Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on "Loudon v. Mhyre," (756 P.2d 138 (1988)), and whether it applied to a plaintiff's nonparty, treating physician when such physician is employed by a defendant. Specifically, the Court was asked whether Loudon barred ex parte communications between a physician and his or her employer's attorney where the employer is a corporation and named defendant whose corporate attorney-client privilege likely extends to the physician. To protect the values underlying both the physician-patient and the attorney-client privileges, the Supreme Court adopted a modified version of the "Upjohn" test: an attorney hired by a defendant health care provider to investigate or litigate an alleged negligent event may conduct privileged ex parte communications with a plaintiff's nonparty treating physician only where the communication meets the general prerequisites to application of the attorney-client privilege, the communication is with a physician who has direct knowledge of the event or events triggering the litigation, and the communications concern the facts of the alleged negligent incident. The attorney-client privilege protects the privileged communications only - not the facts transmitted in those communications. Facts are proper subjects of investigation and discovery, even if they are also the subject of privileged communications. View "Youngs v. PeaceHealth" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jaryd Schroeder sought treatment from the respondents, Dr. Steven Weighall and Columbia Basin Imaging. Schroeder was nine years old at the time and suffered from headaches, nausea, dizziness, weakness in his legs, and double vision. He underwent an MRI (magnetic resonance imaging), which Weighall reviewed and found to be normal. Schroeder's symptoms persisted. On either November 9 or 19, 2009, when he was 17, Schroeder underwent another MRI. This time the radiologist who reviewed the image found an Arnold Chiari Type I Malformation. On January 13, 2011, the day before his 19th birthday, Schroeder filed a medical malpractice action against Weighall, Columbia Basin Imaging, PC, and a third party subsequently dismissed by stipulation. Weighall asserted that the action was barred by the statute of limitations codified at RCW 4.16.350 and subject to the minority tolling exemption codified at RCW 4.16.190(2). Schroeder and his mother discovered Weighall's alleged omission November 2009 when Schroeder was still a minor. If not for RCW 4.16.190(2), the one-year statute of limitations applicable to his claim would have tolled until his 18th birthday. The ultimate issue before the Supreme Court was the constitutionality of RCW 4. 16. 190(2). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that RCW 4.16.190(2) violated article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution, and therefore reversed the trial court's summary judgment order dismissing Schroeder's medical malpractice action. View "Schroeder v. Weighall" on Justia Law

The City of Seattle appealed an unpublished Court of Appeals decision that affirmed a $12.75 million verdict in favor of former Seattle fire fighter Mark Jones. Jones was injured when he fell fifteen feet through a station "pole hole." The City argued that the trial court erred by excluding three late-disclosed defense witnesses without first conducting the necessary inquiry under "Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance," (93 3 P .2d. 1036 (1997)) and by denying the City's motion to vacate the judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence. After review, the Supreme Court found that though the trial court erred in excluding testimony by the late-disclosed witnesses, the Court agreed with both parties that the error was harmless. Further, the Court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the City's motion to vacate. Therefore the trial court was affirmed. View "Jones v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

Petitioner Albert Boogaard argued that the comprehensive marine liability insurance policy he purchased from International Marine Underwriters (IMU) for his general partnership, ABCD Marine, covered bodily injuries he suffered while working as an independent contractor for Northland Services Inc. (NSI). Specifically, petitioner claimed that even as a general partner he qualified and was covered as a third party under the "insured contract" provision of the policy. IMU contended that as a general partner and insured, Boogaard was not a third party under the insured contract provision. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of IMU. As a general partner, Boogaard did not qualify as a third party under the "insured contract" provision in accordance with Washington partnership law. View "Int'l Marine Underwriters v. ABCD Marine, LLC" on Justia Law

Paul Chan Kim murdered his partner, Baerbel K. Roznowski, after officer Andrew Rensing of the Federal Way Police Department served Kim with an antiharassment order forbidding him to contact or remain near Roznowski. Roznowski's two daughters filed suit against the city of Federal Way, alleging that Rensing's negligent service of the order resulted in Roznowski's death at Kim's hands. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict against the City. The City claims the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment and its motion for judgment as a matter of law because it owed Roznowski no duty under the public duty doctrine, foreclosing any tort liability. The Supreme Court disagreed. The City had a duty to serve the antiharassment order on Kim, and because it had a duty to act, it had a duty to act with reasonable care in serving the order. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's denial of the City's motions, although on different grounds than those relied on by the Court of Appeals. View "Washburn v. City of Federal Way" on Justia Law

