Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Bobby Messer, a lineman, came into contact with an energized electric transmission line and suffered severe injuries. Petitioners, Bobby and Amanda Messer, filed a complaint alleging that several defendants, including Hampden Coal Company, acted with deliberate intent, resulting in the injury to Bobby. Petitioners settled with or voluntarily dismissed all parties except Hampden. Before trial, Petitioners moved to strike a prospective juror for cause because he had stated opinions that potentially conflicted with those of the Petitioners' electrical engineering expert and possessed such professional education and experience in the field of electrical engineering that his presence upon the jury would have caused his opinions to unduly influence the jury's deliberations on the case's central issue. The circuit court denied the motion, and the jury returned a verdict for Hampden. The court subsequently denied Petitioners' motion for a new trial based on the court's refusal to strike the prospective juror for cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's decision to deny Petitioners' motion to excuse the potential juror for cause did not constitute an abuse of discretion, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Petitioners' motion for a new trial

Kyle Hoffman was a passenger in an automobile driven by William Piper (William) when an accident resulted in the deaths of Hoffman and William. Robin Prinz, administratrix of the estate of Kyle Hoffman, filed a complaint asserting a wrongful death claim against Julie Piper (Petitioner), administratrix of the estate of William, and a declaratory judgment claim against State Farm. The complaint alleged that William's grandfather maintained a personal liability policy through State Farm that provided coverage to William. The circuit court bifurcated the two claims and stayed the wrongful death action pending resolution of the declaratory judgment action. The circuit court found the State Farm policy provided liability coverage for the allegedly negligent actions of William. State Farm appealed. Petitioner filed a motion to stay the wrongful death action pending the Court's resolution of State Farm's appeal, which the circuit court denied. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order denying the stay. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to further stay the wrongful death proceedings; and (2) a writ of prohibition is not available to correct discretionary rulings.

Employee injured his back while working for Employer. Employee ultimately received a permanent partial disability award for his back injury. Employee then sought a psychiatric consultation, which resulted in Employee being assessed with major depressive disorder. The claims administrator denied Employee's request to add depression as a compensable injury of his workers' compensation claim, and the Workers' Compensation Office of Judges and Workers' Compensation Board of Review (BOR) affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a claimant must get prior authorization from a claims administrator before seeking an initial psychiatric consultation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) W. Va. S.C.R. 85-20-12.5(a), which states that an initial psychiatric evaluation must be authorized by a claims administrator, is an invalid administrative regulation; (2) W. Va. C.S.R. 85-12-12.4 sets forth a three-step process that must be followed when a claimant is seeking to add a psychiatric disorder as a compensable injury in his or her workers' compensation claim; and (3) in the instant case, Employee did not receive the process that he was entitled to under section 85-12-12.4. Remanded.

Steven Posey was injured after falling at the City of Buckhannon's solid waste transfer station while unloading garbage bags and other material. Posey and his wife filed a complaint against the City, alleging negligence. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the City was entitled to immunity from liability pursuant to the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act. The Poseys appealed, contending that transfer stations, such as the one conducted by the City, were not included in the governmental immunity provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that a transfer station conducted directly by a political subdivision as a temporary collection site for solid waste to be transported to a dump or sanitary landfill constitutes a "facility" within the meaning of the immunity provisions of the Act.

In three cases consolidated for review, the facts were similar. A person was admitted to a nursing home, and a family member signed an admission agreement containing an arbitration clause. After the person died, a family member filed suit against the nursing home, alleging the nursing home negligently caused injuries leading to the person's death. The nursing home sought to dismiss the lawsuit and compel the family member to participate in binding arbitration. The family members asserted the arbitration clauses were unenforceable, alleging (1) the clauses violated the West Virginia Nursing Home Act, and (2) were unconscionable under the common law. After reviewing the relevant laws, the Supreme Court held that (1) the Nursing Home Act, which states any that waiver by a nursing home resident of his right to sue for injuries sustained in a nursing home shall be void as contrary to public policy, is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act; and (2) in the context of pre-injury nursing home admission agreements, where a personal injury or wrongful death occurred after the signing of the contract, arbitration clauses are unenforceable to compel arbitration of a dispute concerning negligence that results in a personal injury or wrongful death.

