Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was injured when he struck a horse while driving on a Vermont State road. The horse belonged to Susan Wielt, who leased a house and land from Brian Toomey. Plaintiff sued Wielt and Toomey for negligence. Toomey moved for summary judgment, arguing he had no duty to keep the horse enclosed or to prevent its escape. The trial court granted summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed that grant of summary judgment. View "Deveneau v. Weilt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dow Tillson underwent an elective procedure to remove a cataract in his left eye. Defendant Dr. Richard Lane, M.D., performed the procedure at Springfield Hospital. Plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that within twenty-four hours of surgery, Mr. Tillson’s left eye showed signs of infection. Dr. Lane made a presumptive diagnosis of endopthalmitis, but did not refer Mr. Tillson to a retinologist for treatment. Within forty-eight hours of surgery, Mr. Tillson was permanently blind in his left eye. Plaintiff sued for medical malpractice, and defendants the doctor and hospital, moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the superior court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that deposition testimony of plaintiff’s expert witness was sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tillson v. Lane" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a jury verdict rendered in favor of Rutland Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Rutland Regional Medical Center, and related entities (“RRMC”) and Dr. Santiago Cancio-Bello arising from injuries due to claimed medical malpractice in connection with the birth of Amy and Robert Labates’ daughter in 2007. Following the return of the jury verdict in favor of RRMC and Cancio-Bello, the Labates moved for a new trial on several different grounds, many of which concerned alleged juror misconduct, including a claim that a juror read an e-mail sent by RRMC to its employees during the trial and therefore tainted the verdict. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing and this appeal followed. The only issue before the Supreme Court centered on that e-mail. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Labate v. Rutland Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Rodney Demag worked for a car dealership which also provided automobile service. As a convenience for customers, he picked up vehicles belonging to customers, leaving his own vehicle and returning the customer’s vehicle at the end of the day. Plaintiff provided this service to defendant Better Power Equipment, Inc.'s (BPE) general manager and his wife, picking up their cars from BPE’s parking lot. This occurred five to six times a year. The arrangement had existed for approximately ten years. In 2009, plaintiff drove to defendant for scheduled service, parking in his usual spot next to the vehicle of the general manager and his wife. Although this area was not generally used for parking by BPE customers, the general manager and his wife typically parked there, and other employees sometimes parked there in the winter. Plaintiff spoke briefly with the general manager about the service needed for his vehicle. Plaintiff then returned to his own vehicle, retrieved a few items, took a step and fell into an uncovered storm drain. He filed this case to recover damages for the injuries he suffered as a result of that fall. Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment against him in the resulting personal injury case. The trial court found that plaintiff was a licensee of defendant, [ . . .] rather than an invitee. It concluded that plaintiff was entitled to a lesser standard of care from BPE, which allowed for summary judgment against him. The Supreme Court determined "that the time has come to abolish Vermont’s common-law negligence distinction between licensees and invitees" and reversed and remanded. View "Demag v. Better Power Equipment" on Justia Law

On July 3, 2009, plaintiffs Michaela and David Martin and their three-year-old daughter Gracie spent the day at a campsite that the family rented at a campground in Island Pond, Vermont. Defendants John and Joanna Christman rented a campsite near the Martins. Michaela took Gracie to a playground adjacent to the Christmans’ site. The Christmans were camping with two of their boxer dogs, one of which was a two-year old male named Diesel. They had a table of their own which was sheltered with a gazebo. Joanna Christman tied Diesel to a pole supporting the gazebo. Gracie asked John Christman if she could pet Diesel, and he said that she could. Without warning Diesel attacked Gracie, knocking her to the ground and biting her face. John Christman forced his dog to let go of the child. The Martins took Gracie to North Country Hospital where she received surgery to repair her wounds. The Martins brought suit against the Christmans, their insurer, and the campground on several theories, including strict liability and negligence. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the strict liability claim on the ground that existing Vermont precedent required proof of negligence to recover against a dog owner for damages caused by his or her dog. It also dismissed a "direct action" claim against the Christmans’ insurer. The parties stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of the negligence claim and a related claim of premises liability. This appeal was limited to the trial court’s dismissal of the strict liability claim. The Vermont Supreme Court declined to change the common-law rule requiring proof of a dog owner’s negligence as the sole basis for liability for personal injuries inflicted by the dog. "In the face of longstanding precedent, both in Vermont and in the United States in general, we decline to change the substantive law by judicial decision." View "Martin v. Christman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed two superior court decisions in a personal-injury negligence action: (1) an order dismissing all claims against defendant Robert Merrill, Sr., in his individual capacity, on summary judgment; and (2) an order granting partial judgment as a matter of law during trial, concluding that any liability of defendant Springfield Lodge No. 679, Loyal Order of Moose, Inc., could not be predicated on the action or inaction of Mr. Merrill, Sr., its governor. Plaintiff, attended a New Year's Eve party at the Springfield Lodge when a fight broke out between two other party guests, Danny Snide and Robert Merrill, Jr., the adult son of defendant Robert Merrill, Sr. At the time, Merrill, Sr. was the governor of the Lodge, the highest position in the Lodge hierarchy, and was an unpaid volunteer. Eventually, there was a scuffle in the men’s room involving Merrill, Jr. and an unnamed man. Merrill, Sr. arrived and asked another person to keep Merrill, Jr. in the bathroom while Merrill, Sr. went to look for the unnamed man. Merrill, Jr. and began fighting Snide, by which plaintiff was injured. In addition to alleging his injury, plaintiff submitted selected