Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

After an altercation that took place at Bubba's Bar and Grill (Bubba's), Petitioner filed a complaint against Bubba's, asserting three negligence claims. Petitioner subsequently learned that Bubba's was a fictitious name used for business purposes by The Tavern, LLC and that James Paugh and Lawson Mangum were the only members of The Tavern. Petitioner sought leave to amend his complaint to utilize the proper company name, add Paugh and Mangum as defendants, and assert a veil piercing count against Paugh and Mangum. The Tavern argued in response that the sole purpose for adding Paugh and Mangum as defendants was to pierce the veil of their West Virginia limited liability company, which The Tavern claimed was against West Virginia law. Instead of ruling on Petitioner's motion, the circuit court certified a question to the Supreme Court regarding West Virginia's version of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (the Act). The Court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that the Act permits the equitable remedy of piercing the veil to be asserted against a West Virginia limited liability company. View "Kubican v. The Tavern, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought underinsured motorists (UIM) coverage from Respondent, Plaintiff's insurance carrier, after he was involved in an accident. Plaintiff and his wife eventually filed suit against Respondent seeking to recover the benefits. Plaintiff and Respondent settled the claim. Plaintiffs then amended their complaint against Respondent to allege a bad faith claim for violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, alleging that Respondent acted in bad faith by not paying their first-party claim for UIM. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then moved for attorney fees and costs for substantially prevailing in the underlying bad faith award. The circuit court denied the costs and fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that there was no factual basis upon which to award fees on the bad faith claim. View "Lemasters v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Joe Mallory called McDowell County 911 to request assistance, reporting that a man was threatening to kick in his door and harm him. A dispatcher took Mallory's call. After the Dispatcher learned the man had left Mallory's home, Dispatcher explained to Mallory there was no longer a need for a trooper to come to his home. A trooper did not travel to Mallory's home, and Mallory did not call for further assistance. It was later determined that the threatening man had robbed and killed Mallory. The administratrix of Mallory's estate (Plaintiff) filed a wrongful death action against the dispatcher and McDowell County 911 (collectively, McDowell County 911), among others. The circuit court granted summary judgment to McDowell County 911, concluding that County 911 did not owe a special duty of care to Mallory. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly awarded summary judgment to McDowell County 911 because Plaintiff failed to establish that they owed a special duty of care to Mallory. View "Upchurch v. McDowell County 911" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a deliberate intent action alleging he was injured while constructing a mine portal canopy at defendant Frontier Coal Company's camp. On the final day of trial, a conversation took place between a trial representative of Frontier and a juror. The circuit court granted Plaintiff's motion to disqualify the juror and seated an alternate juror on the jury. The jury subsequently conducted deliberations and entered a verdict in favor of Defendants. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the jury's verdict and order a new trial based on the alleged improper juror contact. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the conversation between the juror and Frontier's representative raised a presumption of prejudice, but the potential prejudice was remedied when the trial court removed the juror and replaced him with an alternate juror before jury deliberations began; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion when it granted Plaintiff's motion to set aside the jury's verdict and order a new trial because the speculative prejudice the trial court relied upon did not meet the standard set forth in State v. Johnson to set aside a jury's verdict. Remanded. View "Bluestone Indus., Inc. v. Keneda" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed as a welder by Defendant when he sustained severe burns from an arc blast emanating from a 480-volt electrical box as he attempted to turn on the power at his work station. Plaintiff sued Defendant, offering as evidence that Defendant was required, under applicable safety standards within the industry, to routinely inspect its 480-volt electrical boxes. Defendant was unable to show that the 480-volt box that caused the accident had been inspected since the 1950s or early 1960s. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in finding (1) the safety standards relied on by Plaintiff were not specifically applicable to his work and working conditions; and (2) no question of material fact existed concerning whether Defendant intentionally exposed Plaintiff to the unsafe 480-volt box. Remanded. View "McComas v. ACF Indus., LLC" on Justia Law