In two consolidated original jurisdiction actions, petitioners Mylan, Inc., Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Mylan Technologies, Inc. sought writs of prohibition in two actions pending in the circuit court of Kanawha County. In each action, the circuit court denied a motion filed by petitioners to dismiss the case on the basis of forum non conveniens. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of prohibition, asserting that each of the circuit judges erred in applying the forum non conveniens statute, W. Va. Code 56-1-1a, and seeking to prohibit the circuit court from refusing to dismiss their actions. In a show cause order, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the eight factors listed for consideration in Section 56-1-1a. The Court, therefore, granted the writs and remanded the actions.

In a medical professional liability action, the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellants James and Debbie MacDonald, which included an award of $1,500,000 for noneconomic loss. In accordance with W. Va. Code 55-7B-8, the circuit court reduced the noneconomic damages award to $500,000, finding that James suffered a permanent and substantial physical deformity warranting application of the higher cap amount. On appeal, the MacDonalds argued that the cap contained in the statute was unconstitutional, and therefore, the circuit court erred in reducing the jury's verdict. Appellees, Sayeed Ahmed, M.D. and City Hospital, asserted a cross-assignment of error, arguing that the $250,000 cap should have been applied in this case. City Hosptial also cross assigned as error the circuit court's denial of its motion for summary judgment, motion for judgment as a matter of law, and motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute as amended in 2003 was constitutional, (2) the circuit court did not err in applying the higher cap, and (3) the circuit court did not err in denying the motions filed by City Hospital.

Elgene Phillips was driving his truck when the truck hydroplaned, ran off the road, and rolled over. Phillips died as a result of the accident. As administratrix of the decedent's estate, petitioner Shelia Haynes filed a wrongful death action, alleging that the seatbelt in the decedent's trunk was defective. Chrysler, the manufacturer of the decedent's truck, and Autoliv, the manufacturer of the seatbelt, were named as defendants. The parties settled for $150,000, but the agreement did not contain an apportionment between the two defendants regarding who was responsible for that amount. After Chrysler declared bankruptcy, petitioner filed a motion to sever claims against Chrysler and a motion to compel Autoliv to pay the entire amount of the settlement. The circuit court denied petitioner's motions, and as a result petitioner received only $65,000 in settlement proceeds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) the terms of the contract were unambiguous, and Autolive was bound by the underlying agreement; and (2) by cashing Autolive's check for $65,000, the petitioner and Autolive did not reach an accord and satisfaction under the facts of the case.

Randy Mace, as personal representative of the estate of Kathy Mace, appealed from an order of the circuit court dismissing his wrongful death lawsuit on the basis of forum non conveniens. Applying the forum non conveniens statute, the circuit court concluded that North Carolina, the state in which the action accrued, was a more convenient forum for Mace's claims. Mace argued, however, that he was unable to try his claims in North Carolina because they were barred by that state's statute of limitations. Thus, he argued, the circuit court erred in dismissing the case because it misinterpreted the forum non conveniens statute as permitting dismissal despite the lack of an alternate forum in which the claims may be tried. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Finding the language of the statute ambiguous, the Court construed the statute in a manner consistent with the Court's prior case law and the federal common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. Under this construction, the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the statute.

Appellants William and Denise Huggins filed a lawsuit against appellees sewer board, city, and mayor, alleging that a violation of the Workers' Compensation Act had occurred when Huggins' health insurance was terminated while he was off of work recovering from a compensable work-related injury, and, further, that he had been wrongfully terminated. The appellees filed a motion for summary judgment with the lower court, alleging that the plaintiffs had no basis in law for their complaint. The circuit court granted the motion, and the appellants appealed. At issue was whether Huggins was terminated while off work and receiving temporary total disability benefits due to his compensable injury, or, instead, whether Huggins resigned from employment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that appellees terminated Huggins in violation of the anti-discrimination policies set forth in the Act. However, the circuit court's determination that Huggins was not entitled to punitive damages against the mayor was affirmed.