pages from an Orientation Guide for New Officers listed the duties of the governor of the Lodge, which plaintiff asserted obligated the Governor to take action to prevent the misconduct of members on Lodge property. In reviewing plaintiff's appeal, the Supreme Court found the Guide offered no such language obligating the Lodge Governor as plaintiff maintained. "For that reason, the trial court’s summary judgment decision dismissing the claims against Merrill, Sr. is correct in its result. We also conclude that the court could have gone further and provided the Lodge summary judgment on the claims against it that were premised on a theory of common-law respondeat superior for the action or inaction of Merrill, Sr. . . . Merrill, Sr.’s status as a social guest in the Lodge dining and bar facility is an additional reason why he had no duty to plaintiff to prevent the incident that caused injury to him and why the Lodge has no liability based on Merrill, Sr.’s inaction." View "Buxton v. Springfield Lodge No. 679, Loyal Order of Moose, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose following a fire that destroyed a commercial building in Rutland in 2010. Plaintiff Johnathan Lasek leased the northern half of the building and used the space as a workshop for his house-staining business. He stored staining products and other equipment and constructed a business office in the northeastern corner of the building. The southwestern corner of the building contained a fully enclosed room that was occupied by another commercial tenant, Vermont Vapor Inc. (VVI). The remainder of the building was used by landlord Downing Properties, LLC, as storage for ATVs, motorcycles, and snowmobiles. VVI used its space as a laboratory for mixing the liquid filler for electronic cigarettes. VVI owner Adam Tredwell and his father Warren altered the room to Adam's specificationsm, adding sheetrock and other materials to create a “clean room.” He also installed an eight-inch fan on the south wall of the laboratory that vented to the outside of the building. An industrial space heater was suspended from the rafters of the warehouse, above the ceiling of the laboratory. The Tredwells connected the heater to a propane tank so that they could heat the space in the winter months. Warren was the last person in the laboratory the night before the fire. When firefighters arrived shortly after the fire was reported, the northwest corner of the building (plaintiff's corner) had a large hole in the roof and was heavily engulfed in flames. VVI's corner was not on fire at that time. Plaintiff sued VVI for negligence and strict liability, alleging that VVI had caused the fire by mishandling liquid nicotine. He also sued landlord for breach of the implied warranty of suitability for commercial use, negligence, breach of the duty to warn, and unjust enrichment. After plaintiff's presentation of his case, the trial court granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law. This appeal followed. Plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred: (1) in excluding the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness on causation; (2) in granting defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law; (3) in excluding an eyewitness's statements to police; (4) by denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial; (5) by awarding all deposition costs to defendants; and (6) in refusing to disqualify counsel for defendant-landlord. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision in all respects, with the exception of the award of deposition costs. View "Lasek v. Vermont Vapor, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sandra J. Murphy (as personal representative and administrator of the Estate of Christopher Murphy) appealed a superior court decision that vacated a jury verdict in her favor and entered judgment as a matter of law for defendant Sentry Insurance. The decedent died after a forklift he was operating for his employer, Pete's RV Center, tipped over. At the time of the accident, the decedent was operating a forklift equipped with an unapproved towing attachment, and using the forklift to tow a fifth-wheel camper. In its capacity as Pete's general liability insurer, Sentry had performed a safety survey at Pete's in April 2002. Plaintiff sued Sentry, alleging in relevant part that Sentry was negligent in performing the safety survey because it failed to identify and warn of the dangers of using forklifts with unapproved towing attachments. Plaintiff contended on appeal that there was sufficient evidence to establish Sentry's liability for her husband's workplace death under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A based on a negligent inspection theory. Plaintiff also argued that the court erred in awarding costs to Sentry. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that, assuming the risk of physical harm associated with the use of unapproved forklift attachments was present at the time of Sentry's inspection, nothing Sentry did increased the risk of physical harm to decedent from such attachments. The Court therefore agreed with the trial court that Sentry's liability could not be premised on section 324A(a). The Court found plaintiff's arguments with regard to whether the jury reasonably could conclude that through its inspection, Sentry assumed a portion of Pete's duty to provide a safe workplace to its employees, as unpersuasive. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Murphy v. Sentry Insurance" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Nicholas Bonnano appealed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment against him and in favor of his employer, Verizon, and Verizon’s third-party claims administrator, Sedgwick Claims Management. Plaintiff’s claims stemmed from an alleged breach of a settlement agreement with employer regarding his workers’ compensation claim. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred because there was a dispute of material fact as to the voluntariness of employer’s temporary total disability (TTD) payments made to plaintiff after the TTD termination date indicated in the settlement. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court in all respects. View "Bonanno v. Verizon Business Network Systems" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Thomas and Marie Baptie, administrators of the estate of their son, John Baptie, appealed a superior court's decision granting defendant and former police officer Aron McNeil, summary judgment dismissing their negligence case against him. Specifically, plaintiffs argued the officer was liable for the death of their son as the result of the negligent investigation of their complaint against defendant Jonathon Bruno, the man who murdered their son four days after they made a complaint. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court's conclusions that defendant was entitled to qualified official immunity from plaintiffs' lawsuit and that, they could not prove all of the elements of their negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims. View "Baptie v. Bruno" on Justia Law