Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Wisconsin Supreme Court
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court granting Defendants' motion for the application of Wis. Stat. Chapter 655 and dismissing the wrongful death claim brought by Plaintiff on behalf of the estate of her mother, Anne Oros, and in Plaintiff's capacity as Oros's daughter, holding that dismissal was not warranted.Oros allegedly died as a result of negligence on the part of Divine Savior Healthcare, Inc. Divine Savior and its insurer (collectedly, Defendants) argued that Plaintiff could not bring a wrongful death claim as an adult child of Oros because the liability protections given to certain healthcare providers under Chapter 655 barred the claim. The circuit court concluded that Chapter 655 applied and dismissed the claim. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff's wrongful death claim was not subject to Chapter 655 and that dismissal was not warranted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that dismissal under Chapter 655 of Plaintiff's wrongful death claim was not warranted. View "Estate of Anne Oros v. Divine Savior Healthcare Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and instead granting summary judgment in favor of Elliot Brey, holding that Wis. Stat. 632.32(2)(d) does not bar an insurer from requiring that an insured sustain bodily injury or death in order to trigger underinsured (UIM) coverage under an automobile liability insurance policy.The circuit court determined (1) the State Farm automobile liability insurance policy issued to Brey's mother and her husband did not provide uninsured motorist (UIM) coverage to Brey for the death of his father in an automobile accident because Brey was an insured under the policy but his father was not; and (2) Brey could not recover under the policy because he did not sustain bodily injury. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that sections 632.32(1) and (2)(d) bar an insurer from limiting UIM coverage to only those insureds who sustain bodily injury or death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 632.32(2)(d) does not require insurers to extend UIM coverage to an insured for bodily injury or death suffered by a person who was not insured under the policy. View "Brey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff's complaint alleging malicious prosecution, holding that a withdrawal of a prior proceeding may satisfy the favorable termination element of a malicious prosecution claim.In dismissing Plaintiff's complaint, the circuit court concluded that the complaint failed to establish that the prior proceeding was terminated in Plaintiff's favor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court hereby adopts the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 674, cmt. j addressing whether a withdrawal constitutes a favorable termination; and (2) whether or not the withdrawal in this case constitutes a favorable termination remains a question for the fact-finder. The Supreme Court remanded this case to the circuit court to apply the analysis set forth in this opinion. View "Monroe v. Chase" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court ruling that the exclusive-remedy provision of the Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Act, Wis. Stat. 102.03(2), did not bar Petitioner's tort action against his employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier, holding that the Act provided Plaintiff's exclusive remedy for the injuries alleged in his complaint.In his tort action against Continental Indemnity Company Plaintiff alleged that Continental was negligent in failing to approve payment for a refill of his antidepressant medication that was prescribed after a workplace injury and that, as a result, he attempted suicide. Continental filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that section 102.03(2) barred Plaintiff's tort action. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the Act's exclusive remedy provision did not bar Plaintiff's action. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the allegations in Petitioner's tort action, if proven, would satisfy the conditions for worker's compensation liability, and therefore, the exclusive-remedy provision applied. View "Graef v. Continental Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court denying summary judgment to Jacob Tetting and his insurer, concluding that Tetting, who was an occupant of a bar when he injured another person, was not an "other lawful occupant of real property" entitled to immunity.David Stroede was drinking at a bar when he punched another person. Jacob Tetting, an employee of the bar who was patronizing the bar with his family, grabbed Stroede, and when he released him, Stroede fell down some concrete stairs and suffered injuries. Stroede brought this action against Tetting, the bar, and the bar's insurer. Tetting and his homeowners insurance provider (together, Tetting) filed motions for summary judgment asserting that Tetting was entitled to immunity and did not owe a duty of care to Stroede. The circuit court decided that Tetting was not a "possessor of real property" under Wis. Stat. 895.529 and was therefore not entitled to immunity. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Tetting was an "other lawful occupant" entitled to immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Tetting was not an "other lawful occupant of real property" under section 895.529 and was therefore not entitled to immunity. View "Stroede v. Society Insurance" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming in part the order of the circuit court that Appellant pay restitution to the victims of his crime, holding that a civil settlement did not preclude the restitution ordered and that the restitution order was a reasonable exercise of the circuit court's discretion under the applicable law and facts presented.Appellant collided with T.K.'s vehicle, resulting in T.K.'s death. Appellant and his insurance company reached a civil settlement with T.K.'s adult children. Appellant subsequently pled no contest to homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle. The circuit court ordered restitution to the adult children. The court of appeals reduced the amount of restitution because the amount included income lost as a result of the adult children's spouses missing work due to Appellant's criminal conduct. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) properly determined that the civil settlement did not preclude the circuit court from ordering restitution; and (2) erred by reducing the restitution amount because a victim suffers actual pecuniary damages when his or her spouse does not work, as the victim is a member of the marital community that is affected by the loss of income. View "State v. Muth" on Justia Law