Jared Barton sued Korrine Linvog, her parents Thomas and Madonna Linvog, and the State. Barton reached a settlement with the Linvogs through which the Linvogs agreed to advance Barton money in exchange for his promise not to execute a judgment against them above their insurance policy limits. Neither Barton nor the Linvogs disclosed this settlement to the court or to the State. After a jury trial, Barton was awarded $3.6 million, and the trial court entered judgment against the State and the Linvogs. In the process of paying the judgment, the State discovered the agreement. The State then moved to vacate the judgment on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. The trial court denied the motion but sanctioned Barton's attorney for failing to disclose the terms of the agreement. Barton's attorney appealed the sanction. Finding no abuse of discretion in its sanction against Barton's attorney, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Barton v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

In "Keller v. City of Spokane," (44 P.3d 845 (2002)), the Washington Supreme Court held that the duty to design and maintain reasonably safe roadways extended "to all persons, whether negligent or fault-free." This case presented an opportunity to clarify the relationship between questions of duty and legal causation in the context of a municipality's or utility's obligation to design and maintain reasonably safe roadways. In this case, the Court held that the reasoning of Keller equally supported a determination of legal causation. Therefore, if the jury finds the negligent placement of the utility pole too close to the roadway was a cause of plaintiff's injuries when defendant's car left the roadway and struck the pole then it was also a legal cause of plaintiff's injuries. View "Lowman v. Wilbur" on Justia Law

In 2003, members of the Committee Against the VietCong Flag disseminated an e-mail message throughout the Olympia Vietnamese community accusing Duc Tan and the Vietnamese Community of Thurston County (VCTC), a nonprofit corporation, of engaging in procommunist activities. Additionally, defendant Norman Le authored three newsletter articles repeating allegations from the e-mail and also accusing Tan and the VCTC of being undercover Viet Cong agents. Tan and the VCTC sued the authors of the publications for defamation. The trial judge determined that Tan and the VCTC were public figures as a matter of law at summary judgment. The case then proceeded to trial where a jury found Le and his coauthors liable for defamation and awarded Tan and the VCTC $310,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for dismissal, finding the statements in the e-mail and newsletters were protected opinion supported by disclosed facts, with the exception of the allegation that members of the VCTC, including Tan, were undercover Viet Cong agents. The court found Tan and the VCTC failed to make the requisite showing that the authors published any of the statements with actual malice. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the defamatory statements made by Nonnan Le and the other authors were not protected opinion and therefore actionable. The Court also held that that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported the jury's finding of actual malice with respect to those statements. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the jury's verdict. View "Tan v. Le" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ian Dean worked aboard a fishing vessel owned by The Fishing Company of Alaska (FCA). While aboard the vessel, Dean experienced pain in his hands and neck. After Dean left the vessel, he sought medical treatment and FCA began paying Dean maintenance and cure as required by general maritime law. After paying Dean's maintenance and cure for just over three years, FCA stopped paying when it obtained the opinion of a physician that Dean's injuries had reached maximum cure. At the time when FCA cut off Dean's maintenance and cure, Dean's own physician opined that Dean's injuries could benefit from additional treatment. Dean sued FCA and filed a motion asking the trial court to order FCA to resume paying maintenance and cure. The trial court applied a summary judgment standard to Dean's motion and denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's decision to apply the summary judgment standard and reversed. View "Dean v. Fishing Co. of Alaska" on Justia Law

Dorothy Halstein suffered from dementia. She owned a home worth between $235,000 and $320,000. While suffering demential, she owed approximately $75,000 to Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu), secured by a deed of trust on her home. Because of the cost of her care, her guardian did not have the funds to pay her mortgage. Quality Loan Services, acting as trustee of the deed of trust, foreclosed on her home. Quality sold the home for $83,087.67, one dollar more than Ms. Halstein owed. A notary falsely notarized the notice of sale by predating the notary acknowledgement. The falsification permitted the sale to take place earlier than it could have had the notice of sale been dated when it was actually signed. Before the foreclosure sale, Halstein's court-appointed guardian secured a buyer for her house willing to pay $235,000. There was not enough time before the scheduled foreclosure to close the sale with the buyer. Despite numerous requests, WaMu did not postpone the sale. A jury found that the trustee was negligent, and that the trustee's acts violated the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), and that the trustee breached its contractual obligations. The Court of Appeals reversed all but the negligence claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part, and restored the award based on the CPA. View "Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank" on Justia Law