Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was a claim for damages relating to a drilling contract Petitioner Elcon Construction and Respondent Eastern Washington University. Elcon alleged tort and contract claims. The contract claims were resolved by arbitration. In dismissing the tort claims, the trial court applied the independent duty rule formerly known as the "economic loss rule," which the Court of Appeals similarly applied in affirming. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court and Court of Appeals misapplied the independent duty doctrine to bar Elcon's tort claims in this case. The Court found Elcon's claims failed factually. Viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Elcon, no genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to Elcon's fraud in the inducement or tortious interference claims. The Court affirmed on different grounds reached by the trial and appeals courts.

This issue on appeal in this case involved a maritime claim for maintenance and cure and whether, under federal maritime law, a judge, instead of a jury, awards attorney fees following the jury award of compensatory and punitive damages in favor of an injured seaman against the employer for willful failure to pay maintenance and cure. Respondent Dana Clausen worked on board Appellant Icicle Seafoods' Bering Star as second engineer when he sustained injuries. Respondent encountered persistent difficulties in getting Icicle and its adjuster Spartan, to meet its obligation to pay him maintenance and cure during his recovery. Icicle paid Respondent $20 per day to cover lodging, utilities, and meals. Respondent resorted to living in a recreational vehicle with a leaking roof and with no heat, air conditioning, running water, or toilet facilities. Additionally, Icicle delayed or refused to pay for treatment that Respondent's doctors recommended. In a report to Icicle, Spartan confirmed that Respondent's injuries were likely career-ending. Icicle filed suit in federal court against Respondent to terminate Respondent's right to maintenance and cure. Respondent filed the present action and Icicle's suit in federal court was dismissed. Respondent sought damages for Icicle's negligence under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. 30104), unseaworthiness of the Bering Star, and wrongful withholding of maintenance and cure. The jury found Icicle negligent under the Jones Act, and that Icicle was callous or willful and wanton in its failure to pay maintenance and cure. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under federal maritime law, the trial court calculates an attorney fee award related to a maintenance and cure action, and the punitive damages award as determined by the jury here, based on the callous or willful and wanton withholding of maintenance and cure, was proper.

In this appeal the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the parties' indemnity agreement clearly and unequivocally indemnified the Snohomish County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation (doing business as Community Transit) for losses resulting from its own negligence. Upon review, the Court concluded that the language of the agreement, and in particular language providing that indemnity would not be triggered if losses resulted from the sole negligence of Community Transit, clearly and unequivocally evidenced the parties' intent that the indemnitor, FirstGroup America, Inc. (doing business as First Transit) indemnify Community Transit for losses that resulted from Community Transit's own negligence. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to the contrary and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Respondent Bonnie Anthis won a civil suit against Petitioner Walter Copland for the wrongful death of her husband, Harvey Anthis. Respondent sought to collect Petitioner's only known asset, his retirement pension, to satisfy the judgment. Petitioner, a retired police officer, argued that his Law Enforcement Officers' and Firefighters' Retirement System (LEOFF) pension money could not be garnished even after it has been deposited into his personal bank account. The trial court disagreed and ruled that the money in the account could be garnished. Petitioner appealed, and the Court of Appeals certified the question to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: Washington has one statute that exempts a beneficiary's money "whether [it] be in the actual possession of such person or be deposited or loaned." Other exemption statutes exempt only "[t]he right . . . to a . . .retirement allowance." The survey of case law and the plain language in the LEOFF exemption statutes indicate that the latter statutes exempt funds before they are given into the hands of the beneficiary, but not after receipt.

The Supreme Court consolidated "Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company" and "Weismann v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois" for the purpose of clarifying the pro rata sharing rule announced in several precedential cases, including "Mahler v. Szucs" (957 P.2d 632). The rule is based on the "common fund" exception to the "American rule" on attorney fees. The rule requires personal injury protection (PIP) insurers to share pro rata in the attorney fees incurred by injured persons when the PIP insurer wins at trial. Plaintiffs in these cases recovered PIP funds as insureds under policies held by the tortfeasors. They incurred attorney fees arising from the recovery of the liability insurance. The insurance companies attempted to offset the funds expended under PIP policies by reducing plaintiffs' award under the tortfeasors' liability insurance. The Court of Appeals held that neither plaintiff was entitled to recoup a pro rata share of attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the pro rata fee sharing rule applied in this context.

