Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, petitioner Guy Wuthrich was riding a motorcycle on Avondale Road Northeast in King County, approaching an intersection with Northeast 159th Street. Drivers on 159th Street are controlled by a stop sign at the intersection; drivers on A von dale Road were not. Defendant Christa Gilland was driving a car on 159th Street. When she reached the intersection with Avondale Road, she stopped to wait for passing traffic but did not see Wuthrich approaching from the left. She turned left onto Avondale Road and collided with Wuthrich's motorcycle, seriously injuring him. Wuthrich filed a complaint against both Gilland and the County, alleging that the County was liable for his injuries because overgrown blackberry bushes obstructed Gilland's view of traffic at the intersection. The trial court dismissed the action against the County on summary judgment. The Supreme Court found genuine issues of material fact as to whether the County had a duty to keep the roadway at issue here in a reasonable safe condition. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wuthrich v. King County" on Justia Law

Two Washington residents got into a single-car accident that occurred in Idaho. The issue as presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Washington or Idaho law applied: plaintiff filed this suit in Washington more than two years after the accident. If Idaho law applied, the plaintiff's claim was time barred by Idaho's two-year statute of limitations; if Washington law applied, the plaintiff's claim was permitted under Washington's three-year statute of limitations. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that Washington's law, including its statute of limitations, applied here. View "Woodward v. Taylor" on Justia Law

In 2012, plaintiff Heidi Kroeber was shot outside the Bad Monkey Bar in Kent, Washington by Matthew Atkinson, who was driving an uninsured truck belonging to a friend at the time he opened fire. Plaintiff and her boyfriend had antagonized Atkinson earlier that evening. After pleading guilty to the crime of "Drive-By Shooting," Atkinson claimed that he had not intended to injure anyone and later claimed that he did not know that he was shooting where people were standing. There were factual disputes concerning whether Atkinson's truck was stopped or in motion at the time that he opened fire, and whether he accelerated rapidly away from the scene after the shooting. Plaintiff filed a claim with defendant, GEICO Insurance Company, to recover damages under the UIM coverage provision of her own automobile insurance policy. Under the relevant parts of this policy, GEICO was liable for "damages an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle due to: 1. bodily injury sustained by that insured and caused by an accident; and 2. the liability of the owner or operator for these damages must arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the underinsured motor vehicle." GEICO denied plaintiffs claim, asserting that her injuries did not arise out of the use of Atkinson's truck. Plaintiff sued GEICO, claiming that she was entitled to UIM coverage. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, and that court certified two questions to the Washington Supreme Court: (1) whether an injury to an insured pedestrian "arose out of" the intentional firing of a gun from an uninsured pickup truck; and (2) whether it is material if the shooter intended to harm anyone when firing the gun. The Washington Supreme Court answered the first question by holding that an injury "arises out of' vehicle use so long as some causal connection is present between a condition of, an attachment to, or some aspect of a vehicle and the resulting injury. "The converse is also true-·-an injury does not 'arise out of' vehicle use under circumstances where no such causal connection exists, making the vehicle the mere situs of the accident." The Court answered the second question in the negative. View "Kroeber v. Geico Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Christiana Anaya suffered from uncontrolled diabetes, which left her susceptible to serious infections. She went to the Toppenish Community Hospital with a urinary tract infection. Blood test results revealed Ms. Anaya had a yeast infection. The lab called Ms. Anaya's primary care facility (the Yakima Valley Farm Workers Clinic) where Respondent Dr. Mark Sauerwein was covering for Ms. Anaya's usual provider. Sauerwein was concerned about the lab results. Due to the serious nature of a blood infection, the doctor decided that if Ms. Anaya was feeling ill, she should come in immediately for treatment. If she was feeling better, it was more likely that the test result was a false positive, a common occurrence in microbiology labs. Dr. Sauerwein used the complete clinical picture available to him to conclude that the lab result was a false positive resulting from contamination but had the nurse contact Mrs. Anaya to move her next appointment up to the following week. Dr. Sauerwein did not tell Mrs. Anaya about the test result. The lab positively identified candida glabrata as the yeast in Ms. Anaya's blood. An infection of glabrata in the blood is serious. Lab microbiologists entered this information into Ms. Anaya's medical record but did not notify Dr. Sauerwein, the Clinic, or anyone else about the positive test result. Before Ms. Anaya's next visit to the Clinic, her condition worsened. Ms. Anaya went to Yakima Memorial Hospital where she was prescribed amphotericin B, which is highly toxic to the kidneys. Given the compromised state of Ms. Anaya's kidneys from her diabetes, a health care provider would not normally prescribe amphotericin B until positively identifying glabrata. Unfortunately, the amphotericin B treatment came too late to stop the infection from spreading to the internal organs. Ms. Anaya died at age 32 of cardiac arrest, deprivation of oxygen to the brain, and fungal sepsis; all stemming from type II diabetes mellitus. Mr. Anaya Gomez, as personal representative of Ms. Anaya's estate, filed suit against Dr. Sauerwein and the Clinic for malpractice. Three weeks before the jury trial, the estate moved to add a claim for failure to obtain informed consent. At the close of Mr. Anaya's case, the defense moved for judgment as a matter of law on the informed consent claim. The trial judge granted the motion and dismissed the informed consent claim, arguing that case law precluded the claim in misdiagnosis cases. The jury then found Dr. Sauerwein did not breach any duty owed to Ms. Anaya. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that when a health care provider rules out a particular diagnosis based on the patient's clinical condition-including test results, medical history, presentation upon physical examination, and any other circumstances surrounding the patient's condition that are available to the provider the provider may not be liable for informed consent claims arising from the ruled out diagnosis. The Court affirmed the appellate court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Gomez v. Sauerwein" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the state recreational use statute. Susan Camicia was injured when she was thrown from her bicycle after colliding with a wooden post on a portion of an Interstate I-90 bicycle trail in the City of Mercer Island. The City moved for summary judgment based on statutory immunity granted for unintentional injuries to landowners who allowed members of the public to use land for outdoor recreation (without charging a fee for the use). The appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the recreational immunity could not be determined as a matter of law in this case because there were disputed facts as to whether the trial in question served a recreational purpose as opposed to a transportation purpose. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court’s reasoning and affirmed its decision. View "Camicia v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on "Loudon v. Mhyre," (756 P.2d 138 (1988)), and whether it applied to a plaintiff's nonparty, treating physician when such physician is employed by a defendant. Specifically, the Court was asked whether Loudon barred ex parte communications between a physician and his or her employer's attorney where the employer is a corporation and named defendant whose corporate attorney-client privilege likely extends to the physician. To protect the values underlying both the physician-patient and the attorney-client privileges, the Supreme Court adopted a modified version of the "Upjohn" test: an attorney hired by a defendant health care provider to investigate or litigate an alleged negligent event may conduct privileged ex parte communications with a plaintiff's nonparty treating physician only where the communication meets the general prerequisites to application of the attorney-client privilege, the communication is with a physician who has direct knowledge of the event or events triggering the litigation, and the communications concern the facts of the alleged negligent incident. The attorney-client privilege protects the privileged communications only - not the facts transmitted in those communications. Facts are proper subjects of investigation and discovery, even if they are also the subject of privileged communications. View "Youngs v. PeaceHealth" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jaryd Schroeder sought treatment from the respondents, Dr. Steven Weighall and Columbia Basin Imaging. Schroeder was nine years old at the time and suffered from headaches, nausea, dizziness, weakness in his legs, and double vision. He underwent an MRI (magnetic resonance imaging), which Weighall reviewed and found to be normal. Schroeder's symptoms persisted. On either November 9 or 19, 2009, when he was 17, Schroeder underwent another MRI. This time the radiologist who reviewed the image found an Arnold Chiari Type I Malformation. On January 13, 2011, the day before his 19th birthday, Schroeder filed a medical malpractice action against Weighall, Columbia Basin Imaging, PC, and a third party subsequently dismissed by stipulation. Weighall asserted that the action was barred by the statute of limitations codified at RCW 4.16.350 and subject to the minority tolling exemption codified at RCW 4.16.190(2). Schroeder and his mother discovered Weighall's alleged omission November 2009 when Schroeder was still a minor. If not for RCW 4.16.190(2), the one-year statute of limitations applicable to his claim would have tolled until his 18th birthday. The ultimate issue before the Supreme Court was the constitutionality of RCW 4. 16. 190(2). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that RCW 4.16.190(2) violated article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution, and therefore reversed the trial court's summary judgment order dismissing Schroeder's medical malpractice action. View "Schroeder v. Weighall" on Justia Law

