Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on an insured's duty to cooperate with an insurer's claim investigation. Petitioner John Staples' claim was denied for failing to cooperate, namely failing to submit to an examination under oath (EUO). Petitioner sued the insurer for bad faith and related causes of action; the trial court dismissed the case on summary judgment. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that genuine issues of fact still existed and made summary judgment inappropriate in this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Staples v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Larry Stout was severely injured while being apprehended by a subcontractor of CJ Johnson Bail Bonds. He sued the contractor, the subcontractor, and the owners of CJ Johnson under two theories of vicarious liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CJ Johnson, holding that vicarious liability did not apply in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, assuming that vicarious liability applies to the activity but holding that such liability is available only to "innocent[] nonparticipant[s]," not those voluntarily engaging in the dangerous activity with knowledge of the danger. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that fugitive apprehension was an activity that posed a peculiar risk of physical harm, and that defendant could assert a cause of action against CJ Johnson based on the theory of vicarious liability because the narrow exception for employees of independent contractors (in this case, the subcontractor) did not apply. View "Stout v. Warren" on Justia Law

An employee of a church who claimed she was harmed by actions of a church's minister brought numerous claims against the church and the minister. At this point in the proceedings, the case involved her negligent retention, negligent supervision, and Title VII sex discrimination claims against the church. The Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment, ruled that these claims were not barred by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as the trial court had determined. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the negligent retention and supervision claims. "Under the First Amendment, allowing these claims to go forward would violate the First Amendment right of the church to select and supervise its ministers as well as the First Amendment right of a hierarchical religious organization to be free of government involvement in the decisions made by its ecclesiastical tribunals. We remand the Title VII claims for further proceedings." View "Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal concerned a discovery dispute involving birth injuries sustained by Jordan Gallinat at Southwest Washington Medical Center in Vancouver, Washington, in 1996. In June 2009, Douglas Fellows, as litigation guardian for Gallinat, filed a complaint alleging medical negligence and corporate negligence against Dr. Daniel Moynihan, Dr. Kathleen Hutchinson, and the Center. The trial court determined that the Center's credentialing, privileging, and personnel records for the doctors were protected from disclosure under the quality improvement privilege (RCW 70.41.200(3)). This case also implicated the applicability of the peer review privilege codified in RCW 4.24.250. After the Court of Appeals denied discretionary review, the Supreme Court court granted petition for review. Because the Court found that the trial court erred in concluding that no other information or records need be disclosed, it remanded the case for in camera review of the records sought by Fellows. View "Fellows v. Moynihan" on Justia Law

This case centered on whether the recreational use immunity statute, RCW 4.24.200-.210, applied under the circumstances where a landowner, who otherwise operates an admission fee-based camp, allows a group access for no charge. During the group’s stay at the camp, plaintiff was injured when riding a slide on the property. The camp asserted recreational use immunity as a defense to the claim. On summary judgment, the trial court ruled that the camp was not immune from liability under the statute because it normally charged fees for the recreational use. This interlocutory appeal was certified after the trial court found there was likely a substantial ground for difference of opinion. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed and held that recreational use immunity is not available under these circumstances because the property was not open to the general public. View "Cregan v. Fourth Mem'l Church" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Leo Macias worked as a tool keeper in a shipyard and his job required that he maintain respirators that other workers wore to filter out dangerous contaminants. Plaintiff and his wife Patricia brought this suit against the respirator manufacturers, alleging that cleaning and maintaining the respirators exposed Mr. Macias to asbestos, causing him to develop mesothelioma. The plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturers owed a duty to warn Mr. Macias of the danger that he could be exposed to harmful asbestos dust when he cleaned and maintained the respirators. The respirator manufacturers moved for summary judgment on the ground that as a matter of law they owed no duty to warn. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under Washington case law the defendants did not owe a duty to warn because they did not manufacture the asbestos-containing products that were the source of the asbestos to which Mr. Macias was exposed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. In the two precedential cases, the Court held that generally a manufacturer does not have a duty to warn of the dangers inherent in a product that it does not manufacture, sell, or supply. However, "Simonetta" and "Braaten" did not control in this case because the duty at issue was to warn of the danger of asbestos exposure inherent in the use and maintenance of the defendant manufacturers’ own products- - the respirators. View "Macias v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

After a landslide damaged their home, homeowners Timothy Jackowski and Eri Takase (the Jackowskis) sued the sellers of the home, seeking rescission or, in the alternative, damages for fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. The homeowners also sued the sellers' broker and agent, alleging fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of common law fiduciary duties. They leveled similar claims against their own broker and agent together with a claim for breach of statutory fiduciary duties. The trial court entered summary judgment dismissing all of the Jackowskis' claims, except the fraudulent concealment claims against the sellers and the sellers’ broker and agent regarding cracks in the concrete basement floor. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in part and reversed it in part. The sellers and the homeowners’ broker and agent then sought review by the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

This case required the Supreme Court to construe the former RCW 64.12.030, the "timber trespass statute." Plaintiffs Jacon and Laura Jongeward, and Gordon and Jeannie Jongeward asserted a timber trespass claim against defendant BNSF Railway Company when a fire spread from BNSF's property and destroyed the Jongewards' trees. The district court certified the question to the Washington Supreme Court. To answer, the Court outlined the 142 year history of the statute, and concluded after its review of the history, that: (1) a plaintiff cannot recover damages under the timber trespass statute when a defendant commits an indirect act or omission that causes mere collateral injury; but (2) a plaintiff may recover damages when a defendant commits a direct trespass causing immediate injury to a plaintiff's trees, even if the defendant is not physically present on the plaintiff's property.

This case required the Supreme Court to construe the former RCW 64.12.030, the "timber trespass statute." Plaintiff Broughton Lumber Company asserted a timber trespass claim against defendants BNSF Railway Company and Harsco Corporation in the United States District Court, District of Oregon, Portland Division, after a fire spread from BNSF's property and destroyed Broughton's trees. The district court certified the question to the Washington Supreme Court. To answer, the Court outlined the 142 year history of the statute, and concluded after its review of the history, that: (1) a plaintiff cannot recover damages under the timber trespass statute when a defendant commits an indirect act or omission that causes mere collateral injury; but (2) a plaintiff may recover damages when a defendant commits a direct trespass causing immediate injury to a plaintiff's trees, even if the defendant is not physically present on the plaintiff's property.

This case arose from the tragic death of a teenager Ashlie Bunch. Ashlie’s adoptive father, Steven Bunch (Bunch) brought an action under RCW 4.24.010, against the treatment center where Ashlie committed suicide, McGraw Residential Center. Ashley’s adoptive mother, Amy Kozel, sought to join the lawsuit as a necessary party under CR 19(a). The superior court denied Kozel’s motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding that Kozel satisfied statutory standing requirements and CR 19(a), the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.