In November 1998, Respondent David Moeller’s 1996 Honda Civic CRX was damaged in a collision. Respondent had an insurance policy through Farmers Insurance Company of Washington (Farmers). Farmers chose to repair Respondent's damaged car, and he authorized the repairs. In May 1999, Respondent brought suit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated Farmers policy holders in Washington State asserting a breach of contract claim on the grounds that Farmers failed to restore his vehicle to its "preloss condition through payment of the difference in the value between the vehicle's pre-loss value and its value after it was damaged, properly repaired and returned." The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the contract between Farmers and Respondent provided for the diminished value of the post-accident, repaired car. Upon review, the Court affirmed the appellate court which held that the policy language at issue here allowed for recovery for the diminution in value.

Linda Mohr suffered a trauma-induced stroke and became permanently disabled. She and her husband, Charles, claimed that negligent treatment by her health care providers caused Mrs. Mohr a loss of the chance of a better outcome. In "Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound," the Supreme Court recognized the "lost chance doctrine" in a survival action when the plaintiff died following the alleged failure of his doctor to timely diagnose his lung cancer. The Mohr's case "compel[led]" consideration of whether, in the medical malpractice context, there was a cause of action for a lost chance, even when the ultimate result is some serious harm short of death. The Supreme Court held that there was such a cause of action and, accordingly, reversed the order of summary judgment.

The trial court in this case ruled that under the Washington courts' application of "Frye v. United States," there must be general acceptance in the relevant scientific community that a particular type of in utero toxic exposure can cause a particular type of birth defect before expert testimony on causation is admissible. Plaintiff Julie Anderson worked for Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., from 1998 until she filed a safety complaint with the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) and was fired. While it was not officially part of her job, Plaintiff regularly mixed paint. Employees were required by official company policy to wear respirators when mixing paint, but there was reason to believe that the policy was not rigorously enforced and may have been actively undermined by management. Plaintiff gave birth to a son in January 2000. By 2003, it was clear the child suffered from "medical abnormalities." He was diagnosed with a neuronal migration defect, congenital hemiplegia, microcephalus, and a multicystic dysplastic kidney, among other things, along with "delays in motor, communication, cognitive, and adaptive behavior." Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's interpretation and subsequent ruling on the issue. The Court held that the Frye test is not implicated if the theory and the methodology relied upon and used by the expert to reach an opinion on causation is generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. The Court affirmed the trial court's rulings on comparative fault and wrongful discharge. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings.

On certification from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, the Supreme Court considered whether the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 (WISHA), and Washingtonâs laws prohibiting driving while under the influence (DUI) are inadequate to promote the public policies underlying them. Plaintiff Matthew Cudney, whose employment was terminated by ALSCO Inc., asserted a claim in federal court for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for reporting that a managerial employee drove a company vehicle during business hours while that employee was intoxicated. The issues presented for certification pertained to (1) whether WISHA adequately promotes the public policy of insuring workplace safety and protecting workers who report safety violations so as to preclude a separate claim by a terminated employee for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; and (2) whether the DUI laws adequately promote the public policy of protecting the public from drunken drivers so as to preclude a separate claim by a terminated employee for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. In response, the Court held that both WISHA and the stateâs DUI laws adequately promote the stated public policies.

Ten special education students and their parents and guardians (Appellants) sued Clover Park School District for intentional torts, outrage, negligence and unlawful discrimination under state law. Clover Park moved for summary judgment to dismiss, arguing that Appellants had not exhausted the administrative remedies available under the state Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The trial court granted Clover Parkâs motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case, holding that IDEAâs administrative exhaustion requirement does not apply to state-law claims nor does Washington State law require exhaustion before filing such claims.