Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose following a fire that destroyed a commercial building in Rutland in 2010. Plaintiff Johnathan Lasek leased the northern half of the building and used the space as a workshop for his house-staining business. He stored staining products and other equipment and constructed a business office in the northeastern corner of the building. The southwestern corner of the building contained a fully enclosed room that was occupied by another commercial tenant, Vermont Vapor Inc. (VVI). The remainder of the building was used by landlord Downing Properties, LLC, as storage for ATVs, motorcycles, and snowmobiles. VVI used its space as a laboratory for mixing the liquid filler for electronic cigarettes. VVI owner Adam Tredwell and his father Warren altered the room to Adam's specificationsm, adding sheetrock and other materials to create a “clean room.” He also installed an eight-inch fan on the south wall of the laboratory that vented to the outside of the building. An industrial space heater was suspended from the rafters of the warehouse, above the ceiling of the laboratory. The Tredwells connected the heater to a propane tank so that they could heat the space in the winter months. Warren was the last person in the laboratory the night before the fire. When firefighters arrived shortly after the fire was reported, the northwest corner of the building (plaintiff's corner) had a large hole in the roof and was heavily engulfed in flames. VVI's corner was not on fire at that time. Plaintiff sued VVI for negligence and strict liability, alleging that VVI had caused the fire by mishandling liquid nicotine. He also sued landlord for breach of the implied warranty of suitability for commercial use, negligence, breach of the duty to warn, and unjust enrichment. After plaintiff's presentation of his case, the trial court granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law. This appeal followed. Plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred: (1) in excluding the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness on causation; (2) in granting defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law; (3) in excluding an eyewitness's statements to police; (4) by denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial; (5) by awarding all deposition costs to defendants; and (6) in refusing to disqualify counsel for defendant-landlord. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision in all respects, with the exception of the award of deposition costs. View "Lasek v. Vermont Vapor, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sandra J. Murphy (as personal representative and administrator of the Estate of Christopher Murphy) appealed a superior court decision that vacated a jury verdict in her favor and entered judgment as a matter of law for defendant Sentry Insurance. The decedent died after a forklift he was operating for his employer, Pete's RV Center, tipped over. At the time of the accident, the decedent was operating a forklift equipped with an unapproved towing attachment, and using the forklift to tow a fifth-wheel camper. In its capacity as Pete's general liability insurer, Sentry had performed a safety survey at Pete's in April 2002. Plaintiff sued Sentry, alleging in relevant part that Sentry was negligent in performing the safety survey because it failed to identify and warn of the dangers of using forklifts with unapproved towing attachments. Plaintiff contended on appeal that there was sufficient evidence to establish Sentry's liability for her husband's workplace death under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A based on a negligent inspection theory. Plaintiff also argued that the court erred in awarding costs to Sentry. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that, assuming the risk of physical harm associated with the use of unapproved forklift attachments was present at the time of Sentry's inspection, nothing Sentry did increased the risk of physical harm to decedent from such attachments. The Court therefore agreed with the trial court that Sentry's liability could not be premised on section 324A(a). The Court found plaintiff's arguments with regard to whether the jury reasonably could conclude that through its inspection, Sentry assumed a portion of Pete's duty to provide a safe workplace to its employees, as unpersuasive. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Murphy v. Sentry Insurance" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Nicholas Bonnano appealed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment against him and in favor of his employer, Verizon, and Verizon’s third-party claims administrator, Sedgwick Claims Management. Plaintiff’s claims stemmed from an alleged breach of a settlement agreement with employer regarding his workers’ compensation claim. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred because there was a dispute of material fact as to the voluntariness of employer’s temporary total disability (TTD) payments made to plaintiff after the TTD termination date indicated in the settlement. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court in all respects. View "Bonanno v. Verizon Business Network Systems" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Thomas and Marie Baptie, administrators of the estate of their son, John Baptie, appealed a superior court's decision granting defendant and former police officer Aron McNeil, summary judgment dismissing their negligence case against him. Specifically, plaintiffs argued the officer was liable for the death of their son as the result of the negligent investigation of their complaint against defendant Jonathon Bruno, the man who murdered their son four days after they made a complaint. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court's conclusions that defendant was entitled to qualified official immunity from plaintiffs' lawsuit and that, they could not prove all of the elements of their negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims. View "Baptie v. Bruno" on Justia Law

