Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

M.R., a high school student and basketball player, was sexually abused by Cody Butler, a women's basketball coach at Yakima Valley Community College (YVCC), starting when she was 17 years old. The abuse continued into her adulthood, including inappropriate touching, sexual comments, and physical advances. Butler's actions had a significant negative impact on M.R.'s life, leading to substance abuse, abusive relationships, and other personal issues. In 2018, M.R. connected her experiences of abuse to her injuries while in therapy.In 2019, M.R. sued the State of Washington, YVCC, and Butler for various claims, including negligence and assault. The trial court denied the State's motion for summary judgment, which argued that M.R.'s claims were time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.080(2). The court found that the abuse was a continuous series of events that could not be segregated. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that RCW 4.16.340 only applies to claims based on acts of childhood sexual abuse occurring before the plaintiff turns 18 years old.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The court held that RCW 4.16.340 does not preclude complainants from bringing claims of sexual abuse that originate from childhood sexual abuse and extend into the victim’s adulthood. The court found that the statute's plain language and legislative intent support the inclusion of claims for continuing sexual abuse that are based on intentional acts of childhood sexual abuse. The court also noted that the statute accounts for the continuing tort doctrine, allowing for claims involving a common scheme of abuse by the same perpetrator. View "M.R. v. State" on Justia Law

Former Spokane police officer Jeffery Thurman was the subject of a June 13, 2019 article in the Spokesman-Review, owned by Cowles Co., which alleged he was fired for racial slurs, sexual harassment, and talk of killing black people. On June 14, 2021, Thurman filed a defamation lawsuit against Cowles Co. Shortly after, on July 25, 2021, the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA) took effect. Thurman amended his complaint on December 3, 2021, adding new factual allegations and a claim under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA).The trial court partially granted Cowles' special motion for expedited relief under the UPEPA, dismissing Thurman’s CPA claim but denying the motion to dismiss the defamation claim, reasoning that the defamation claim was part of the original complaint. Cowles appealed the denial of expedited relief for the defamation claim, and Thurman cross-appealed the dismissal of his CPA claim.The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the UPEPA applied to both Thurman’s defamation and CPA claims. The majority reasoned that the defamation claim was "asserted" on a continuing basis on the UPEPA’s effective date. The dissent argued that the defamation claim was not "asserted" on or after July 25, 2021, and thus the UPEPA did not apply.The Washington Supreme Court held that Thurman’s amended defamation claim relates back to the original complaint filed on June 14, 2021, and is not subject to the UPEPA. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings, deciding the case on statutory grounds and declining to address the constitutional arguments. View "Thurman v. Cowles Co." on Justia Law

Barry Chrisman was seriously injured when a tree fell on his work vehicle while driving through a riparian management zone (RMZ) in a recently logged forest area. The RMZ, a buffer of trees left standing to benefit wildlife and water quality, was part of the Lugnut timber area managed by the Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Chrisman and his employer sued the State of Washington, Sierra Pacific Industries, and Precision Forestry Inc. for negligence, arguing that the defendants were not immune under the Forest Practices Act of 1974, which provides immunity for forestland owners when a tree required to be left standing in an RMZ falls and causes injury.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that they were immune under the statute as forestland owners required to leave the RMZ trees standing. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The appellate court held that Sierra and Precision were not forestland owners because they did not have the right to harvest RMZ trees and that only entities with the authority to determine RMZ parameters are entitled to immunity. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the RMZ was properly drawn.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that the defendants are immune under the Forest Practices Act. The court determined that the statute provides broad immunity to forestland owners, including those in actual control of the land with the right to sell or dispose of timber. The court concluded that Sierra and Precision fit the definition of forestland owners and that the immunity applies regardless of whether the RMZ was properly drawn. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County v. State" on Justia Law

