Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a high school female athlete, became a patient of defendant who was an orthopedic surgeon and a professor at the University of Vermont medical school, in September 2000, a few months after her sixteenth birthday. Plaintiff had suffered a hip injury while training for soccer season, and her pediatrician referred her to defendant, whose office notes indicated that she had groin pain near the pubic area. After several visits, defendant told plaintiff that her parents did not need to accompany her to appointments, which sometimes took place on a weekly basis, sometimes after hours. On at least three occasions during the course of his treatment of plaintiff, including one time before her first surgery and another time before her second surgery, defendant inserted his ungloved fingers into plaintiff's vagina. No one other than defendant and plaintiff was present on these occasions. Defendant insisted these penetrations were legitimate medical internal examinations conducted for diagnostic purposes. Plaintiff sued defendant for sexual assault and battery and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. She appealed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to defendant based on a six-year statute of limitations applicable to childhood sexual abuse. The court determined that the limitations period had run as a matter of law before plaintiff filed her lawsuit relied primarily on her statements to police and her deposition testimony concerning her awareness of defendant's wrongful conduct at the time of the alleged assaults. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the court erred by determining the limitations accrual date as a matter of law rather than allowing the jury to weigh inferences from the factual record regarding plaintiff's state of mind and knowledge during the relevant period of time. View "Clarke v. Abate" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a final relief-from-abuse order in which the family division of the superior court concluded that plaintiff was a vulnerable adult and that defendant abused and exploited her. The Supreme Court found there was ample evidence in the record for the trial court to have found that defendant engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with plaintiff, who was a vulnerable adult. View "Smith v. Wright" on Justia Law

Claimant Deborah Lydy was a traveling licensed practical nurse employed by defendant Trustaff, Inc. While on duty, a patient attacked her causing her to suffer (among other things) an acute cervical sprain. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether employer-health insurance premiums should have been included when calculating claimant's average weekly wages under the state workers' compensation laws. The Department of Labor concluded that such premiums were not "wages" and should not have been included. Concluding that the Vermont Legislature did not intend for wages to include payments made on behalf of employees for the purpose of acquiring health insurance. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commissioner's judgment. View "Lydy v. Trustaff, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, Claimant Robert Brown tore the rotator cuff in his right shoulder while at work. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the workers' compensation laws precluded a certain impairment rating and associated award of permanent partial disability benefits for Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) when the claimant was not diagnosed with CRPS, but an expert confirmed he had it. The Commissioner of the Department of Labor and the trial court both concluded that the applicable law denied the Commissioner discretion to assign the impairment rating and award benefits associated with CRPS when the diagnosis did not meet the diagnostic standards. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the Commissioner erred in his conclusion, and reversed and remanded for reconsideration. View "Brown v. W.T. Martin Plumbing & Heating, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a jury award of emotional distress and economic damages in a legal malpractice action. Defendant challenged the damages award on the grounds that emotional distress damages were not available in a legal malpractice case and that the award of economic damages equal to the amount plaintiff paid to settle the underlying case was improper because plaintiff failed to establish that the underlying settlement was reasonable. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed as to the award of emotional distress damages and affirmed as to the economic damages award. View "Vincent v. DeVries" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kelley O'Brien sued defendants Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) and FAHC nurse Catherine Synnott for drawing his blood at the request of law enforcement officers and without his consent, and for injuries he suffered when allegedly assaulted by police officers after defendants negligently allowed those officers unrestricted access to him in the hospital while he was recovering from surgery. The trial court granted defendants summary judgment, concluding that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the police officers would harm plaintiff if allowed unsupervised access, and that nurse had plaintiff's apparent consent to draw the blood. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court agreed with the trial court that plaintiff has not identified any evidence that defendants should have anticipated that the police officers would attack plaintiff if left unsupervised. As the trial court noted, plaintiff was in police custody at the time, so some police presence around him was to be expected. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that defendants could not be held liable for negligence on account of nurse's alleged conduct in leaving plaintiff alone with law enforcement officers even viewing the evidence most favorably to plaintiff. Given that the Legislature has not indicated an intent to limit the liability of medical personnel who draw blood at the request of law enforcement, the Court concluded that, at least in a situation as alleged by plaintiff here in which a patient is conscious and the authority to draw blood depends upon actual, as opposed to statutorily implied, consent the police officers’ request did not protect defendants from liability for drawing the blood without plaintiff’s consent. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court in part (as to granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's negligence claim), and reversed in part (as to granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's battery claim). View "O'Brien v. Synnott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a jury verdict finding that defendant’s conceded breach of a duty of care, and the resulting low-impact, rear-end auto accident, was not the proximate cause of any injuries and harm to plaintiff. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s instruction concerning proximate cause improperly and prejudicially directed the jury to consider the foreseeability of plaintiff’s injuries, even though “duty” and “breach” had been established as a matter of law. On that ground, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court. The Court considered several other issues raised by plaintiff that were likely to arise on remand and concluded that none would require reversal. View "Fagnant v. Foss" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff appealed the trial court's entry of judgment in defendants' favor following the court's discovery sanction, which precluded plaintiff from offering expert testimony or evidence regarding defendants' negligence due to plaintiff's repeated failure to adequately reply to interrogatories. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the discovery response was sufficient and the court abused its discretion in concluding that more detailed factual information was required. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the sanctions were within the trial court's power and were not "untenable" or "unreasonable," and that the sanctions precluded plaintiff from offering certain evidence "but was not a dismissal." As such, no special findings were required. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Stella v. Spaulding" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a workers' compensation insurer was entitled to reimbursement of death benefits it paid when a claimant's beneficiary also received proceeds from a life-insurance policy. Upon review, the Court held that under 21 V.S.A. 624(e) a workers' compensation carrier cannot seek reimbursement from life-insurance payments because such proceeds are not "damages," as contemplated by the statute and paid because of a third party's tortious actions. The Court therefore affirmed the Commissioner of Labor's grant of summary judgment to the estate of the claimant. View "Estate of Dunn v. Windham Northeast Supervisory Union" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Shaddy appealed a trial court's dismissal of his complaint against the Brattleboro Retreat and some of its employees. Plaintiff, a former Retreat employee, brought claims of defamation, obstruction of justice, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and intentional interference with a contract, arising from the Retreat’s allegation that he unlawfully diverted regulated drugs from the medication room at its facility. The court dismissed the entire complaint on the ground that, having been resolved in proceeding before the Department of Labor and in plaintiff’s criminal case, the issue of whether plaintiff diverted the drugs was res judicata. The court also stated alternative grounds for dismissing all of the claims against the individual defendants, as well as the IIED, obstruction-of-justice, and intentional-interference-with-a-contract claims against both the individual defendants and the Retreat. Plaintiff argued that the court erred in dismissing his claims on the basis of res judicata and by failing to properly consider his complaint in light of his pro se status. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court’s dismissal of the defamation claim against the Retreat, but otherwise affirmed its decision. View "Shaddy v. Brattleboro Retreat et al." on Justia Law