SLAPP statute, which the trial court had not adequately addressed. View "Talandar v. Manchester-Murphy" on Justia Law

Defendants discovered that a parcel of land near their property was seemingly omitted from the plaintiff's deed. They arranged for the heirs of a previous owner to deed that parcel to them without confirming the heirs' ownership or consulting the plaintiff, who used the parcel. After recording their deed, defendants informed the plaintiff that they owned the parcel and asked her to remove her belongings. The plaintiff sued for deed reformation and slander of title.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division, granted the plaintiff's claim for deed reformation on summary judgment and concluded that Mr. Kolodziej slandered the plaintiff's title after a bench trial. Defendants appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the plaintiff had a transferrable ownership interest capable of disparagement, as the reformed deed related back to the original deed. The court found that the defendants published a false statement by recording a deed that falsely claimed ownership of the disputed parcel. The court also concluded that Mr. Kolodziej acted with malice by recklessly disregarding the plaintiff's potential claim to the property. Finally, the court determined that the plaintiff's legal expenses incurred in clearing the cloud on her title constituted special damages necessary to sustain her slander-of-title claim. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the deed reformation and the ruling on the slander-of-title claim, including the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff. View "Massucco v. Kolodziej" on Justia Law

Frank Driscoll was running along East Shore Road in Isle La Motte when he was struck by a trailer being pulled by a truck driven by Benjamin Wright, an employee of Wright Cut and Clean, LLC. Driscoll was running on the left side of the road, facing traffic, while Wright was driving in the same direction on the right side. As Wright's truck approached, Driscoll moved to the left edge of the road but was struck by the trailer when he moved back towards the center. Driscoll was unconscious when police arrived and had no memory of the accident.Driscoll sued Wright for negligence and Wright Cut and Clean for vicarious liability and direct negligence in hiring, training, and supervising Wright. The Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Civil Division, bifurcated the claims and held a jury trial on the negligence claim. Driscoll's expert, Dr. Jerry Ogden, testified about the dimensions of the trailer and the truck's speed but could not establish Driscoll's position before the impact or a clear causative link between Wright's actions and Driscoll's injuries. The court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants, concluding that Driscoll failed to establish causation.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Driscoll did not provide sufficient evidence of causation, as his expert could not definitively link Wright's actions to the injury. The court emphasized that without clear evidence showing that Wright's alleged negligence caused the injury, the claim could not proceed. Consequently, the judgment in favor of Wright and Wright Cut and Clean was affirmed, and the direct negligence claim against Wright Cut and Clean was also dismissed due to the lack of an underlying tort by Wright. View "Driscoll v. Wright Cut and Clean, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Shirley Ann Carpin, who sued Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation and Clifton Associates on behalf of her mother's estate for negligence and wrongful death. She alleged that the defendants caused the asbestos exposure that led to her mother's mesothelioma and subsequent death. Her mother, Shirley Hilster, was exposed to asbestos through her husband, who worked as a pipefitter and regularly came home with asbestos-contaminated clothes. Hilster's husband worked for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., where Clifton Associates had installed asbestos. Hilster was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a cancer caused by asbestos exposure, in July 2020 and died three months later.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the twenty-year statute of repose under 12 V.S.A. § 518(a), finding the “last occurrence” to which her mother’s mesothelioma was attributed fell outside the repose period. Carpin appealed, arguing that her claims are not barred by § 518(a)’s repose period and, in the alternative, that § 518(a) violates the Vermont Constitution.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court determined that the “last occurrence” to which Hilster’s mesothelioma was attributed was her last known exposure to asbestos in 1995. The court further concluded that the statute was constitutional. The court rejected Carpin's argument that the “last occurrence” was the cellular changes that resulted in her 2020 mesothelioma diagnosis. The court also rejected Carpin's constitutional challenge, finding that the statute of repose did not arbitrarily disadvantage any part of the community and was a valid legislative prerogative. View "Carpin v. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Jennifer Zeno-Ethridge and Dennis Ethridge, appealed from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Comcast Corporation, Eustis Cable, and Green Mountain Flagging. The suit arose from an incident in which Jennifer witnessed a fatal accident involving a utility truck and a flagger while she was driving. Following the incident, she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression.Jennifer sued the defendants for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) and negligence, while Dennis filed a loss-of-consortium claim. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, determining that Jennifer's contact with the flagger’s blood and brain matter did not constitute a "physical impact from external force" necessary for a NIED claim. It also concluded that Jennifer's PTSD diagnosis did not satisfy the "actual injury" requirement for a negligence claim.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the act of Jennifer stepping in the flagger's blood and brain matter was not a physical impact from an external force. Furthermore, the court clarified that a PTSD diagnosis alone is insufficient to satisfy the “actual injury” requirement of a negligence claim, as it is a mental or emotional harm, rather than a physical one. Consequently, Jennifer's NIED and negligence claims failed as a matter of law. Therefore, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Dennis's loss-of-consortium claim, which was dependent upon the success of Jennifer's claims. View "Zeno-Ethridge v. Comcast Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff William Doherty appealed the grant of summary judgment to defendant Alphonse Sorrentino. On the morning of November 8, 2019, plaintiff walked a short distance from the Village Inn to the Woodstock Inn in Woodstock, Vermont. It was not precipitating at that time. He remained at the Woodstock Inn for about fifteen minutes. It began to snow as he left the Woodstock Inn to return to the Village Inn. Plaintiff slipped and fell on a sidewalk abutting 81 Central Street. Snow had lightly accumulated on the sidewalk. Defendant arrived after plaintiff fell but before an ambulance transported plaintiff to a local hospital. Defendant was also the sole owner of ACS Design Build and Construction Services, LLC, both of which had main offices at 81 Central Street. The sidewalk was owned by the Town of Woodstock. The Town had an ordinance that required owners of property abutting a [Woodstock] Village sidewalk clear accumulated snow or ice for pedestrian traffic to a minimum width of three feet, and within twenty-four hours of such accumulation. No accumulated snow had been cleared at the time plaintiff fell. Plaintiff sued, alleging that defendant, in his personal capacity, breached a duty to plaintiff to clear the sidewalk of snow, which was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. In moving for summary judgment, defendant argued that he owed no duty to plaintiff because: neither defendant nor the owner of the building, Tanglewood, owned or controlled the sidewalk on which plaintiff fell; landowners abutting public sidewalks owed no duty to the public to keep the sidewalk in a safe condition; and the municipal ordinance did not otherwise create a duty to plaintiff. The civil division awarded summary judgment to defendant concluding plaintiff did not bear his burden to show that defendant knew or should have known of a dangerous condition on the sidewalk. The court determined that plaintiff failed to offer any basis to reach defendant’s personal assets as sole shareholder of Tanglewood, and that plaintiff did not allege defendant owned or controlled the sidewalk where plaintiff fell. The court found that the municipal ordinance did not create a duty of care to plaintiff. Finding no reversible error in the trial court judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Doherty v. Sorrentino, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants alleging childhood sexual abuse, and defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the statute, which eliminated the prior limitations period, was unconstitutional. The civil division denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the limitations period was a procedural bar and defendants had no vested right in the expiration of the prior statute of limitations. Defendants brought an interlocutory appeal to determine whether 12 V.S.A. § 522 violated Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution by reviving an otherwise time-barred claim of childhood sexual abuse. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded there was no constitutional violation and affirmed. View "A.B. v. S.U. et al." on Justia Law