Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

An employee of a church who claimed she was harmed by actions of a church's minister brought numerous claims against the church and the minister. At this point in the proceedings, the case involved her negligent retention, negligent supervision, and Title VII sex discrimination claims against the church. The Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment, ruled that these claims were not barred by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as the trial court had determined. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the negligent retention and supervision claims. "Under the First Amendment, allowing these claims to go forward would violate the First Amendment right of the church to select and supervise its ministers as well as the First Amendment right of a hierarchical religious organization to be free of government involvement in the decisions made by its ecclesiastical tribunals. We remand the Title VII claims for further proceedings." View "Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal concerned a discovery dispute involving birth injuries sustained by Jordan Gallinat at Southwest Washington Medical Center in Vancouver, Washington, in 1996. In June 2009, Douglas Fellows, as litigation guardian for Gallinat, filed a complaint alleging medical negligence and corporate negligence against Dr. Daniel Moynihan, Dr. Kathleen Hutchinson, and the Center. The trial court determined that the Center's credentialing, privileging, and personnel records for the doctors were protected from disclosure under the quality improvement privilege (RCW 70.41.200(3)). This case also implicated the applicability of the peer review privilege codified in RCW 4.24.250. After the Court of Appeals denied discretionary review, the Supreme Court court granted petition for review. Because the Court found that the trial court erred in concluding that no other information or records need be disclosed, it remanded the case for in camera review of the records sought by Fellows. View "Fellows v. Moynihan" on Justia Law

This case centered on whether the recreational use immunity statute, RCW 4.24.200-.210, applied under the circumstances where a landowner, who otherwise operates an admission fee-based camp, allows a group access for no charge. During the group’s stay at the camp, plaintiff was injured when riding a slide on the property. The camp asserted recreational use immunity as a defense to the claim. On summary judgment, the trial court ruled that the camp was not immune from liability under the statute because it normally charged fees for the recreational use. This interlocutory appeal was certified after the trial court found there was likely a substantial ground for difference of opinion. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed and held that recreational use immunity is not available under these circumstances because the property was not open to the general public. View "Cregan v. Fourth Mem'l Church" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Leo Macias worked as a tool keeper in a shipyard and his job required that he maintain respirators that other workers wore to filter out dangerous contaminants. Plaintiff and his wife Patricia brought this suit against the respirator manufacturers, alleging that cleaning and maintaining the respirators exposed Mr. Macias to asbestos, causing him to develop mesothelioma. The plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturers owed a duty to warn Mr. Macias of the danger that he could be exposed to harmful asbestos dust when he cleaned and maintained the respirators. The respirator manufacturers moved for summary judgment on the ground that as a matter of law they owed no duty to warn. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under Washington case law the defendants did not owe a duty to warn because they did not manufacture the asbestos-containing products that were the source of the asbestos to which Mr. Macias was exposed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. In the two precedential cases, the Court held that generally a manufacturer does not have a duty to warn of the dangers inherent in a product that it does not manufacture, sell, or supply. However, "Simonetta" and "Braaten" did not control in this case because the duty at issue was to warn of the danger of asbestos exposure inherent in the use and maintenance of the defendant manufacturers’ own products- - the respirators. View "Macias v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

After a landslide damaged their home, homeowners Timothy Jackowski and Eri Takase (the Jackowskis) sued the sellers of the home, seeking rescission or, in the alternative, damages for fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. The homeowners also sued the sellers' broker and agent, alleging fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of common law fiduciary duties. They leveled similar claims against their own broker and agent together with a claim for breach of statutory fiduciary duties. The trial court entered summary judgment dismissing all of the Jackowskis' claims, except the fraudulent concealment claims against the sellers and the sellers’ broker and agent regarding cracks in the concrete basement floor. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in part and reversed it in part. The sellers and the homeowners’ broker and agent then sought review by the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

This case required the Supreme Court to construe the former RCW 64.12.030, the "timber trespass statute." Plaintiffs Jacon and Laura Jongeward, and Gordon and Jeannie Jongeward asserted a timber trespass claim against defendant BNSF Railway Company when a fire spread from BNSF's property and destroyed the Jongewards' trees. The district court certified the question to the Washington Supreme Court. To answer, the Court outlined the 142 year history of the statute, and concluded after its review of the history, that: (1) a plaintiff cannot recover damages under the timber trespass statute when a defendant commits an indirect act or omission that causes mere collateral injury; but (2) a plaintiff may recover damages when a defendant commits a direct trespass causing immediate injury to a plaintiff's trees, even if the defendant is not physically present on the plaintiff's property.

