Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Jamie Fast sought medical care because of difficulty conceiving and menstrual bleeding, which had been heavier and more prolonged than normal. Upon first consulting with Dr. Adam Smith, she noted on her medical history forms that her grandmother had diabetes and her parents had high cholesterol. In late March 2008, Dr. Smith confirmed Jamie was pregnant. Jamie bled for the first few months of pregnancy-visiting the emergency room at least once for bleeding. Jamie phoned Dr. Smith's office multiple times to inquire about her bleeding. Each time, Jamie went to Dr. Smith for an examination or she had an ultrasound at the hospital. After each checkup or ultrasound, Dr. Smith assured Jamie that everything was fine or normal. Neither Dr. Smith nor his nursing staff ever raised concerns about blood sugar, diabetes, high blood pressure, or weight loss during Jamie's pregnancy. At an August 2008 appointment, Dr. Gregory Schroff covered for Dr. Smith. Dr. Schroff discovered Jamie's blood glucose concentration was over six times the upper limit of normal. A second test confirmed the high result was not a fluke. Dr. Schroff admitted Jamie to the hospital for management of diabetes and pregnancy that same day. At the hospital, Dr. Schroff ordered intermittent fetal monitoring. The monitor detected fetal distress several times, indicating decelerations of the fetal heart rate. The nursing staff's response was to turn off the monitor, rather than to substitute a different monitor or to expedite delivery of the unborn child. Dr. Schroff failed to review fetal monitor strips. Nurses were unable to detect a fetal heartbeat; Jamie delivered a stillborn baby. She was diagnosed as an insulin-dependent type 2 diabetic since the stillbirth. The medical negligence statute of limitations (MNSOL) required filing a claim for medical negligence within three years of the allegedly negligent act or omission or within one year of when the negligence was or should have been discovered, whichever is later. The MNSOL may be tolled for one year upon the making of a good-faith request for mediation. The general torts catchall statute of limitations was also three years, but with no associated tolling provision. statute of limitations. Dr. Smith, joined by the other defendants, moved for summary judgment, because the Fasts’ wrongful death claim was barred by the general torts catchall statute of limitations and violation of a tort claim statute. The trial court granted summary judgment on both grounds. The Fasts appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that in cases of wrongful death resulting from negligent health care, the MNSOL (RCW 4.16.350(3)) applied. View "Fast v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist." on Justia Law

Highland High School quarterback Matthew Newman suffered a permanent brain injury at a football game in 2009, one day after he allegedly sustained a head injury at football practice. Three years later, Newman and his parents (collectively Newman) sued Highland School District No. 203 (Highland) for negligence. Before trial, Highland's counsel interviewed several former coaches and appeared on their behalf at their depositions. Newman moved to disqualify Highland's counsel, asserting a conflict of interest. The superior court denied the motion but ruled that Highland's counsel "may not represent non-employee witness[es] in the future." Newman then sought discovery concerning communications between Highland and the former coaches during time periods when the former coaches were unrepresented by Highland's counsel. Highland moved for a protective order, arguing its attorney-client privilege shielded counsel's communications with the former coaches. The trial court denied the motion, and Highland appealed. At issue was whether postemployment communications between former employees and corporate counsel should have been treated the same as communications with current employees for purposes of applying the corporate attorney-client privilege. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Washington Supreme Court held that the privilege does not broadly shield counsel's postemployment communications with former employees. The superior court properly denied Highland's motion for a protective order. View "Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203" on Justia Law

Ray Sandberg served in the United States Navy during World War II. Afterward, he worked for decades in dockyards and lumberyards. Throughout his work life, he had been exposed to asbestos. He contracted lymphoma, pleural disease and asbestosis relating to asbestos exposure. In 1999, he sued nearly 40 defendants who had some part in exposing him to asbestos. Most defendants settled; of the one that did not, Sandberg obtained a $1.5 million judgment. At age 84, Sandberg died. His daughter Judy Deggs, as personal representative of Sandberg's estate, sued additional companies that had not been named in her father's original lawsuit. The record of this case does not explain why the additional companies were not named in the 199 suit. The defendants here moved to dismiss this suit as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. On appeal, Deggs argued that the wrongful death claim she brought was a distinct statutory claim and that her injuries were not the same injuries her father suffered and sued for in 1999: her injuries were due to the loss of her father, which did not occur until he died. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal, finding that "[a] wrongful death 'action accrues at the time of death' so long as there is 'a subsisting cause of action in the deceased' at the time of death subject to exceptions no present here." The Court found insufficient cause to abandon that well-established precedent in this case. View "Deggs v. Asbestos Corp." on Justia Law

After the Department of Labor and Industries (Department) learned it had been overpaying respondent Jose Birrueta's industrial insurance benefits for years, it issued two orders, one assessing an overpayment and another changing Birrueta's status from married to unmarried for compensation purposes. Because Birrueta was overpaid due solely to an innocent misrepresentation about his marital status made on his behalf, the Supreme Court held the Department's orders were timely and authorized. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the ruling of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals upholding the Department's orders. View "Birrueta v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