Defendant Douglas Tuthill, Administrator of the Estate of Paul Oakes, appealed a jury's award of $150,000 in punitive damages to plaintiff Doreen Carpentier and the trial court's denial of his motion for remittitur. Defendant also challenged the trial court's denial of his post-judgment motion to vacate a writ of attachment. Paul Oakes was charged with numerous crimes based on acts alleged to have occurred at plaintiff's home. Oakes killed himself shortly before his arraignment on these charges. Following Oakes's death, plaintiff sued his estate, raising claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She sought compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff also requested a writ of attachment against certain real property owned by Oakes. Finding none of defendant's arguments persuasive, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Carpentier v. Tuthill" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the omnibus clause in a automobile insurance policy provided coverage to a permittee to whom the insured owner loans the car when that first permittee was subject to a negligent entrustment claim for loaning the car to a second permittee. A vehicle owner gave her car keys to defendant, who in turned passed them to another driver. The driver was involved in a fatal, single-car accident and the driver's estate sued defendant for negligent entrustment. Defendant sought coverage under the vehicle owner's automobile insurance policy. Defendant appealed the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the insurer and finding that, as a matter of law, defendant did not qualify for coverage under the policy. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant’s entrustment of the vehicle to the driver constituted "use" under the omnibus clause of the policy and that the undisputed evidence supported the conclusion that the insured did not consent to defendant's allowing the driver to drive the car, but that a material issue of fact existed with respect to whether defendant entrusted the car keys to driver reasonably believing that driver would not drive the car. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Co. v. Colby" on Justia Law

Defendants, Nancy and Thomas Bernheim, appealed the trial court’s summary judgment decision granting plaintiff GEICO Insurance Company’s claim against them for reimbursement of $10,000 that GEICO had paid defendants under the medical-payments provision of their automobile insurance policy. Although the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that defendants should have reimbursed GEICO, it reversed and remanded for a determination of the proper reimbursement amount. View "GEICO Insurance Co. v. Bernheim" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a high school female athlete, became a patient of defendant who was an orthopedic surgeon and a professor at the University of Vermont medical school, in September 2000, a few months after her sixteenth birthday. Plaintiff had suffered a hip injury while training for soccer season, and her pediatrician referred her to defendant, whose office notes indicated that she had groin pain near the pubic area. After several visits, defendant told plaintiff that her parents did not need to accompany her to appointments, which sometimes took place on a weekly basis, sometimes after hours. On at least three occasions during the course of his treatment of plaintiff, including one time before her first surgery and another time before her second surgery, defendant inserted his ungloved fingers into plaintiff's vagina. No one other than defendant and plaintiff was present on these occasions. Defendant insisted these penetrations were legitimate medical internal examinations conducted for diagnostic purposes. Plaintiff sued defendant for sexual assault and battery and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. She appealed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to defendant based on a six-year statute of limitations applicable to childhood sexual abuse. The court determined that the limitations period had run as a matter of law before plaintiff filed her lawsuit relied primarily on her statements to police and her deposition testimony concerning her awareness of defendant's wrongful conduct at the time of the alleged assaults. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the court erred by determining the limitations accrual date as a matter of law rather than allowing the jury to weigh inferences from the factual record regarding plaintiff's state of mind and knowledge during the relevant period of time. View "Clarke v. Abate" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a final relief-from-abuse order in which the family division of the superior court concluded that plaintiff was a vulnerable adult and that defendant abused and exploited her. The Supreme Court found there was ample evidence in the record for the trial court to have found that defendant engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with plaintiff, who was a vulnerable adult. View "Smith v. Wright" on Justia Law

Claimant Deborah Lydy was a traveling licensed practical nurse employed by defendant Trustaff, Inc. While on duty, a patient attacked her causing her to suffer (among other things) an acute cervical sprain. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether employer-health insurance premiums should have been included when calculating claimant's average weekly wages under the state workers' compensation laws. The Department of Labor concluded that such premiums were not "wages" and should not have been included. Concluding that the Vermont Legislature did not intend for wages to include payments made on behalf of employees for the purpose of acquiring health insurance. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commissioner's judgment. View "Lydy v. Trustaff, Inc." on Justia Law