This case required the Supreme Court to construe the former RCW 64.12.030, the "timber trespass statute." Plaintiff Broughton Lumber Company asserted a timber trespass claim against defendants BNSF Railway Company and Harsco Corporation in the United States District Court, District of Oregon, Portland Division, after a fire spread from BNSF's property and destroyed Broughton's trees. The district court certified the question to the Washington Supreme Court. To answer, the Court outlined the 142 year history of the statute, and concluded after its review of the history, that: (1) a plaintiff cannot recover damages under the timber trespass statute when a defendant commits an indirect act or omission that causes mere collateral injury; but (2) a plaintiff may recover damages when a defendant commits a direct trespass causing immediate injury to a plaintiff's trees, even if the defendant is not physically present on the plaintiff's property.

This case arose from the tragic death of a teenager Ashlie Bunch. Ashlie’s adoptive father, Steven Bunch (Bunch) brought an action under RCW 4.24.010, against the treatment center where Ashlie committed suicide, McGraw Residential Center. Ashley’s adoptive mother, Amy Kozel, sought to join the lawsuit as a necessary party under CR 19(a). The superior court denied Kozel’s motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding that Kozel satisfied statutory standing requirements and CR 19(a), the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The issue before the Supreme Court involved whether the children of a decedent's predeceased spouse could be considered "stepchildren" under the wrongful death recovery statute. The decedent Audrey Blessing and the children's father were married in 1964. The children's father died in 1994, and Blessing died in 2007. Her estate brought a wrongful death suit, arguing that the children ceased being her step children when their father died. The trial court relied on the close relationship the children and decedent maintained up until her death, and ruled that the children were indeed "stepchildren" and could be beneficiaries in the wrongful death action. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the stepchild/stepparent relationship legally ended before Blessing's death. Finding that the statutory term "stepchildren" was undefined in the statute, the Supreme Court held that which parent died first was irrelevant to whether a stepchild could maintain that status. "Any concerns over the result or regarding which stepchildren should be entitled to recover in a wrongful death suit are more appropriately factored into any damages determination."

Ron Teter was diagnosed with a tumor in his right kidney. Urologist Dr. Andrew Deck, assisted by Dr. David Lauter, performed surgery to remove Teter’s kidney. Immediately after surgery, Teter developed a condition in which increased pressure in one compartment of the body that compromised the tissues in that compartment. Even after a procedure to relieve the pressure, Teter continued to suffer from pain in his left leg that interfered with his ability to stand for long periods of time and with his ability to engage in his usual activities. Teter and his wife (the Teters) sued Drs. Deck and Lauter for negligence. The Teters eventually settled with Dr. Lauter and stipulated to his dismissal as a defendant. The parties encountered difficulties in preparing for trial for their case against Dr. Deck. Neither the Teters nor Dr. Deck complied completely with discovery deadlines and the trial court granted motions to compel by both sides. The case was reassigned to a different judge, who made a record of his strict requirements of conducting the trial in his court. Defense counsel was routinely cautioned about her conduct during trial, and the judge noted his displeasure with both parties' "disregard for protocol and rules of evidence." The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court involved the court's exclusion of a key medical witness as sanction for the parties' conduct during trial. The Court concluded the pretrial motions judge excluded the expert without making the required findings that the violation was willful and prejudicial and could be imposed only after explicitly considering less severe sanctions. When the trial judge was reassigned to this case, he granted a new trial on the ground that the exclusion was a prejudicial error of law, and he was "well within his discretion in granting the new trial." The Supreme Court found that the facts of this case "amply" supported the ruling.