Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed tort claims against Mine Safety Appliances Company (“MSA”). Plaintiffs settled with MSA under settlement agreements that assigned to Plaintiffs the right to recover the remainder of the settlement amount under an insurance policy that North River Insurance Company sold to MSA. MSA then amended their complaints to add claims against North River, and MSA filed cross-claims against North River. In the meantime, earlier-filed litigation between North River and MSA was pending in Pennsylvania and Delaware. North River filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for a stay of the proceedings, arguing that West Virginia was an inconvenient forum and the proceedings should be dismissed pending resolution of the out-of-state litigation. The circuit court denied the motions. The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition subsequently sought by North River, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) denying North River’s motion to dismiss where strong deference was according to Plaintiffs’ choice of forum and considerations relevant to a forum non conveniens analysis suggest no basis for dismissal of the action; and (2) denying the motion to stay the proceedings, as it would be unfair and prejudicial to Plaintiffs to delay the trials unnecessarily. View "State ex rel. N. River Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Petitioners entered into a written agreement with Bastian Homes and Lion Enterprises, Inc. (collectively, “Bastian Homes”) for the construction of a new home. The agreement contained an arbitration clause. After a water leak allegedly substantially damaged major portions of the partially-constructed home, Petitioners sued Bastian Homes. Bastian Homes filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the arbitration clause in the construction contract required the matter to be submitted to arbitration. Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss, contending that the arbitration clause in this case was not bargained for and was therefore invalid. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) because the construction contract was properly formed and supported by sufficient consideration, there was no requirement that the arbitration clause be independently “bargained for”; and (2) because the circuit court decided the arbitration clause not unconscionable without the issue being fairly argued by the parties and without any factual development, this issue needed to be remanded for further development of the record. View "Kirby v. Lion Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a retention pond constructed in a subdivision for the purpose of catching water runoff. Patrick and Melinda Sterner, who owned property in the subdivision, contracted with WHR Group (WHR) to handle the sale of their home. Petitioners subsequently entered into a contract to purchase the property. Petitioners later filed an action against WHR, the Sterners, and Sahley Realty Company, the subdivision developer (collectively, Respondents), asserting claims for fraud, constructive fraud, negligence, and breach of implied contract, alleging that a “slip” occurred on the retention bond prior to their purchase of the lot, which allowed the pond to cross the common boundary line onto their property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this action, the circuit court acted properly in granting Respondents’ motions for summary judgment. View "Dickens v. Sahley Realty Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was W. Va. Code 33-6-36, which, in certain circumstances, requires insurance companies to continue motor vehicle liability coverage for a spouse after the death of, or separation or divorce from, the named insured. Francis McComas separated from and then divorced a United Service Automobile Association (USAA) named insured. USAA removed McComas from the named insured’s policy. Seven days after the divorce, McComas lost control of his vehicle and collided with Kimberly Lucas’s vehicle. McComas died in the collision. Lucas, who was seriously injured, filed a lawsuit against McComas’s estate. Plaintiff included a declaratory judgment count against USAA, contending that the USAA motor vehicle policy with McComas’s former spouse provided liability coverage for McComas’s negligence. The circuit court granted judgment for Plaintiff, determining that USAA was required by section 33-6-36 to notify McComas of his right to buy a separate liability insurance policy upon canceling McComas’s liability coverage, and because that notice was not given to McComas, USAA was required to provide liability coverage to McComas’s estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, 33-6-36 required USAA to notify McComas of the termination of his coverage and his right to request a separate policy. View "United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Lucas" on Justia Law