The City of Seattle appealed an unpublished Court of Appeals decision that affirmed a $12.75 million verdict in favor of former Seattle fire fighter Mark Jones. Jones was injured when he fell fifteen feet through a station "pole hole." The City argued that the trial court erred by excluding three late-disclosed defense witnesses without first conducting the necessary inquiry under "Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance," (93 3 P .2d. 1036 (1997)) and by denying the City's motion to vacate the judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence. After review, the Supreme Court found that though the trial court erred in excluding testimony by the late-disclosed witnesses, the Court agreed with both parties that the error was harmless. Further, the Court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the City's motion to vacate. Therefore the trial court was affirmed. View "Jones v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

Petitioner Albert Boogaard argued that the comprehensive marine liability insurance policy he purchased from International Marine Underwriters (IMU) for his general partnership, ABCD Marine, covered bodily injuries he suffered while working as an independent contractor for Northland Services Inc. (NSI). Specifically, petitioner claimed that even as a general partner he qualified and was covered as a third party under the "insured contract" provision of the policy. IMU contended that as a general partner and insured, Boogaard was not a third party under the insured contract provision. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of IMU. As a general partner, Boogaard did not qualify as a third party under the "insured contract" provision in accordance with Washington partnership law. View "Int'l Marine Underwriters v. ABCD Marine, LLC" on Justia Law

Paul Chan Kim murdered his partner, Baerbel K. Roznowski, after officer Andrew Rensing of the Federal Way Police Department served Kim with an antiharassment order forbidding him to contact or remain near Roznowski. Roznowski's two daughters filed suit against the city of Federal Way, alleging that Rensing's negligent service of the order resulted in Roznowski's death at Kim's hands. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict against the City. The City claims the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment and its motion for judgment as a matter of law because it owed Roznowski no duty under the public duty doctrine, foreclosing any tort liability. The Supreme Court disagreed. The City had a duty to serve the antiharassment order on Kim, and because it had a duty to act, it had a duty to act with reasonable care in serving the order. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's denial of the City's motions, although on different grounds than those relied on by the Court of Appeals. View "Washburn v. City of Federal Way" on Justia Law