N.L. met Nicholas Clark at school track practice. She was 14, and he was 18. Both were students in the Bethel School District. Neither N.L. nor any responsible adult on the field knew that Clark was a registered sex offender who had previously sexually assaulted a younger girl who had been about N.L. 'sage at the time. The Pierce County Sheriff's Department had informed Clark's school principal of his sex offender status, but the principal took no action in response. Clark persuaded N.L. to leave campus with him and raped her. N.L. sued the district, alleging negligence. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the School District’s duty to N.L. ended when she left campus and whether its alleged negligence, as a matter of law, was not a proximate cause of her injury. The Court answered both questions “no,” affirming the Court of Appeals’ judgment reversing the trial court’s dismissal of this case on summary judgment. View "N.L. v. Bethel Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Petitioner-plaintiff Jess Nelson sued defendant-respondent Erickson for personal injuries after a car accident. They went to mandatory arbitration, and the arbitrator awarded the plaintiff a total of $44,923. Of that total award, $1,522 was for attorney fees and costs. Defendant decided to seek trial de novo. In an effort to avoid trial, plaintiff offered to settle for "$26,000 plus taxable costs incurred at arbitration." This language from the settlement offer was the center of the legal dispute in this case. Defendant did not respond to the offer, and the parties went to trial. The jury awarded the plaintiff $24,167. Upon plaintiff's motion for additur, the judge added $3,000 for future noneconomic damages. This brought the total award at trial to $27,167. Plaintiff then moved for attorney fees, arguing that defendant had not improved his position at trial. The trial judge agreed and awarded plaintiff $58,908 in attorney fees and $4,488 in costs. Defendant appealed, arguing that the settlement offer was actually for $26,000 plus the known arbitration costs of $1,522. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether defendant improved his position at trial. After review, the Court held that defendant's position prior to trial should have been interpreted as an ordinary person would. Applying that rule, defendant improved his position at trial and was not required to pay the opposing party's attorney fees. View "Nelson v. Erickson" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court: "Does a title company owe a duty of care to third parties in the recording of legal instruments?" This certified question arose out of a civil action for money damages. Plaintiffs Centurion Properties Ill LLC (CP Ill) and SMI Group XIV LLC (collectively Plaintiffs) asserted that defendant Chicago Title Insurance Company negligently breached its duty of care and caused damages when it recorded unauthorized liens on CP Ill's property. The Washington Supreme Court answered the Ninth Circuit's question "no," holding that title companies did not owe a duty of care to third parties in the recording of legal instruments. "Such a duty is contrary to Washington's policy and precedent, and other duty of care considerations." View "Centurion Props. III, LLC v. Chi. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Ho Im Bae died from acute morphine intoxication at Lakeside Adult Family Home. Esther Kim, the personal representative of Bae's estate, brought tort claims against several individuals involved in Bae's care. The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review came from Alpha Nursing & Services Inc. and two of its nurses, who did not provide nursing services to Bae, but who were alleged to have observed signs of abuse and physical assault that should have been reported to the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) and law enforcement. Specifically, the issue was whether the abuse of vulnerable adults act (AVAA) created an implied cause of action against mandated reporters who fail to report abuse. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that one of the nurses did not have a duty to report and the other nurse fulfilled her reporting duty by contacting DSHS. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this issue: "[t]he AVAA creates a private cause of action against mandated reporters who fail to report abuse, and genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment." A separate issue was whether the claims against one of the nurses should have been dismissed for insufficient service. The nurse, Christine Thomas, moved to Norway, and plaintiff personally served her there almost a year after filing and amended complaint and properly serving Alpha. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the nurse's motion to dismiss: "Consistent with Norway's ratification of the Hague Convention, however, the plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence in serving Thomas through Norway's designated central authority." View "Kim v. Lakeside Adult Family Home" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the alleged tortious conduct of an Idaho state trooper against an Idaho citizen during a traffic stop in which pursuit began in Idaho, but ended in Washington. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether, under these facts, a trial court could exercise subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction under the Washington long-arm statute, RCW 4.28.185. Based on the facts of this case, the Court held that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, but that personal jurisdiction was in either Idaho or Washington. The Court remanded this case back to the trial court to consider whether to dismiss this case on comity grounds. View "Pruczinski v. Ashby" on Justia Law

In a workers' compensation appeal, the trial court denied the worker-employee's proposed instruction, which would inform the jury that it must give special consideration to the (opinion) testimony of his attending physician. The trial court ruled against the worker. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial on an unrelated basis (holding that the trial court reversibly erred when it refused the worker's request to revise the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals' (Board) erroneous finding regarding the location of his injury). However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court correctly rejected the instruction. The Supreme Court granted review on the issue of whether it was error to refuse to give the special consideration instruction. The Court held the instruction should have been given. View "Clark County v. McManus" on Justia Law