In 2021, Lyra Jean Spencer filed a personal injury lawsuit against Franklin Hills Health-Spokane LLC. To serve the summons, her attorney hired a process server who, after learning that the registered agent was unavailable, served the documents to the company's human resources manager, Sheri Flavel. Franklin Hills filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that service on Flavel was improper as she was not authorized to accept service under RCW 4.28.080(9). The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Spencer had not met her initial burden to show that service was proper.Spencer appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals concluded that Spencer had made a prima facie showing that service to Flavel was proper and the trial court erred in dismissing the case without first holding an evidentiary hearing to determine if Flavel was a “managing agent” or “office assistant” under RCW 4.28.080(9).The Supreme Court of the State of Washington granted Franklin Hills’s petition for review. The court concluded that the service statute is to be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of accomplishing service of process and notice to the defendant. The court held that a person may be a managing agent if they are in charge of a single department of the corporation’s business, even if their discretion is controlled somewhat by a superior, provided that they have substantial managerial responsibilities and authority to act on behalf of the corporation. The court found that Flavel, as the human resources manager, met the definition of a managing agent under the statute. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings, allowing the lawsuit to proceed to discovery and trial. View "Spencer v. Franklin Hills Health-Spokane, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the death of a patient, Cindy Essex, who visited Samaritan Hospital's emergency room due to severe shoulder pain. The doctors, who were not employees of the hospital but independent contractors, failed to diagnose her necrotizing fasciitis, a severe soft-tissue infection, leading to her death within 24 hours. The estate of Cindy Essex sought to hold Samaritan Hospital liable for the doctors' alleged negligence under theories of nondelegable duty, inherent function, and agency law principles of delegation.The trial court denied the estate's motion for partial summary judgment concerning Samaritan’s potential vicarious liability for the doctors' alleged negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that ostensible agency is the sole basis for holding a hospital vicariously liable for the negligence of nonemployee physicians.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that statutes and regulations impose nondelegable duties on hospitals concerning the provision of emergency services. A hospital remains responsible for those nondelegable duties regardless of whether it performs those duties through its own staff or contracts with doctors who are independent contractors. The court also found that the estate provided sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment concerning its corporate negligence claim against Samaritan. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Estate of Essex v. Grant County Public Hospital District No. 1" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington was asked to consider a class action suit brought by patients against MultiCare Health System, Inc., a Washington corporation that operates Good Samaritan Hospital. The suit arose after a nurse employed by MultiCare, Cora Weberg, improperly diverted injectable narcotics for her own use and infected some emergency department patients with hepatitis C. The patients claimed that MultiCare failed to meet the accepted standard of care in supervising and hiring Nurse Weberg. The trial court divided the class into two groups: those who were assigned to Nurse Weberg and those who were not. It then dismissed the claims of the second group. The trial court ruled that legal causation was not satisfied because Nurse Weberg did not directly treat these patients. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.However, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed both courts and held that legal causation is satisfied. The court held that both classes can proceed with their chapter 7.70 RCW claims, which govern civil actions for damages for injury occurring as a result of health care. The court reasoned that the General Treatment Class's injuries arose as a result of health care, allowing their claim under chapter 7.70 RCW to proceed. The court also found that legal causation is satisfied when a hospital’s negligent supervision and hiring potentially exposes patients to a bloodborne pathogen, inducing fear and requiring blood testing. Thus, the court concluded that the General Treatment Class's claims should not have been dismissed. View "M.N. v. MultiCare Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington considered two questions certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding a university's duty of care towards its students. The plaintiff, a student, alleged that the defendant university was negligent in failing to protect her from being raped by a fellow student, who had prior complaints of sexual misconduct, at an off-campus party. The first question asked whether under Washington law a university has a special relationship with its students that gives rise to a duty to use reasonable care to protect them from foreseeable harm caused by other students. The Court answered yes, indicating that such a relationship exists as defined by the common law principles laid out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344. This duty applies when a student is on campus or participating in university-sponsored activities. The second question asked about the scope of this duty. The Court determined that the duty applies within the confines of the university campus or at university-controlled events, and is based on a student's enrollment and presence on campus. The Court did not extend this duty to off-campus situations or situations not under the university's control. Therefore, the Court concluded that the university was not liable for the plaintiff's off-campus assault. View "Barlow v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington was asked to determine whether a landowner could delegate its duty to protect invitees on its premises from known or obvious dangers to an independent contractor. The case arose from the death of Jeffry Eylander, an employee of an independent contractor, Commercial Industrial Roofing Inc. (CIR), who fell through a skylight while cleaning the roof of a warehouse owned by Prologis Targeted U.S. Logistics Fund and Prologis Management LLC (collectively, Prologis). Eylander's daughter, as personal representative of his estate, sued Prologis for wrongful death, alleging that Prologis had breached its duty of reasonable care to protect Eylander from harm.The Court held that Prologis had reasonably delegated its duty of reasonable care to protect invitees from known or obvious dangers to CIR. The Court found that Prologis had fulfilled its duty by selecting a professional and experienced contractor, CIR, and by requiring CIR to follow all applicable laws, be solely responsible for the health and safety of its employees, and create and post a site-specific safety plan before starting work. Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Prologis. View "Eylander v. Prologis Targeted U.S. Logistics Fund" on Justia Law

In the case presented, plaintiff Bette Bennett alleged that she suffered a traumatic brain injury due to medical negligence by the defendant, the United States. However, the cause of her injury was not diagnosed until after the eight-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions under Washington law had expired, making it impossible for her to timely commence her lawsuit. The United States moved to dismiss her complaint as time-barred.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington was asked to decide whether the statute of repose violates certain provisions of the Washington Constitution. The court held that while the legislature has broad authority to set time limits for commencing an action, the eight-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions under RCW 4.16.350(3) violates the privileges and immunities clause of article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. The court reasoned that the statute implicates the fundamental right of state citizenship by limiting the pursuit of common law claims against certain defendants, but it does not satisfy the "reasonable ground" test under the state constitution. Therefore, the court concluded that the statute of repose is unconstitutional under independent state law. The court declined to reach the second certified question regarding whether the statute of repose unconstitutionally restricts a plaintiff's right to access the courts in violation of the Washington Constitution. View "Bennett v. United States" on Justia Law

Carmella DeSean sought a Sexual Assault Protection Order Act (SAPOA) order against Isaiah Sanger after an evening of drinking ended in unwanted sex. At the evidentiary hearing, Sanger argued DeSean consented and had capacity to do so. The trial court found DeSean lacked capacity due to intoxication, declined to consider Sanger’s defense, and granted the SAPO. Sanger appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under the SAPOA and Nelson v. Duvall, 387 P.3d 1158 (2017), the trial court should have considered Sanger’s affirmative defense. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the SAPOA did not permit respondents in nonconsensual sexual penetration cases to raise the affirmative defense that they reasonably believed the victim had capacity to consent. "The plain language of the statute is unambiguous and omits affirmative defenses. The SAPOA functions independently from the criminal code, and we decline to graft a criminal defense into a statute intended to provide sexual assault victims with civil remedies." View "DeSean v. Sanger" on Justia Law