Thomas and Lori Likens filed a complaint against Petitioners in the circuit court, alleging several claims, including the allegation that Skyline had negligently designed and built their manufactured home. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the Likenses were required to file an administrative complaint with the West Virginia Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Board (the Board) as a prerequisite to the filing of their civil complaint. The circuit court denied Petitioners’ motion to dismiss, concluding that W. Va. Code 21-9-11a did not require the Likenses to first file an administrative complaint seeking relief with the Board before asserting their claim seeking damages. Petitioners requested the Supreme Court to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order. The Court granted the requested writ, concluding that W. Va. Code 21-9-11a(b) requires an aggrieved party to file an administrative complaint with the Board before he or she may file a civil lawsuit for monetary damages. View " State ex rel. Skyline Corp. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Employee filed this action against Employer, alleging that his exposure to diesel exhaust fumes while employed by Employer caused him to develop cancer. Employee subsequently died, and his wife (Petitioner) was substituted as the plaintiff. Petitioner amended the complaint to allege that Employee's death was a result of his exposure to diesel exhaust fumes. Employer moved to exclude the testimony of Petitioner's three expert witnesses on the grounds that their methodology was not reliable. After a hearing, the circuit court excluded Petitioner's experts' testimony. The court then entered summary judgment in favor of Employer because Petitioner did not have an expert. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order excluding the testimony of Petitioner's experts and the grant of summary judgment, holding that the trial court exceeded the scope of its review of the reliability prong of W. Va. R. Evid. 702 in concluding that Petitioner's experts were not reliable. Remanded. View "Harris v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell down a staircase in a commercial parking lot that lacked handrails. Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Defendants, who constructed and maintained the stairs, asserting that Defendants were prima facie negligent because a local ordinance legally required the installation of at least one handrail. Defendants asserted that the missing handrail was an open and obvious danger, and therefore, Plaintiff was barred as a matter of law from recovering any damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Defendants, finding no actionable negligence because Defendants had no duty of care toward Plaintiff. The Supreme Court first abolished the open and obvious doctrine and then reversed the circuit court's orders in this case, holding (1) if a hazard is open is obvious on premises, it does not preclude a cause of action by a plaintiff for injuries caused by that hazard; and (2) instead, a jury may consider the obviousness of the hazard in determining the comparative negligence of the plaintiff against that of the owner of the premises. Remanded. View "Hersh v. E-T Enters., Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

Richard Young was killed while working for Apogee Coal Company (Apogee) after being allegedly instructed by his supervisor, James Browning, to remove a counterweight on an end loader that fell on top of him and killed him. Petitioner, administratrix of Young's estate, sued Apogee, Browning, and Apogee's alleged parent company (collectively, Respondents), alleging, inter alia, a deliberate intent cause of action against Browning and Apogee on the basis that Young had not been property trained on removal of the counterweight. Respondents removed the case to the U.S. district court, which certified a question of law to the West Virginia Supreme Court. The Court answered by holding that a non-employer "person," such as a supervisor or co-employee, may not be made a defendant in a deliberate intent cause of action pursuant to W. Va. Code 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii). View "Young v. Apogee Coal Co., LLC " on Justia Law

In 2009, GameStop, Inc., which operated retail stores that sold video games and video gaming software, hired Petitioner as an assistant manager. When she began her employment, Petitioner received a store associate handbook. In a document included with the handbook was an arbitration agreement. Petitioner signed and dated an acknowledgment of the handbook and rules including arbitration. In 2011, Petitioner sued GameStop and some of its managers (collectively, GameStop) for wrongful discharge, sexual harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, among other causes of action. The circuit court dismissed the complaint pending Petitioner's submission of her claims to final and binding arbitration. Petitioner appealed, arguing that she did not enter into a valid arbitration with GameStop or, in the alternative, the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner and GameStop entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate Petitioner's claims; and (2) the arbitration agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. View "New v. GameStop, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent was employed periodically by Petitioner. While engaged in certain activities at an apartment complex that was being demolished by Petitioner, Respondent was injured. Respondent filed a workers' compensation claim for his injuries, but the claim was denied. The Supreme Court found that Respondent's injuries were compensable under the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act. Respondent subsequently amended his previously-filed negligence action and asserted a deliberate intent claim against Petitioner. The circuit court certified three questions to the Supreme Court, which answered by holding (1) Respondent's claim against Petitioner was governed by the 2005 amendment to the deliberate intent statute; (2) an employer in a deliberate intent action may introduce evidence that is relevant to the issues of whether an employee's conduct created a specific unsafe working condition, whether the employer had knowledge of the unsafe working condition, and whether the employee's injuries were the proximate result of that unsafe working condition; and (3) Petitioner was not precluded from arguing that Respondent was at the site of his own volition and voluntarily agreed to remove a decontamination unit, which caused him to fall and suffer injuries. View "Master Mech. Insulation, Inc. v. Simmons" on Justia Law