Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether the omnibus clause in a automobile insurance policy provided coverage to a permittee to whom the insured owner loans the car when that first permittee was subject to a negligent entrustment claim for loaning the car to a second permittee. A vehicle owner gave her car keys to defendant, who in turned passed them to another driver. The driver was involved in a fatal, single-car accident and the driver's estate sued defendant for negligent entrustment. Defendant sought coverage under the vehicle owner's automobile insurance policy. Defendant appealed the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the insurer and finding that, as a matter of law, defendant did not qualify for coverage under the policy. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant’s entrustment of the vehicle to the driver constituted "use" under the omnibus clause of the policy and that the undisputed evidence supported the conclusion that the insured did not consent to defendant's allowing the driver to drive the car, but that a material issue of fact existed with respect to whether defendant entrusted the car keys to driver reasonably believing that driver would not drive the car. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Co. v. Colby" on Justia Law

Defendants, Nancy and Thomas Bernheim, appealed the trial court’s summary judgment decision granting plaintiff GEICO Insurance Company’s claim against them for reimbursement of $10,000 that GEICO had paid defendants under the medical-payments provision of their automobile insurance policy. Although the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that defendants should have reimbursed GEICO, it reversed and remanded for a determination of the proper reimbursement amount. View "GEICO Insurance Co. v. Bernheim" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a high school female athlete, became a patient of defendant who was an orthopedic surgeon and a professor at the University of Vermont medical school, in September 2000, a few months after her sixteenth birthday. Plaintiff had suffered a hip injury while training for soccer season, and her pediatrician referred her to defendant, whose office notes indicated that she had groin pain near the pubic area. After several visits, defendant told plaintiff that her parents did not need to accompany her to appointments, which sometimes took place on a weekly basis, sometimes after hours. On at least three occasions during the course of his treatment of plaintiff, including one time before her first surgery and another time before her second surgery, defendant inserted his ungloved fingers into plaintiff's vagina. No one other than defendant and plaintiff was present on these occasions. Defendant insisted these penetrations were legitimate medical internal examinations conducted for diagnostic purposes. Plaintiff sued defendant for sexual assault and battery and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. She appealed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to defendant based on a six-year statute of limitations applicable to childhood sexual abuse. The court determined that the limitations period had run as a matter of law before plaintiff filed her lawsuit relied primarily on her statements to police and her deposition testimony concerning her awareness of defendant's wrongful conduct at the time of the alleged assaults. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the court erred by determining the limitations accrual date as a matter of law rather than allowing the jury to weigh inferences from the factual record regarding plaintiff's state of mind and knowledge during the relevant period of time. View "Clarke v. Abate" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a final relief-from-abuse order in which the family division of the superior court concluded that plaintiff was a vulnerable adult and that defendant abused and exploited her. The Supreme Court found there was ample evidence in the record for the trial court to have found that defendant engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with plaintiff, who was a vulnerable adult. View "Smith v. Wright" on Justia Law

Claimant Deborah Lydy was a traveling licensed practical nurse employed by defendant Trustaff, Inc. While on duty, a patient attacked her causing her to suffer (among other things) an acute cervical sprain. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether employer-health insurance premiums should have been included when calculating claimant's average weekly wages under the state workers' compensation laws. The Department of Labor concluded that such premiums were not "wages" and should not have been included. Concluding that the Vermont Legislature did not intend for wages to include payments made on behalf of employees for the purpose of acquiring health insurance. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commissioner's judgment. View "Lydy v. Trustaff, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, Claimant Robert Brown tore the rotator cuff in his right shoulder while at work. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the workers' compensation laws precluded a certain impairment rating and associated award of permanent partial disability benefits for Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) when the claimant was not diagnosed with CRPS, but an expert confirmed he had it. The Commissioner of the Department of Labor and the trial court both concluded that the applicable law denied the Commissioner discretion to assign the impairment rating and award benefits associated with CRPS when the diagnosis did not meet the diagnostic standards. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the Commissioner erred in his conclusion, and reversed and remanded for reconsideration. View "Brown v. W.T. Martin Plumbing & Heating, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a jury award of emotional distress and economic damages in a legal malpractice action. Defendant challenged the damages award on the grounds that emotional distress damages were not available in a legal malpractice case and that the award of economic damages equal to the amount plaintiff paid to settle the underlying case was improper because plaintiff failed to establish that the underlying settlement was reasonable. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed as to the award of emotional distress damages and affirmed as to the economic damages award. View "Vincent v. DeVries" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kelley O'Brien sued defendants Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) and FAHC nurse Catherine Synnott for drawing his blood at the request of law enforcement officers and without his consent, and for injuries he suffered when allegedly assaulted by police officers after defendants negligently allowed those officers unrestricted access to him in the hospital while he was recovering from surgery. The trial court granted defendants summary judgment, concluding that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the police officers would harm plaintiff if allowed unsupervised access, and that nurse had plaintiff's apparent consent to draw the blood. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court agreed with the trial court that plaintiff has not identified any evidence that defendants should have anticipated that the police officers would attack plaintiff if left unsupervised. As the trial court noted, plaintiff was in police custody at the time, so some police presence around him was to be expected. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that defendants could not be held liable for negligence on account of nurse's alleged conduct in leaving plaintiff alone with law enforcement officers even viewing the evidence most favorably to plaintiff. Given that the Legislature has not indicated an intent to limit the liability of medical personnel who draw blood at the request of law enforcement, the Court concluded that, at least in a situation as alleged by plaintiff here in which a patient is conscious and the authority to draw blood depends upon actual, as opposed to statutorily implied, consent the police officers’ request did not protect defendants from liability for drawing the blood without plaintiff’s consent. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court in part (as to granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's negligence claim), and reversed in part (as to granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's battery claim). View "O'Brien v. Synnott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a jury verdict finding that defendant’s conceded breach of a duty of care, and the resulting low-impact, rear-end auto accident, was not the proximate cause of any injuries and harm to plaintiff. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s instruction concerning proximate cause improperly and prejudicially directed the jury to consider the foreseeability of plaintiff’s injuries, even though “duty” and “breach” had been established as a matter of law. On that ground, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court. The Court considered several other issues raised by plaintiff that were likely to arise on remand and concluded that none would require reversal. View "Fagnant v. Foss" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff appealed the trial court's entry of judgment in defendants' favor following the court's discovery sanction, which precluded plaintiff from offering expert testimony or evidence regarding defendants' negligence due to plaintiff's repeated failure to adequately reply to interrogatories. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the discovery response was sufficient and the court abused its discretion in concluding that more detailed factual information was required. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the sanctions were within the trial court's power and were not "untenable" or "unreasonable," and that the sanctions precluded plaintiff from offering certain evidence "but was not a dismissal." As such, no special findings were required. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Stella v. Spaulding" on Justia Law