Parents filed a product liability action on behalf of Child, who was severely burned while attempting to start a fire in his family's fireplace with a fire starter gel. Defendants filed third-party complaints against Parents. Parents argued that the parental immunity doctrine barred Defendants from arguing that Parents' negligence caused or contributed to Child's injuries. The district court subsequently certified questions to the Supreme Court regarding the law on the parental immunity doctrine. The Supreme Court answered by holding that in a product liability action brought for injury to a child (1) the parental immunity doctrine precludes a defendant from asserting a contribution claim against the child's parents, but an allegedly negligent parent may be included as a third-party defendant for the allocation of fault; and (2) the parental immunity doctrine does not preclude a defendant from asserting the defense of abnormal product use by the parents to establish the negligence or fault of the parents or from asserting that the conduct of a parent was an intervening cause of the child's injuries. View "Landis v. Hearthmark, LLC" on Justia Law

Decedent died as a result of the injuries he received when he was attacked by several pit bull terriers. Petitioner, the administratrix of Decedent's estate, brought this action against Respondents, the Monroe County Commission and Patricia Green, the Monroe County dog warden, alleging, inter alia, that Respondents failed to impound the dogs due to non-payment of taxes and for not having proper registration and failed to impound and/or destroy the dogs for being vicious. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the public duty doctrine and statutory immunities. Petitioner subsequently moved to amend her complaint to incorporate allegations of fact to support her claim that a "special relationship" exception to the public duty doctrine applied. Before ruling on the motion to amend, the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing Petitioner's case on the basis of statutory immunities and in failing to grant Petitioner's motion to amend her complaint. Remanded. View "Bowden v. Monroe County Comm'n" on Justia Law

Joseph Jackson, an employee of the Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (DOH), was operating a dump truck and performing clean-up work pursuant to a state of emergency declaration, when he struck Joseph Belcher's automobile. Belcher filed this action against Jackson and the DOH (Defendants), alleging negligence and vicarious liability. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that because Jackson was working as an emergency service worker at the time of the accident, he was entitled to immunity under W. Va. Code 15-5-11(a). The circuit court denied Defendants' motion, concluding that section 15-5-11(a) contemplated exceptions to the immunity that the statute provided to emergency service workers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 15-5-11(a) operates to provide a limited waiver of the emergency service worker immunity provided by the statute where the emergency service worker is an employee of the State and the recovery sought is confined to "the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage." View "Jackson v. Belcher" on Justia Law

A 2007 stockholders’ derivative suit alleged that Massey’s officers and directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to make sure that Massey employees were complying with environmental and mine worker safety laws and regulations. A 2008 settlement released the claims in exchange for certain reforms to be made a part of corporate governance policies relating to company oversight and conduct regarding environmental and mine worker safety standards. The reforms were incorporated into Massey’s written Corporate Governance Agreement and were to remain in effect for five years. On April 5, 2010, an explosion occurred at Massey’s Upper Big Branch Mine at Montcoal, West Virginia, killing 29 miners. According to a contempt petition, investigations subsequent to the disaster found systematic mine safety compliance failures leading up to the explosion. The trial court dismissed the civil contempt petition. The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. The petitioners lacked standing to pursue contempt proceedings because they no longer own any Massey stock; Massey has been purchased by Alpha Natural Resources; and the respondents were removed by Alpha as corporate directors and officers. View "Manville Pers. Injury Settlement Fund v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

The cases underlying these consolidated appeals involved the purchase of an automobile. Plaintiffs purchased vehicles and signed retail installment contracts with three separate dealers. The dealers assigned their rights in the contract and vehicles to Credit Acceptance Corporation, who financed the purchases. All of the contracts contained arbitration clauses. Plaintiffs later commenced civil actions against Credit Acceptance in circuit court, alleging, inter alia, violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection act (WVCCPA). Credit Acceptance filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss, which the circuit court denied, finding that the arbitration agreements were unconscionable based upon the unavailability of some of the arbitration forums named therein and because Plaintiffs in the agreements waived their respective rights to a jury trial. The Supreme Court reversed in both of the cases, holding that because one of the arbitration forums named in the arbitration agreements remained available to arbitrate the parties' disputes, and because an arbitration agreement is not unenforceable solely because a party to the contract waives her right to a jury trial, the causes must be remanded for entry of orders compelling arbitration. View "Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front" on Justia Law