Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Jared Barton sued Korrine Linvog, her parents Thomas and Madonna Linvog, and the State. Barton reached a settlement with the Linvogs through which the Linvogs agreed to advance Barton money in exchange for his promise not to execute a judgment against them above their insurance policy limits. Neither Barton nor the Linvogs disclosed this settlement to the court or to the State. After a jury trial, Barton was awarded $3.6 million, and the trial court entered judgment against the State and the Linvogs. In the process of paying the judgment, the State discovered the agreement. The State then moved to vacate the judgment on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. The trial court denied the motion but sanctioned Barton's attorney for failing to disclose the terms of the agreement. Barton's attorney appealed the sanction. Finding no abuse of discretion in its sanction against Barton's attorney, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Barton v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

In "Keller v. City of Spokane," (44 P.3d 845 (2002)), the Washington Supreme Court held that the duty to design and maintain reasonably safe roadways extended "to all persons, whether negligent or fault-free." This case presented an opportunity to clarify the relationship between questions of duty and legal causation in the context of a municipality's or utility's obligation to design and maintain reasonably safe roadways. In this case, the Court held that the reasoning of Keller equally supported a determination of legal causation. Therefore, if the jury finds the negligent placement of the utility pole too close to the roadway was a cause of plaintiff's injuries when defendant's car left the roadway and struck the pole then it was also a legal cause of plaintiff's injuries. View "Lowman v. Wilbur" on Justia Law

In 2003, members of the Committee Against the VietCong Flag disseminated an e-mail message throughout the Olympia Vietnamese community accusing Duc Tan and the Vietnamese Community of Thurston County (VCTC), a nonprofit corporation, of engaging in procommunist activities. Additionally, defendant Norman Le authored three newsletter articles repeating allegations from the e-mail and also accusing Tan and the VCTC of being undercover Viet Cong agents. Tan and the VCTC sued the authors of the publications for defamation. The trial judge determined that Tan and the VCTC were public figures as a matter of law at summary judgment. The case then proceeded to trial where a jury found Le and his coauthors liable for defamation and awarded Tan and the VCTC $310,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for dismissal, finding the statements in the e-mail and newsletters were protected opinion supported by disclosed facts, with the exception of the allegation that members of the VCTC, including Tan, were undercover Viet Cong agents. The court found Tan and the VCTC failed to make the requisite showing that the authors published any of the statements with actual malice. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the defamatory statements made by Nonnan Le and the other authors were not protected opinion and therefore actionable. The Court also held that that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported the jury's finding of actual malice with respect to those statements. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the jury's verdict. View "Tan v. Le" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ian Dean worked aboard a fishing vessel owned by The Fishing Company of Alaska (FCA). While aboard the vessel, Dean experienced pain in his hands and neck. After Dean left the vessel, he sought medical treatment and FCA began paying Dean maintenance and cure as required by general maritime law. After paying Dean's maintenance and cure for just over three years, FCA stopped paying when it obtained the opinion of a physician that Dean's injuries had reached maximum cure. At the time when FCA cut off Dean's maintenance and cure, Dean's own physician opined that Dean's injuries could benefit from additional treatment. Dean sued FCA and filed a motion asking the trial court to order FCA to resume paying maintenance and cure. The trial court applied a summary judgment standard to Dean's motion and denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's decision to apply the summary judgment standard and reversed. View "Dean v. Fishing Co. of Alaska" on Justia Law

Dorothy Halstein suffered from dementia. She owned a home worth between $235,000 and $320,000. While suffering demential, she owed approximately $75,000 to Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu), secured by a deed of trust on her home. Because of the cost of her care, her guardian did not have the funds to pay her mortgage. Quality Loan Services, acting as trustee of the deed of trust, foreclosed on her home. Quality sold the home for $83,087.67, one dollar more than Ms. Halstein owed. A notary falsely notarized the notice of sale by predating the notary acknowledgement. The falsification permitted the sale to take place earlier than it could have had the notice of sale been dated when it was actually signed. Before the foreclosure sale, Halstein's court-appointed guardian secured a buyer for her house willing to pay $235,000. There was not enough time before the scheduled foreclosure to close the sale with the buyer. Despite numerous requests, WaMu did not postpone the sale. A jury found that the trustee was negligent, and that the trustee's acts violated the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), and that the trustee breached its contractual obligations. The Court of Appeals reversed all but the negligence claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part, and restored the award based on the CPA. View "Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank" on Justia Law

Brandon Afoa was paralyzed in an accident while he was working at Sea-Tac Airport and sought to recover from the Port of Seattle on three theories the Supreme Court applied in other multiemployer workplace cases: as a business invitee; for breach of safety regulations under the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 (WISHA); and the duty of a general contractor to maintain a safe common area for any employee of subcontractors. The Court concluded that the same principles that apply to other multiemployer workplaces apply to Sea-Tac and that a jury could find the Port (which owns and operates the airport) liable under any of these three theories. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing Afoa's claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Afoa v. Port of Seattle" on Justia Law

The City of Seattle and Officers Kevin McDaniel and Pohna Lim challenged an appellate court's decision affirming the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. Respondent Elsa Robb, on behalf of her deceased husband Michael Robb, alleged that law enforcement acted negligently by failing to pick up and remove shotgun shells lying near Samson Berhe after stopping him on suspicion of burglary. After the stop, Berhe returned to retrieve the cartridges, and shortly thereafter used one of them to kill Michael Robb. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 302B may create an independent duty to protect against the criminal acts of a third party where the actor’s own affirmative act creates or exposes another to the recognizable high degree of risk of harm. However, the Court also held that in this case, the police officer’s failure to pick up shotgun shells lying near defendants in a "Terry" stop was not an affirmative act as contemplated by the Restatement. Therefore the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Robb v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court in this case. A Clark County deputy sheriff sought to proceed to trial and recover damages from Burger King Corporation under the Washington Product Liability Act (WPLA) on a claim that he suffered ongoing emotional distress from discovering he was served a burger with phlegm inside the bun. Specifically, the issue was whether, in the absence of physical injury, the WPLA permits relief for emotional distress damages caused by being served and touching, but not consuming, the contaminated food product. The Supreme Court concluded that the WPLA permits relief in such circumstances, provided that the emotional distress is a reasonable reaction and "manifest by objective symptomatology." View "Bylsma v. Burger King Corp." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on an insured's duty to cooperate with an insurer's claim investigation. Petitioner John Staples' claim was denied for failing to cooperate, namely failing to submit to an examination under oath (EUO). Petitioner sued the insurer for bad faith and related causes of action; the trial court dismissed the case on summary judgment. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that genuine issues of fact still existed and made summary judgment inappropriate in this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Staples v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Larry Stout was severely injured while being apprehended by a subcontractor of CJ Johnson Bail Bonds. He sued the contractor, the subcontractor, and the owners of CJ Johnson under two theories of vicarious liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CJ Johnson, holding that vicarious liability did not apply in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, assuming that vicarious liability applies to the activity but holding that such liability is available only to "innocent[] nonparticipant[s]," not those voluntarily engaging in the dangerous activity with knowledge of the danger. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that fugitive apprehension was an activity that posed a peculiar risk of physical harm, and that defendant could assert a cause of action against CJ Johnson based on the theory of vicarious liability because the narrow exception for employees of independent contractors (in this case, the subcontractor) did not apply. View "Stout v. Warren" on Justia Law