Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

On May 21, 2008, Lisa Laws and Carmen Tinker (Plaintiffs) each filed a complaint against Calvin McIlroy, Jr. (McIlroy) and Calvin McIlroy, Sr. for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on June 8, 2007. GEICO and State Farm, the potential uninsured/underinsured motorist carriers were served with a copy of Laws' complaint, and State Farm was served with a copy of Tinker's complaint. Plaintiffs then filed orders of nonsuit. Plaintiffs filed second, identical lawsuits in the circuit court on January 19, 2010 before the nonsuit orders were entered by the court on February 4, 2010. McIlroy filed motions to dismiss the complaints, arguing that both cases were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Additionally, GEICO filed a plea in bar and State Farm filed a motion to dismiss, raising the same arguments made by McIlroy in his motions. The circuit court dismissed the actions with prejudice, concluding that Plaintiffs' complaints were not timely filed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it granted the motions to dismiss and the plea in bar, as the court erroneously interpreted the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries.

This case arose out of a dispute between two attorneys, John Cattano and Carolina Bragg, the only shareholders of Cattano Law Firm. Bragg filed an amended complaint including claims for a writ of mandamus for the copying and inspection of corporate records, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, breach of contract, and judicial dissolution. A jury returned a verdict finding (1) Bragg owned 27.35 percent of the firm; (2) in Bragg's favor on her claim of derivative conversion, awarding the firm damages; and (3) in favor of Bragg on the breach of contract and judicial dissolution claims, awarding Bragg damages individually. The circuit court then awarded what it determined to be reasonable fees to Bragg. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that there was no error in the judgment of the circuit court.

These companion appeals arose out of a personal-injury suit brought by a former high school student who was injured in a fight with another student on school grounds. On the morning of the fight, an assistant principal received a report that the fight would occur sometime that day, but he did not act on the report before the fight. The injured student sued two students and the assistant principal, asserting claims for simple and gross negligence, assault, and battery. The circuit court entered judgment against all three defendants, awarding the injured student a total of $5 million in damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court erred by (1) holding that the assistant principal was not entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity from Plaintiff's simple negligence claim under the common law; and (2) refusing Plaintiff's proffered jury instruction on gross negligence. Remanded for a new trial limited to Plaintiff's gross negligence claim against the assistant principal.

Mary Arnold, who was injured in an automobile collision, brought a negligence action against the other driver, Jonathan Wallace, who was uninsured. Travelers Insurance Company, Arnold's carrier, defended the suit pursuant to its uninsured motorist coverage. The jury awarded a verdict for Arnold in the amount of $9,134. Arnold appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in admitting medical records under the business records exception, as there was established a sufficient foundation for the admission of the evidence; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in finding an expert physician qualified to testify when her partner previously had been retained by the opposing counsel.

A putative class action was filed in the U.S. District Court. The representative plaintiffs in the class action asserted claims of strict liability, negligence and medical monitoring against Merck & Co., Inc. Class certification was eventually denied, and the class action was dismissed. Prior to the dismissal of the putative class action, four Virginia residents filed individual state law actions against Merck in the southern district of New York, asserting federal diversity jurisdiction. The district court granted Merck's motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs' actions were untimely under Virginia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, and the pendency of the putative class action did not toll Virginia's limitations period for the four plaintiffs' state law claims. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals, and the Virginia Supreme Court accepted certification to determine questions of state law. The Court held that Virginia law recognizes neither equitable nor statutory tolling of a Virginia statute of limitations for unnamed putative class members due to the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction.

Namina Barber was a passenger in an automobile that was hit by a vehicle driven by Billy Wakole. As a result of her injuries Barber brought an action against Wakole, who admitted liability for the accident but disputed the extent of Barber's damages. The jury returned a verdict for $30,000 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in allowing counsel for Barber to argue in his closing that each item of damage was separate and had a fixed numerical value and permitting him to enumerate each item of damages to the jury, as the argument made by Barber for specific amounts for various types of damages did not invade the province of the jury nor did it violate Va. Code Ann. 8.01-379.1.

Rappahannock Goodwill Industries (RGI) enterd into an agreement with Specialty Hospitals of Washington. When Specialty Hospitals failed to perform under the agreement, RGI filed a complaint against Specialty Hospitals, asserting claims for breach of contract, conversion, and quantum meruit. No responsive pleadings were filed on behalf of Specialty Hospitals, and the circuit court entered default judgment in favor of RGI. Specialty Hospitals then filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, alleging that service of process was defective, that RGI's claims were against a different entity, and that RGI had erroneously sued Specialty Hospitals. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) failing to find actual notice to Specialty Hospitals, and (2) failing to consider all the factors set forth in Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3:19(d)(1).

Robert Hardick, a Navy sailor, filed suit under general maritime law against John Crane, Inc. (JCI) seeking compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that he was exposed to asbestos contained in products manufactured by JCI and that he contracted mesothelioma as a result. Robert died prior to trial, and his action was revived as a wrongful death action by his wife, Margaret. The jury returned a verdict for Margaret, and the trial court required JCI to pay a sum of $2,988,741 to Margaret. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court erred by permitting the jury to award Margaret nonpecuniary damages for the wrongful death of Robert, as Robert was a seaman and thus precluded from recovering nonpecuniary damages. Remanded.

Maritess Lopez died from aspiration pneumonia secondary to a surgery performed by Dr. Matthew Galumbeck. Plaintiff, Lopez's husband, brought a wrongful-death action against Galumbeck, another doctor, and Plastic Surgery of Tidewater. The trial entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Galumbeck appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying Galumbeck's motion for a mistrial due to a juror's alleged misconduct; and (2) admitting unpaid medical bills into evidence. The Court additionally held that Galumbeck's assertions that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from introducing a surgical log into evidence or from using it to refresh a nurse's recollection and in allowing testimony and evidence on a collateral matter were not preserved for appeal.

During the course of his employment as a police officer for the Town of Abingdon, Kevin Christy suffered injuries from an automobile accident. Christy was insured under an automobile liability insurance policy issued by Mercury Casualty Company (Mercury). Christy submitted a claim to Mercury for payment of the portion of his medical expenses not paid by the Town's workers' compensation carrier. Mercury denied the claim, asserting that an exclusion in the policy barred Christy from receiving any payment for medical expenses because a portion of those expenses had been paid by workers' compensation benefits. Christy filed a warrant in debt against Mercury seeking contract damages. The district court entered judgment in favor of Christy. The circuit court reversed, concluding that, based on the unambiguous language of the exclusion, payment of workers' compensation triggered the exclusion and precluded payment by Mercury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of the exclusion was clear and that the exclusion permitted Mercury to deny coverage for any expenses that would have been subject to workers' compensation coverage without regard to whether all of those expenses were actually paid by the workers' compensation carrier.