Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Central to this case is the proper interpretation of a 2006 statute of limitations and statute of repose applicable to a claim for medical malpractice. Appellant Lisa Unruh filed suit against her orthodontist, Dr. Dino Cacchiotti, alleging that his negligent treatment when she was a minor resulted in her losing her teeth and having to undergo extensive implant surgery. The Doctor successfully moved for summary judgment, contending that the statute of limitations had expired. At the Court of Appeals, the Doctor raised an alternative ground for dismissing Appellant's case based on an eight-year statute of repose. After requesting supplemental briefing, the Court of Appeals certified the case for the Supreme Court's review. After review of the applicable legal authority, the Court held that neither the statute of limitations nor the statute of repose barred Appellant's claim. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 1994, Respondent Sylvia Smith began to experience pain in her wrists and swelling in her arms. She was prescribed splints to wear while working for Petitioner Crown, Cork & Seal as a "bagger." In 1997, Respondent sustained an injury at work when a forklift ran over and fractured her leg. In 2005, the Department of Labor & Industries (L&I) determined that because of the forklift accident Respondent was permanently and totally disabled. L&I ordered Crown to place Respondent on the pension rolls. L&I also issued an order that denied Crown "second injury fund" coverage. On Crown's appeal, the superior court reversed the L&I orders. The court concluded that Respondent's wrist injuries preexisted the forklift injury and as such did not constitute a "previous bodily disability." L&I appealed to the Court of Appeals, who reversed the superior court's ruling. The question before the Supreme Court was what constituted a "previous bodily disability" for second injury fund coverage. The Court responded by holding that a "previous bodily injury" under state law is one that "effectively impacts an employee's performance in the workplace or materially diminishes the employee's functional ability to perform the routine activities associated with daily living." The Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's holding in favor of Respondent.

Petitioner and Washington resident Delbert Williams was employed by an Idaho employment agency. The agency regularly sent him to work for Pro-Set Erectors, an Idaho construction subcontractor. In 2007, Pro-Set was hired by Respondent Leone & Keeble (L&K), a general contractor. L&K is a Washington company. Later that year, Petitioner was injured on the job. He filed a claim with the Idaho State Insurance Fund, who accepted his claim and issued workers' compensation payments. In late 2008, the payments stopped. Petitioner filed suit against L&K in Washington, but the trial court dismissed his petition citing lack of jurisdiction over Petitioner's Idaho workers' compensation claim. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did have jurisdiction over Petitioner's claim: "our courts below...seem to have given deference to opinions of the Idaho courts" instead of applying Washington law. L&K argued that because Petitioner received benefits from Idaho, he was barred from bringing the same claim in Washington. Petitioner's claim was allowed under the Washington Industrial Insurance Act, which fell under the jurisdiction of Washington courts. The Court reversed the decision of the lower courts and remanded Petitioner's case for further proceedings.

There was a catastrophic failure at the Spokane waste water treatment plant. One man was killed, and two others were severely injured. The survivors, including Respondent Larry Michaels, successfully sued Appellant CH2M Hill, the engineering firm that worked for the city at the time of the accident. The City of Spokane, as employer of Respondents, was immune from liability under the Industrial Insurance Act. All parties agreed that the City was negligent. The issue at trial was whether CH2M Hill was also negligent. On appeal to the Supreme Court, CH2M Hill challenged the trial judge's rulings on its liability as well as twenty-six other findings of fact. Of importance here was whether the City's immunity could be imputed to CH2M Hill under the same insurance act. The Supreme Court dissected all twenty-six points in its review, and concluded that CH2M Hill was not entitled to the same immunity as the City. The Court agreed with all rulings of the trial court. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision in the case.

Petitioner Maureen Blair was a long-haul trucker. In 2003, she slipped and fell on a gasoline spill at a truck stop operated by Respondent TA-Seattle East No. 176 (also known as Travelcenters of America). Petitioner and her husband brought suit against Travelcenters in 2006. From the onset, there were problems with her case. Her trial counsel had problems at the firm, and as a result, missed several key discovery deadlines, particularly one involving disclosure of Petitioner's proposed witness list. Travelcenters moved to strike the witness list. The trial court did not enter any findings, but it struck the witness list, and sanctioned Petitioner's counsel for subsequent untimely disclosures. Three days before trial, Travelcenters moved to dismiss the case because without witnesses, Petitioner could not prove her case. The trial court granted the motion, and Petitioner appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Petitioner challenged the propriety of the trial court's sanctions and for striking the witnesses, claiming that the court was required to make a finding for the record why it did what it did. The appellate court held that the trial court did not have to enumerate its reasons. But the Supreme Court disagreed. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court misread the case law governing this kind of matter, and vacated the sanction orders from the trial court, and reversed the order granting Travelcenter's motion to dismiss.