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In this personal injury, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need not prove the exact moment the unsafe condition commenced so long as the evidence is sufficient to prove it existed long enough to give the defendant constructive notice of its presence.Plaintiff slipped on an unknown substance at Woodman's Food Market, causing him to fall and suffer injuries. Plaintiff sued Woodman's, alleging that the substance caused an unsafe condition and that Woodman's had constructive notice of its existence. During trial, Plaintiff introduced a security camera video showing the part of the store where he slipped and fell, but there was no evidence showing when the substance was deposited on the floor. The jury entered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict should have been granted because the evidence provided no indication of how long the hazard existed on Woodman's floor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to permit an inference that the substance had been on Woodman's floor for at least ninety minutes, and therefore, the circuit court could reasonably conclude that there was some evidence to sustain Plaintiff's cause of action with respect to constructive notice. View "Correa v. Woodman's Food Market" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Fryed Audio, LLC was entitled to recreational immunity from Plaintiff's tort action, holding that Fryed Audio was entitled to immunity pursuant to Wis. Stat. 895.52(2).Fryed Audio was a member of Rhythm Method, LLC, with whom the Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc. contracted to provide music for its festival. At the event. Plaintiff allegedly tripped on an electronic cord that Steven Fry, the sole member of Fryed Audio, laid. Plaintiff sued Fryed Audio for negligence. Fryed Audio moved for summary judgment under Wis. Stat. 895.52(2), which provides that agents of owners have immunity from claims by those who enter property of a statutory owner to engage in recreational activity. The circuit court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Lions Club lacked the right to control Fryed Audio. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there were no issues of material fact as to the Lions Club's right to control Fryed Audio in regard to laying the cords, and Fryed Audio was an agent of the Lions Club; and (2) the Lions Club was a statutory owner, and therefore, Fryed Audio was entitled to immunity. View "Lang v. Lions Club of Cudahy Wisconsin, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's order that determined that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant-insurance company were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, holding that claim preclusion barred the claims of certain plaintiffs, but the Court was evenly divided as to whether claim preclusion barred the claims brought by a fourth plaintiff.This case arose from a car accident in which a mother and her three daughters were seriously injured. The father was not in the car. The accident resulted in two separate lawsuits. In the first action, the mother brought a negligence claim against the driver of the other vehicle and her insurer, State Farm. The children were also named as plaintiffs. The action settled. The second lawsuit brought by the family, including the father, alleging that the driver of the car in which they were passengers was negligent. Plaintiffs sued the driver's insurer directly. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that the action was barred by claim preclusion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court held (1) claim preclusion barred the claims brought by the mother and daughters in the second action; but (2) the court of appeals properly allowed the father's claims to proceed. View "Teske v. Wilson Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the MacLeish children's claim against the Boardman law firm for legal malpractice, holding that Charles MacLeish's clear testamentary intent was not thwarted by any alleged negligence on the part of Boardman, and therefore, the action was properly dismissed.David, Hayden, Kay, and Robin MacLeish brought this action against Boardman, the law firm that administered their father's estate. The circuit court dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the children failed to demonstrate that Boardman's alleged negligent administration of their father's estate thwarted his clear testamentary intent. The Supreme Court declined the children's request to abandon Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 331 N.W.2d 325 (1983), and affirmed, holding (1) the Auric exception to the rule of nonliability of an attorney to a non-client applies to the administration of an estate in addition to the drafting and execution of a will; (2) applying Auric to the facts of this case, the father's clear testamentary intent was not thwarted by Boardman's alleged negligence; and (3) therefore, the circuit court correctly dismissed the legal malpractice claim. View "MacLeish v. Boardman & Clark LLP" on Justia Law